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How and why do people become involved in European homegrown 
jihadism? This book addresses this question through an in-depth study 
of the Dutch Hofstadgroup, infamous for containing the murderer 
of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was killed in November 2004 in 
Amsterdam, and for plotting numerous other terrorist attacks. The 
Hofstadgroup offers a window into the broader phenomenon of 
homegrown jihadism that arose in Europe in 2004 and is still with us 
today. Utilizing interviews with former Hofstadgroup participants and 
the extensive police files on the group, Becoming a European Homegrown 
Jihadist overcomes the scarcity of high-quality data that has hampered 
the study of terrorism for decades. The book advances a multicausal 
and multilevel understanding of involvement in European homegrown 
jihadism that is critical of the currently prevalent ‘radicalization’-
based explanatory frameworks. It stresses that the factors that initiate 
involvement are separate from those that sustain it, which in turn are 
again likely to differ from those that bring some individuals to actual acts 
of terrorism. This is a key resource for scholars of terrorism and all those 
interested in understanding the pathways that can lead to involvement 
in European homegrown jihadism.
Dr. Bart Schuurman is an Assistant Professor at Leiden University’s 
Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA), based in The Hague.
‘Schuurman finally breaks through the secrecy surrounding terrorism to write 
about the Hofstadgroup based on primary sources and personal interviews 
with perpetrators. His evidence refutes the conventional academic wisdom 
on radicalization and terrorism that are too often based on speculation and 
unreliable data. A must-read for any student of political violence.’
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My research into the Hofstadgroup began in late 2011, when I was fortunate 
enough to come into contact with the Dutch police f iles on this group 
through a research project that my employer Leiden University had been 
asked to conduct. Had anyone told me at the time that this f irst encounter 
would lead to a PhD thesis and ultimately this book, I would have raised 
my eyebrows in considerable skepticism. These pages speak to the ability 
to f ind academic interest and challenge in unexpected places. While this 
book marks the end of my study of the Hofstadgroup, I hope to be able to 
continue exploring what drives people to become and remain involved in 
extremism and terrorism.
The f indings presented in this book, and any errors they might contain, 
are mine alone. Yet I received a great deal of help, inspiration and encourage-
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also grateful for the support provided by John Horgan. It was an honor to 
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you to the Fulbright Committee and the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds for 
making that research stay possible. I would also like to acknowledge the very 
insightful feedback provided on my PhD work by the reading committee; 
Beatrice de Graaf, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, John Horgan, Alex Schmid, Bernard 
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on the cover.
While working on this manuscript, I became indebted to numerous 
colleagues, journalists and Dutch government employees who were kind 
enough to share their insights into the Hofstadgroup with me. Thanks in 
particular to Paul Abels, Joop Bijen, Beatrice de Graaf, Martijn de Koning, 
Christianne de Poot, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Arjan Erkel, Janny Groen, Ahmet 
Olgun, Ruud Peters, Alex Schmid, Marije Veerman, and Anton Weenink. 
Particular thanks are due to the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 
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interviewees who assisted me; your help was crucial to the success of this 
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always sensitive and at times deeply personal.
To friends, family, and colleagues both in the Netherlands and abroad: 
thank you for enduring years of Hofstadgroup anecdotes. Special mention 
goes to Maarten, Joost, Sander, and Jasper for a friendship that borders on 
family and for which I am profoundly grateful. I would also like to specif i-
cally thank Nora, Mary, and Charles, Wouter, Joris, Erik, Liesbeth, Sergei, 
Wietse, Constant, Isabelle, Alastair, Carl, and Lisa; here is to the future. 
To my family; you have been a tremendous source of support throughout 
this process. Thank you for your encouragement, patience, and for always 
allowing me to f ind my own way. This book is dedicated to you.
Finally, if it weren’t for the encouragement and help of Paul Abels and 
Michael Kowalski at the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Coun-
terterrorism (NCTV), as well as the support of professor Edwin Bakker, this 




The Hofstadgroup – Islamist terrorism in the Netherlands
On 2 November 2004, Dutch f ilmmaker and publicist Theo van Gogh was 
shot and stabbed to death in broad daylight while cycling through Amster-
dam. Shortly after 9 am, a twenty-six-year-old man approached Van Gogh, 
emptied a 9 mm pistol at him and then attempted to sever his head as he 
lay dead or dying on the sidewalk. Without fully accomplishing this task, 
the assailant stuck his knife in Van Gogh’s chest. He also left behind a note 
in which he threatened Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali by stabbing it onto 
his victim’s body with a second blade. The attacker then calmly reloaded 
the magazine of his f irearm and walked towards a nearby park, where a 
shootout with police off icers ensued. Several minutes later he was taken 
into custody after suffering a bullet wound to the leg. As he was taken away, 
a policeman told him he was lucky to be alive. Van Gogh’s murderer replied 
that he did not agree; he had intended to die during the f iref ight.1
Van Gogh’s assailant was no stranger to the Dutch police or the Gen-
eral Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Since the fall of 2003, both 
organizations had come across this individual during their investigations 
into a group of young Dutch Muslims believed to be involved in terrorist 
activities. Because some of them lived and met each other in The Hague, 
a city also known in Dutch as the Hofstad (Court city), the AIVD began 
referring to these individuals as the ‘Hofstadgroup’ from October 2003 
onward.2 The name has stuck, even though the group’s alleged members 
did not use it themselves.3 Until the day of the murder, however, the AIVD 
had not estimated that Van Gogh’s assailant was preparing a violent crime. 
In fact, it had regarded him as a peripheral member of the group.4 Moving 
swiftly on information provided by the AIVD after the attack on Van Gogh, 
the police arrested the other individuals thought to be part of this terrorist 
organization.5 Although most suspects were apprehended without incident, 
two resisted violently.
1 Donner and Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, Nr. 1’, 1-2; Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir 
in De Strafzaak Tegen Mohammed B.’, 10-27.
2 Donner and Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, Nr. 3’, 3, 5.
3 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 48-49.
4 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 2, 17.
5 Police Investigator 1, ‘Personal Interview 6’, 4.
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In the early hours of 11 November, a police arrest squad approached an 
apartment in The Hague where two suspects were staying. After making 
their presence known, the off icers rammed the door only to f ind that it 
had been barricaded. Within moments, one of the occupants responded by 
throwing a hand grenade through the slender crack between door and door 
frame and was in turn shot at by the police. Both bullets missed their mark, 
but the grenade exploded on the street where it injured f ive policemen, 
one of whom seriously. Throughout the day that followed, the two suspects 
called for the police to come and get them and threatened to blow up the 
house. The standoff ended late in the afternoon when both individuals were 
induced to surrender after one of them had been shot in the shoulder by 
members of a military special forces unit. At the time of their arrest, both 
suspects were carrying additional hand grenades.6
It was quickly apparent that both Van Gogh’s murderer and the hand-
grenade wielding individuals adhered to an extremist interpretation of 
Islam. The note that the murderer left on Van Gogh’s body and the will he 
had carried with him, titled ‘Baptized in Blood’, left little doubt that the 
attack had been inspired by his beliefs and that the perpetrator had hoped 
to die as a martyr for his cause.7 The two suspects in The Hague hastily 
wrote a will during the ‘siege’ of their apartment that similarly set out their 
wish to die f ighting for Allah. Because their apartment had been wired by 
the AIVD, there are records of the various phone calls they made to friends 
and relatives announcing their imminent martyrdom.8 In fact, almost all 
of the other people arrested in connection with the Van Gogh killing were 
to a greater or lesser extent found in possession of documents, audiotapes, 
videos, and Internet materials espousing radical and extremist views of 
Islam and glorifying terrorism.9
These signs of an extremist ideology and the gruesome nature of Van 
Gogh’s death, led the events of November 2004 to have an impact on Dutch 
society and politics that is felt to this day.10 They fueled an already heated 
6 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 95-96; AHA07/24: 3087-127; AGV01/62: 17969-
8005; GET: 8235-8237; The Hague Court of Appeal, ‘LJN BC2576’, 26-29; De Weger, ‘Continuïteit 
En Verandering’, 630.
7 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 18; appendix: Overzicht teksten 
geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 46-47; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 
65.
8 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA07/24: 3088-91, 3093-103, 3107, 3124; AHB01/25: 
139-142; GET: 18235-37.
9 Ibid., 01/01: 131, 134, 142-47, 160-61, 171-72; 01/13: 47.
10 De Koning and Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 221; ’T Sas and Born, ‘Hoofdoff icier: Mohammed 
Bouyeri Handelde Niet Alleen’.
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debate about multiculturalism and the integration of Muslim minorities.11 
But instead of being seen as a purely domestic affair, the Hofstadgroup 
was quickly interpreted within the context of the global ‘jihadist’ terrorist 
threat that had manifested itself with the 9/11 attacks on the United States 
orchestrated by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization.12 More specif i-
cally, Van Gogh’s assassin, his associates and the apparent 2005 attempts 
by some of the Hofstadgroup’s remnants to plot additional attacks, came to 
be viewed as prime examples of the rise of a new ‘homegrown’ dimension 
of jihadist terrorism in Europe.13
Homegrown jihadist terrorism f irst appeared in Europe in March 2004, 
when bombs exploded on commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 people and 
injuring 1500.14 Almost a year and a half later, suicide bombers targeted Lon-
don’s public transportation system, causing the deaths of 52 victims.15 What 
the attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam, and London had in common was that 
they were carried out by Islamist terrorists who lived, worked, and, albeit to 
varying degrees, belonged to the countries they attacked. The perpetrators 
of the Madrid attacks were largely f irst-generation immigrants; many of 
those involved in the Amsterdam and London attacks had been born and 
raised there.16 Whereas previously jihadist terrorism had emanated from 
places like Afghanistan, the tragedies in Madrid, Amsterdam, and London 
revealed dangers much closer to home.
1.1 Studying involvement in European homegrown jihadism
More than a decade after Van Gogh’s murder, jihadist terrorism continues 
to pose a threat to European societies.17 In 2011, American forces completed 
their withdrawal from Iraq while neighboring Syria fell into civil war. These 
events created opportunities for al-Qaeda and its aff iliates, but especially 
11 Buijs and Demant, ‘Extremisme En Radicalisering’, 170-71.
12 ‘Spanje Ziet Band Met Nederland’; Coolsaet, ‘EU Counterterrorism Strategy’, 867-69; De Graaf 
and Eijkman, ‘Terrorismebestrijding En Securitisering’, 33; General Intelligence and Security 
Service, ‘From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal 
Order’, 5.
13 Sageman, ‘The Next Generation of Terror’, 37-39; General Intelligence and Security Service, 
‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 29; Kirby, ‘The London Bombers’, 415.
14 Rose, Murphy, and Abrahms, ‘Does Terrorism Ever Work?’, 186.
15 Silke, ‘Holy Warriors’, 99.
16 Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 314, 333, 394, 397-405.
17 EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2014, 21-22; Nesser, ‘Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat’, 
440-56.
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for the so-called ‘Islamic State’, to make considerable gains in both coun-
tries. Thousands of European men and women have joined these groups as 
‘foreign f ighters’.18 The risk that battle-hardened, paramilitary trained, and 
ideologically extremist returnees will commit attacks in their countries of 
origin has become a prime concern for European authorities.19 In addition, 
there is the threat posed by extremists who chose to stay at home and by 
the relatively large, and apparently growing, circle of radical and extremist 
sympathizers that surround this militant core.20 Given this context, it is 
clear that research on (homegrown) jihadist terrorism in Europe continues 
to be relevant not just for academics, but also for those working to prevent 
attacks and reduce societal polarization.21
Using an in-depth case study, this book asks how and why people become 
involved in European homegrown jihadist groups. As Sageman lamented 
in 2014, it is a question we are still unable to conclusively answer.22 For a 
topic as academically and societal relevant as terrorism this is a surprising 
state of affairs. After the 9/11 attacks, considerable new sources of funding 
became available and a large number of new researchers began studying 
terrorism, which led to a tremendous increase in research output.23 Why 
is a comprehensive understanding of what drives people to participate in 
this particular form of political violence still so far off?
The slow progress towards understanding how and why involvement 
in terrorism occurs is in fact not so surprising. ‘Terrorism’ continues to 
lack a commonly accepted def inition, frustrating comparative research 
and theoretical development.24 The diversity in terms of terrorists’ goals, 
means, organizational structures, and guiding ideologies imply that factors 
relevant to involvement in one typology of terrorism might be less salient 
in others.25 Crucially, while there are almost f ifty separate hypotheses 
about how and why involvement in terrorism occurs, most of them lack 
18 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘The Transformation of Jihadism’, 5; Neumann, 
‘Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq’.
19 Vidino, ‘European Foreign Fighters’, 217-19.
20 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, ‘Jaarverslag 2014’, 18-20; General Intelligence 
and Security Service, ‘The Transformation of Jihadism’, 28-34.
21 Abels, ‘Het Nederlandse Contraterrorisme Beleid’, 127; Cliteur, ‘Waarom Terrorisme Werkt’, 
308.
22 Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, 569.
23 Silke, ‘Contemporary Terrorism Studies’, 34-35; Schmid, ‘The Literature on Terrorism’, 
458-60.
24 Sánchez-Cuenca, ‘Why Do We Know So Little?’, 594-95.
25 McAllister and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 202.
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the empirical verif ication necessary to fully determine their validity.26 This 
is due in large part to one of the most enduring problems in the study of 
terrorism; the scarcity of primary sources.27 The secondary literature and 
media reports, still the most prevalent sources in terrorism research, are 
generally not reliable and detailed enough to function as the sole basis for 
academic research.28
The goal of this book is to contribute to our understanding of how and why 
people become involved in European homegrown jihadist groups. It does so 
through an in-depth analysis of the structural, group-, and individual-level 
factors that facilitated, motivated, and sustained participants’ processes 
of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. The Hofstadgroup has been chosen 
as a case study f irstly because the author was able to gather extensive 
primary-sources-based information on the group. Access to such data is 
seen as a prerequisite for making an empirically substantiated contribution 
to the existing body of literature. Secondly, the Hofstadgroup is interest-
ing because it was part of what could be termed the f irst generation of 
homegrown jihadism in Europe, one that gave rise to similar groups in 
neighboring states.29 While Chapter 4 argues that past research may have 
overstated the representativeness of the Hofstadgroup for this broader 
trend, there are suff icient similarities for the case to yield generalizable 
insights.
At the same time, the limitations of a single-case study research design 
must be acknowledged from the outset. The lack of a comparative aspect 
means the results presented here are f irst and foremost applicable to the 
Hofstadgroup itself. Although the present author argues that the similarities 
between the Hofstadgroup and other European homegrown jihadist entities 
that arose in the early 2000s allow the case to provide insights relevant to 
understanding this broader typology as well, it cannot simply be assumed 
that the explanations for involvement in the Hofstadgroup will all be equally 
relevant to European homegrown jihadism as a whole. However, although 
‘n=1’ in terms of the number of groups studied, this book takes an in-depth 
look at the involvement pathways of dozens of Hofstadgroup participants. 
There is therefore an element of comparison and generalizability present 
within this study despite its focus on a single case study.
26 Ibid., 261.
27 Silke, ‘The Impact of 9/11’, 76-80.
28 Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 5-6.
29 Nesser, ‘Chronology of Jihadism’, 934-40; Nesser, ‘Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous 
Threat’, 441-49.
18 BEcoming a EuropEan HomEgrown JiHadist 
This chapter presents the research questions, the methodology and 
sources used to address them, and concludes by setting out the book’s 
structure. First of all, however, it is necessary to explicate how this study 
of the Hofstadgroup case can yield new insights. Has more than a decade 
of research on this group not suff iciently addressed how and why its par-
ticipants became involved?
1.2 Existing literature on the Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup has been the subject of a wide variety of publications, 
ranging from academic works to journalistic accounts and government 
documents. Within this literature, four issues are identif ied that legitimize 
the present in-depth analysis of the group. First and foremost, existing 
publications on the group reflect the broader trend in research on terrorism 
in their heavy reliance on secondary sources. Furthermore, research on the 
Hofstadgroup has tended to be descriptive rather than explanatory. It has 
also predominantly been focused on a small number of participants, leaving 
the backgrounds and motives of the wider group relatively untouched. 
Finally, there has been a tendency to use singular theoretical perspectives 
that focus only on one of the many potential factors influencing involve-
ment in terrorism identif ied in the literature. In short, the Hofstadgroup’s 
considerable potential to inform the debate on how and why involvement 
in European homegrown jihadism occurs has not been fully realized.
1.2.1 Journalistic accounts of the Hofstadgroup
Several journalists have provided descriptions and initial analyses of the 
main events and actors in the Hofstadgroup timeline.30 Others have produced 
in-depth biographies and background pieces on particular participants.31 
Most of these publications utilize at least some primary sources, such as 
interviews with former participants or their acquaintances,32 information 
derived from court cases,33 or even data from police f iles.34 Particularly 
30 Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam; Groot Koerkamp and Veerman, Het Slapende Leger; Derix, 
‘Hoe Kwam Toch’; Alberts and Derix, ‘Het Mysterie’; Vermaat, De Hofstadgroep.
31 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders; ‘Op De Thee’; Erkel, Samir; Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van 
Mohammed B.’; Calis, ‘Iedereen Wil Martelaar Zijn’.
32 Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam; Groot Koerkamp and Veerman, Het Slapende Leger.
33 Vermaat, De Hofstadgroep; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad.
34 Eikelenboom, Niet Bang Om Te Sterven, 10-11.
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noteworthy is Groen and Kranenberg’s groundbreaking book on the various 
women in and around the Hofstadgroup. Based on interviews collected over 
two years, it offers invaluable f irst-hand perspectives on what drove these 
individuals to become involved.35 Similarly, Vermaat’s account of the trials 
against Hofstadgroup participants is especially valuable for its inclusion of 
verbatim transcripts of what was said during the proceedings.36
Many of these accounts provide informative introductions to the Hof-
stadgroup. Yet on the whole, the journalistic literature on the Hofstadgroup 
is unable to provide a comprehensive explanation of the factors that 
governed the processes by which its participants became involved. Owing 
to their journalistic rather than academic point of departure, these publica-
tions tend to focus on description instead of systematic and theoretically 
grounded analysis. Furthermore, the empirically most valuable works have 
limited their focus to specif ic individuals or segments of the group. Erkel’s 
biography of a leading participant, which mixes information derived from 
interviews with f iction, is a case in point. As is Groen and Kranenberg’s 
book; while it utilizes extensive interviews, it focuses almost exclusively 
on the women in the group. The journalistic literature offers a springboard 
into the Hofstadgroup’s world, but leaves considerable uncharted territory.
1.2.2 Primary-sources-based academic research on the Hofstadgroup
Within the academic literature on the Hofstadgroup, a general distinction 
can be made between studies that utilize primary sources and those that 
do not. The use of interviews or materials produced by participants makes 
works in the f irst category especially valuable. Peters, for instance, has used 
the texts written and translated by Van Gogh’s killer to write an in-depth 
analysis of the latter’s ideological development.37 Several other authors have 
used interviews to produce biographies of people in and around the Hof-
stadgroup that provide insights into how and why they became involved.38 
There are also numerous descriptive and historical studies based on a mix of 
secondary sources and primary ones.39 Silber’s chapter on the Hofstadgroup 
35 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 17.
36 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad.
37 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 1-87; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islam-
ism’, 145-59.
38 De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 249-90; De Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews and Friendship’, 
372-92; Van San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, Idealen Op Drift, 44-53.
39 Benschop, ‘A Political Murder Foretold’; De Goede and De Graaf, ‘Sentencing Risk’, 319-23; De 
Graaf, ‘The Nexus between Salafism and Jihadism’, 18-20; De Graaf, ‘The Van Gogh Murder’, 101-42.
20 BEcoming a EuropEan HomEgrown JiHadist 
is a good example in this regard, providing a detailed overview of events 
and participants.40
De Koning et al. have produced three publications that are notable for 
utilizing primary sources, looking at the Hofstadgroup in its entirety and be-
ing explanatory rather than descriptive in focus. One uses social movement 
theory to argue that the Hofstadgroup’s development was influenced by the 
increasingly strident debate on the role of Islam in the Netherlands and the 
accommodating response of Dutch Salaf ist mosques.41 Another relies on 
the concept of governmentality to make a similar point and interprets the 
group as a rebellious response to the Dutch government’s integration and 
counter-radicalization efforts.42 A third contribution, based on the idea of 
transnationalism, posits that the behavior of Hofstadgroup participants 
ref lected the transposition of global conflicts, in this case a presumed 
Western war against Islam, to a local setting.43
All of these primary-sources-based academic studies have made valu-
able contributions to understanding the Hofstadgroup. But like the jour-
nalistic accounts discussed earlier, they cannot provide a comprehensive 
account of participants’ involvement processes. First of all because none 
of these works explicitly focus on this question. The publications that 
provide an overview of events are good at detailing what happened, but 
their descriptive focus means that they can only partially explain why 
or how the group came to be. In-depth studies of particular participants 
reveal a lot about these individuals’ motivations, their worldviews, and 
involvement processes, but little about the rest of the group. The con-
tributions of De Koning et al. usefully demonstrate the inf luence that 
particular factors had in bringing about involvement in the Hofstadgroup, 
yet as Chapter 2 details, the factors that inf luence how and why people 
become involved in terrorism are interrelated and spread over several 
levels of analysis.44 While singular theoretical perspectives can illuminate 
the inf luence of a particular variable, they leave the potential inf luence 
of many others unaddressed.45
40 Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor, 206-23.
41 De Koning and Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 234-35; De Koning, ‘“Moge Hij Onze Ogen 
Openen”’, 54-55.
42 De Koning, ‘“We Reject You”’, 105.
43 Bartels and De Koning, ‘Submission and a Ritual Murder’, 30-31, 33.
44 E.g. Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 21-27.
45 Eyerman does use multiple theoretical perspectives to study the murder of Van Gogh but 
his work is not concerned with studying how involvement in the Hofstadgroup came about, nor 
does it utilize primary-sources-based data: Eyerman, The Assassination of Theo Van Gogh.
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1.2.3 Secondary-sources-based academic research on the 
Hofstadgroup
Only a small number of academic studies on the Hofstadgroup use primary 
sources. For the most part, this literature relies on newspaper articles or 
existing publications to substantiate the arguments being put forward. The 
uncertain reliability of media reporting on terrorism, which is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2, has had the unfortunate result of casting doubt on 
the accuracy and completeness of at least some of the information on the 
Hofstadgroup found in this category. This problematizes how much we can 
confidently assert to know about what the Hofstadgroup was, what it did, 
and what led its participants to become involved.46
The benef its of hindsight and access to primary sources reveal that 
numerous secondary-sources-based explanations for the Hofstadgroup 
contain inaccuracies. This is a particularly prevalent issue in early studies 
of the group, where authors had little choice but to rely on media reports. 
For example, there is no reliable basis for the idea that Van Gogh’s murderer 
was directly motivated to kill by the escalation of the Iraq war,47 Dutch 
counterterrorism measures,48 or European immigration policies.49 It is 
also disputable that the group was led by Van Gogh’s killer,50 that it had a 
distinct organizational structure,51 planned to assassinate Portuguese Prime 
Minister José Barroso,52 or had links to al-Qaeda.53 Similarly, the claims that 
Van Gogh’s assailant became violent after being turned down by a girl,54 
that his violent act followed unsuccessful attempts to carve out a place in 
Dutch society,55 or that two individuals arrested in June 2005 were on their 
way to kill a Dutch politician, lack a reliable empirical basis.56
46 Egerton, ‘The Internet and Militant Jihadism’, 116-21; Egerton, Jihad in the West, 75-83, 114, 121, 125, 
129, 150-51; Eyerman, The Assassination of Theo Van Gogh, 5; Likar, Eco-Warriors, 107-08, 113-15, 228-29; 
McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 85-88; Rabasa and Benard, Eurojihad, 78, 130; Silber and Bhatt, 
‘Radicalization in the West’, 24-25, 32-33, 38, 40, 47-48; Van der Hulst, ‘Terroristische Netwerken’, 14-15.
47 Nesser, ‘The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker’, 8-9, 20, 22, 24-25; Nesser, ‘Jihadism in Western 
Europe’, 332-37.
48 Nesser, ‘The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker’, 8, 20, 24.
49 Nesser, ‘Lessons Learned’, 3.
50 Nesser, ‘Europe’s Global Jihadis’, 246.
51 Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 337-38, 340.
52 Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 583; Leiken, ‘Europe’s Mujahideen’, 5; Vidino, Al Qaeda in 
Europe, 344-45.
53 Wilkinson, ‘International Terrorism’, 22-23.
54 Transnational Terrorism Security & the Rule of Law Project, ‘The “Hofstadgroep”’, 6.
55 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 22-23; Jacobson, The West at War, 6.
56 Von Knop, ‘The Female Jihad’, 405.
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Of course, none of this is to say that the secondary-sources-based litera-
ture on the Hofstadgroup should be dismissed out of hand. It includes many 
insightful overviews of events and interesting hypotheses on how and why 
involvement came about. This segment of the literature also encompasses 
publications whose value is primarily their ability to be thought-provoking. 
For instance, Cliteur has argued that excessive political correctness has 
prevented a full appreciation of the group’s Islamist motivations.57 Likewise, 
there are various pieces that assert58 or dispute59 that the Hofstadgroup can 
be linked to the failure of multiculturalism that are essentially societal 
critiques. Nevertheless, moving towards a more complete and accurate un-
derstanding of the various factors that underlay the involvement processes of 
its participants necessitates the use of more reliable sources of information.
1.2.4 Insights by proxy
A third set of publications provides insights by proxy. De Poot et al. have 
conducted a study on the various homegrown jihadist networks active in 
the Netherlands between 2001 and 2005, of which the Hofstadgroup was 
one.60 These authors use police f iles to provide insights into a range of 
factors relevant to these groups, such as their members’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds or their daily routines. However, because such f indings are 
agglomerated and completely anonymized, it is diff icult to isolate which 
are specif ic to the Hofstadgroup. A similarly indirect perspective is of-
fered by the autobiography of Yehya Kaddouri. While Kaddouri was not a 
Hofstadgroup participant, his September 2004 arrest on suspicion of prepar-
ing a terrorist attack allows the book to provide an interesting f irst-hand 
impression of how a young Dutch Muslim could become involved in militant 
Islamism in the early 2000s.61 It draws particular attention to the role of the 
Internet, news of violence perpetrated by and against Muslims, and feelings 
of discrimination as facilitating and motivating such involvement.62
57 Cliteur, ‘De “Eigen-Schuldtheorie”’, 185-97; Cliteur, ‘De Lankmoedige Elite’, 207-35; Cliteur, 
‘Waarom Terrorisme Werkt’, 307-45.
58 Carle, ‘Demise of Dutch Multiculturalism’, 68-74; Spruyt, ‘Liberalism and the Challenge 
of Islam’, 320-21; Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, 120-26; Leiken, ‘Europe’s Mujahideen’, 3-6; 
Esman, Radical State; Wessels, De Radicaal-Islamitische Ideologie Van De Hofstadgroep, 24; Mak, 
Nagekomen Flessenpost, 34-37.
59 Aarts and Hirzalla, ‘Lions of Tawhid’, 18-23; Mak, Gedoemd Tot Kwetsbaarheid, 20.
60 De Poot et al., Jihadi Terrorism in the Netherlands.
61 Kaddouri, Lach Met De Duivel.
62 Ibid., 10-34.
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Several scholars have undertaken empirical studies of the Dutch Mus-
lim community from which useful parallels with the Hofstadgroup can 
be drawn. Because the group’s participants were ideologically strongly 
influenced by the fundamentalist ‘Salaf ist’ interpretation of Islam, the 
in-depth analysis by Roex et al. of the Dutch Salaf ism provides several 
informative insights.63 In particular, f ieldwork derived information on 
Dutch Salaf ists’ attitudes towards democracy, and the degree to which 
they support violence.64 Buijs et al. investigated how the convictions of 
‘democratic’ and ‘radical’ Dutch Muslims differed and what drove the latter 
to become radicalized.65 Among their conclusions are the f indings that 
radicalization can be the result of a reaction to perceived injustice, a search 
for meaning in life, or a desire for social solidarity.66
Slootman and Tillie conducted a study on why some Dutch Muslims 
in Amsterdam became radicalized. Their research is based partly on in-
terviews with twelve young men in the ‘periphery’ of the Hofstadgroup.67 
‘Periphery’, however, does not appear to mean that these individuals actu-
ally participated in any direct sense in the Hofstadgroup but, rather, that 
they shared its interpretation of Islam. Their conclusions that radicalization 
is tied to very orthodox religious convictions, the perception that Muslims 
are treated unjustly, and that Islam as a whole is threatened, are valuable 
nonetheless.68 The main benefit of these and the other ‘insights by proxy’ 
is that they draw attention to factors that influenced the radicalization of 
groups and individuals quite similar to the Hofstadgroup, thus hinting at 
factors with above-average explanatory potential.
1.2.5 Research on the Hofstadgroup by government agencies
Reports written by the AIVD, the National Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism (NCTV), and the Dutch Review Committee on the 
Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) constitute the last category of 
publications on the Hofstadgroup. Although the AIVD report on the Hof-
stadgroup is largely descriptive, it does raise several potential explanations 
for involvement, such as peer pressure and the influence of a charismatic 
63 Roex, Van Stiphout, and Tillie, ‘Salaf isme in Nederland’.
64 Ibid., 274-76, 280-82.
65 Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy, Strijders Van Eigen Bodem, 18.
66 Ibid., 251.
67 Slootman and Tillie, ‘Processen Van Radicalisering’, 3, 85-106.
68 Ibid., 4.
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religious authority f igure.69 These hypotheses are worthy of further investi-
gation not in the least because the conclusions are drawn from information 
collected by the agency itself. The NCTV study is concerned with Internet 
usage by jihadists in general, but provides some relevant information on 
the Hofstadgroup in this regard.70 The CTIVD reports are arguably the 
most useful of the three, as they detail when the AIVD began collecting 
intelligence on the Hofstadgroup and what it knew of Van Gogh’s murderer 
and possible accomplices.71
1.3 Claim to originality
From journalistic accounts to government reports, while the best studies on 
the Hofstadgroup provide key parts of the overall puzzle, a comprehensive 
and robustly empirical account that explains how and why participants 
became involved in the group is lacking. This knowledge gap provides the 
primary rationale for the current study, which makes a threefold contribu-
tion to the existing literature. First of all, it aims to improve our understand-
ing of the factors that governed involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Secondly, 
because this group was not a unique phenomenon but one example of 
the broader European homegrown jihadist trend, the research will also 
provide insights into processes of involvement in this typology of terrorism 
in a more general sense. Finally, by utilizing extensive primary sources, 
this book aims to contribute to moving terrorism research toward a more 
empirically robust basis.
1.4 Research questions
Two important premises drawn from the literature on terrorism form the 
foundation of this book. Explained in detail in Chapter 2, the f irst of these 
is that involvement in terrorism is best understood as the end-result of a 
complex process rather than a sudden or clearly made decision. Secondly, 
69 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 9, 37, 39-41. See 
also: Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, ‘Jihadistisch Terrorisme in Nederland’, 88.
70 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, ‘Jihadists and the Internet: 2009 
Update’, 69.
71 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichts-
rapport Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.,’ 8-24; Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de 
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrapport over Eventuele Handlangers’, 1-41.
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the involvement process is itself predicated on multiple factors that reside 
at the structural, group, and individual levels of analysis.72 Structural-level 
analyses focus on the broader social, political, and economic influences that 
shape motives and opportunities for engaging in terrorism. Group-level 
explanations focus on how small-group dynamics influence group forma-
tion and the establishment of a social reality conducive to the adoption of 
extremist worldviews and violent behavior. Individual-level accounts for 
terrorism examine the personal histories of terrorists and assess whether 
mental health issues or personality prof iles offer explanations for their 
involvement in violence.
The overarching question that this book poses is: What factors governed 
the involvement processes of participants of the Hofstadgroup during its 
2002-2005 existence? Based on the premises outlined in the previous para-
graph, three subsidiary research questions are formulated which function as 
stepping-stones towards addressing the main research question. These are: 
How did 1) structural-level factors, 2) group-level factors, and 3) individual-
level factors influence involvement in the Hofstadgroup? It should be noted 
that the emphasis is on understanding processes of involvement rather 
than a singular process. It is apparent from the outset that even within this 
one particular group, not all participants thought and acted similarly. The 
fact that only a minority of Hofstadgroup participants actually planned or 
perpetrated acts of terrorist violence, is the most obvious example of this 
fact. The discussion that follows thus looks at how such different forms of 
involvement can be explained.
1.5 Research method
This book combines the author’s background in history with the interdisci-
plinary nature of the study of terrorism. The historical method is reflected 
in the emphasis placed on analyzing primary sources; Dutch police f iles 
on the Hofstadgroup and interviews with former participants as well as 
Dutch government employees involved in the case. Rather than letting these 
materials speak for themselves, however, the author examines this material 
by drawing on insights from the literature on terrorism. Essentially, existing 
explanations for involvement in terrorism are used as ‘lenses’ through which 
to study the available empirical data. Over the course of f ive chapters, 
72 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 23; Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 7-10; Taylor and 
Horgan, ‘A Conceptual Framework’, 586.
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structural-, group-, and individual-level explanations for involvement in 
terrorism are applied to the Hofstadgroup to see whether they can illumi-
nate distinct explanatory variables. Each relevant explanation is briefly 
introduced, its main assumptions are identif ied and then applied to the 
Hofstadgroup to see if it offers meaningful insights.
This methodological approach has three distinct benefits. First, it allows 
for a theoretically guided and robustly empirical understanding of the 
factors that influenced involvement in the Hofstadgroup to emerge. Second, 
it enables a reflection on the applicability of the various hypotheses on 
involvement in terrorism to European homegrown jihadism as represented 
by the Hofstadgroup. Although single-case studies cannot provide con-
clusive evidence of a theory’s explanative potential or lack thereof, they 
can provide important empirical evidence relevant to those theories. This 
form of theory testing is especially important in the context of terrorism 
studies, as various authors have pointed to the f ield’s tendency to develop 
explanations without suff iciently assessing their empirical validity.73 A 
third benefit of this approach is that it can highlight hypotheses of above-
average explanatory potential. What were the most salient factors that 
led to involvement in the Hofstadgroup? Conversely, the methodological 
approach followed here can help disprove the applicability of hypotheses 
thought to be of general relevance.
No research method is without its drawbacks. The most salient one here 
being the deliberate choice to focus on breadth rather than depth. By using 
existing insights as analytical tools to better understand the processes that 
led to involvement in the Hofstadgroup, a broad perspective is gained on the 
variety of factors on which individuals’ participation was based. A downside 
is that no single explanatory variable is studied exhaustively. Many of the 
explanations used in this book are at the heart of decades of debate and 
research. The multicausal approach utilized here requires reducing the 
complexity of individual theories to a short summary of their constituting 
elements and the main lines of scholarly argument for the sake of clarity 
and space. An in-depth and empirically grounded analysis of the many 
theories discussed in these pages would undoubtedly be a fruitful avenue 
for future research on involvement in European homegrown jihadism, but 
falls outside of the scope of the present undertaking.
73 Aly and Striegher, ‘Examining the Role of Religion’, 849-50; King and Taylor, ‘The Radicaliza-
tion of Homegrown Jihadists’, 616; Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Why Terrorism Occurs’, 28; McAllister 
and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 261.
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Following the main research question’s focus on the factors that brought 
about involvement in the Hofstadgroup, the unit of analysis is the individual 
participant. Whether the discussion is on the structural-level influences 
such as poverty or on group-based processes such as peer pressure, the (im-
plicit) question is always to what degree these factors exerted an influence 
on the young men and women who constituted the Hofstadgroup. After all, 
it was these individuals’ convictions, their backgrounds, their actions, and 
their interactions with each other and the world outside of the group that 
made the Hofstadgroup what it was. This study is thus primarily concerned 
with charting the processes that led these people to become interested in 
a radical or extremist interpretation of Islam, brought them together with 
like-minded individuals and, in a small number of cases, motivated them 
to commit or plan an act of terrorism.
1.6 Sources of information
Two types of primary sources are utilized in this book. The most important 
of these in terms of the amount of information they contain and the fre-
quency with which they are referenced are the f iles that the Dutch National 
Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD) assembled 
during its various investigations of Hofstadgroup suspects.74 Permission to 
use this material was granted following the submission of a formal written 
request to the off ice of the Prosecutor General.75 This data is supplemented 
with semi-structured interviews with Dutch government officials who were 
involved in the Hofstadgroup investigation and former participants in the 
Hofstadgroup itself. The following paragraphs provide further information 
on these sources and a critical assessment of their utility.
1.6.1 Using police files to study terrorism
The police f iles contain thousands of pages of information obtained in a 
variety of ways. Principally, these are the police’s interrogation of suspects 
and witnesses, the results of house searches, phone and Internet taps, and a 
74 The various police investigations were collated into two dossiers; 2004’s ‘RL8026’ and 2005’s 
‘Piranha’. References to these f iles always list one of these dossiers, followed by a section reference 
if applicable, and a page number. In 2013, the KLPD was renamed the National Unit (LE).
75 The Ministry of Security and Justice gave written permission to use the f iles for research 
purposes on 8 March 2013.
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limited degree of information provided by the AIVD. Much of this material 
can be considered a primary source of information as it is a verbatim record 
of what Hofstadgroup participants said, wrote, and did. Particularly useful 
are wiretapped phone calls and transcripts of online chat conversations as 
they are unaffected by the wish to downplay culpability or provide post-
event rationalizations, factors that may diminish the reliability of police 
interrogations and interviews with researchers.76
Another benefit of the police f iles is that they represent the totality of 
information gathered during the investigations into the Hofstadgroup’s 
participants that followed the various arrests in 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
This makes them less subjective than the easier to f ind public prosecutors’ 
indictments, which only contain that information best thought to f it the 
prosecution’s case against the suspects. The quantity and quality of the 
information in the police f iles means that they provide researchers with 
valuable data on Hofstadgroup participants’ backgrounds, worldviews, 
and actions, as well as intragroup dynamics. Yet care must be taken not to 
see these f iles as a ‘holy grail’ for terrorism researchers. There are distinct 
drawbacks to their use that must be acknowledged if they are to contribute 
to a well-balanced analysis.
Police investigations are intended to gather evidence that can be used 
to charge suspects. This means that there can be a certain bias in the way 
information is collected and presented.77 It also means that the questions 
investigators posed to suspects and witnesses often differ from what a 
researcher would have liked to address. There is more emphasis on poten-
tial criminal offenses than on, for instance, group dynamics or the why 
of how of involvement. A related problem is the questionable reliability 
of statements derived from the interrogation of suspects and witnesses. 
Suspects in particular are liable to deny the allegations leveled at them, to 
distort the truth, or to tell outright lies in order to escape sentencing. These 
limitations necessitate a critical attitude towards the f iles and the use of 
complementary sources where possible.
A second limitation of using these police f iles is that, despite their 
considerable size, they still provide only glimpses into the Hofstadgroup 
phenomenon. The f iles are based on criminal investigations and therefore 
primarily illuminate those events that occurred around the various arrests 
of group participants in October 2003, June 2004, November 2004, and June 
76 Cottee, ‘Jihadism as a Subcultural Response’, 743; Harris-Hogan, ‘Australian Neo-Jihadist Ter-
rorism’, 298-314; Lentini, ‘“If They Know Who Put the Sugar”’, 1-12; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 76.
77 Lentini, ‘“If They Know Who Put the Sugar”’, 6-7.
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and October 2005. The details of what happened before or between these 
dates are much less well covered, underlining the need to complement the 
f iles with information derived from other sources.
Perhaps most problematic of all is the fact that the police f iles used here 
are not publicly accessible. This is a serious shortcoming with regard to 
transparency. Crucially, however, the f iles are not a secret source. Although 
the application process is lengthy and cumbersome, researchers and other 
interested parties can apply for access to the very same materials that the 
author used and thus assess the claims made in these pages. To further avoid 
the appearance of ‘masquerading behind a thin façade of privileged access 
to secret sources’,78 and to increase the reliability of the analysis, references 
to the f iles are complemented with publicly available sources wherever 
possible.79 Additionally, it should be noted that the use of conf idential 
data is quite common in the social sciences; full interview transcripts, or 
information about the interviewees themselves, are seldom provided to 
readers. Finally, many pieces of information from the police f iles on the 
Hofstadgroup have been leaked to the press over the years and can be 
easily found online.
1.6.2 Using interviews to study terrorism
Twelve semi-structured interviews were carried out for this study. Seven 
of these were held with Dutch government employees involved in the 
Hofstadgroup case in some capacity and f ive were held with former Hof-
stadgroup participants. The government employees comprised of two public 
prosecutors, two police investigators, one NCTV analyst, one AIVD analyst, 
and one community policing off icer. In addition to these interviews, the 
author also spoke on a more informal basis with academics and journal-
ists who had previously conducted work on the Hofstadgroup, and with 
defense attorneys involved in the case. It should be noted that another nine 
former Hofstadgroup participants were also approached for an interview but 
declined, did not reply, or were not allowed to speak with the author due to 
the terms of their release on probation. One former participant could not be 
contacted because the Dutch prison authorities declined the request for an 
interview. One government employee involved in the case also declined to 
be interviewed. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, ‘interviews’ always refer 
to data collected by the author and not to police interrogations of suspects or 
78 Ranstorp, ‘Mapping Terrorism Studies’, 26.
79 See also: Horne and Horgan, ‘Methodological Triangulation’, 182-92.
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witnesses. All the interviews were held in Dutch, which means that all direct 
quotations encountered in these pages have been translated to English by 
the author. The verbatim Dutch version of quotations is given in the notes.
The semi-structured interview format used here has several advantages. 
The interviewer decides beforehand the topics he or she wishes to discuss 
but, in contrast to the more formal fully-structured interview, leaves room 
for the interview to develop in unforeseen directions.80 This allows semi-
structured interviews to generate information that the interviewer had not 
anticipated beforehand. By coming across more as a conversation than as 
a formal, question-by-question interrogation, semi-structured interviews 
can also help make interviewees feel more comfortable.81 This is especially 
benef icial when sensitive or controversial topics are discussed, such as 
someone’s past involvement in extremism or terrorism.
Interviewees were approached in several ways. The Dutch government 
employees were either contacted via publicly available e-mail addresses or 
introduced to the author via his professional network. The majority of for-
mer Hofstadgroup participants were found through the Internet and social 
media websites in particular. Contacts with two of them were established 
through introductions. None of the interviewees were under any kind of 
obligation to speak with the author. Most seemed motivated by a simple 
willingness to help, a chance to speak about a formative period in their 
lives or professional careers, or the ability to contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of the Hofstadgroup. As most interviewees did not allow a 
recording device to be used, the author largely relied on handwritten notes.
Information gathered through interviews was utilized in several ways. 
The government employees were closely involved in investigating, monitor-
ing, or prosecuting the Hofstadgroup. Interviews with these individuals 
primarily served to establish a detailed chronology of events and to assess 
the validity of information found in other sources.82 Interviews with former 
Hofstadgroup participants were also used for these purposes, but held two 
additional benefits. Of particular importance was their ability to act as a 
counterweight to the ‘off icial’ take on events represented by the police f iles. 
Interviews with former participants restored a degree of balance to what 
would otherwise have been an almost total reliance in terms of primary 
data on materials produced by the Dutch authorities. These interviews were 
also an ideal way of gaining more information on participants’ personal 
80 Zhang and Wildemuth, ‘Unstructured Interviews’, 222.
81 Post and Berko, ‘Talking with Terrorists’, 147.
82 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 766.
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backgrounds and motives, as well as an insiders’ perspective on the group’s 
functioning and internal dynamics.83
Like the police f iles, the use of interviews poses several concerns. One is 
their representativeness. Because most former Hofstadgroup participants 
were not willing to be interviewed or could not be found, the author es-
sentially utilized ‘opportunity sampling’, interviewing only those who 
happened to be accessible and willing to talk.84 This means that it is unclear 
how representative these interviewees are for the group as a whole. Another 
issue with using interviews is assessing their reliability. Ulterior motives 
such as the wish to justify past conduct or to avoid admitting mistakes 
can degrade the truthfulness of interviewees’ accounts. Furthermore, 
to what degree can people be expected to accurately recall what they 
thought or how they felt many years ago?85 While interviews can afford 
unique insights, these issues underline the need to remain critical of data 
gathered using this method. Wherever possible, information derived from 
the interviews was complemented with or checked against other (publicly 
available) sources.
1.7 Ethical guidelines
The use of interviews and data taken from police f iles posed several privacy 
and security-related concerns. The author followed the guidelines for the 
use of personal data set out by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences.86 In addition, the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, the police 
f iles’ owner, stipulated several conditions for their use. The most important 
measure taken to ensure the privacy and safety of the individuals discussed 
in this book is anonymization. No interviewee or Hofstadgroup participant 
is referred to by their actual name. Although this measure negatively affects 
the book’s readability, it is a drawback that is outweighed by the benefits 
in terms of reliability and detail that access to these sources provides. The 
one partial exception is a Syrian preacher, who is referred to by his nom de 
guerre ‘Abu Khaled’. As a central f igure in the group, using this moniker 
ensures a balance between anonymity and readability.
83 Horgan, ‘Interviewing the Terrorists’, 198-99; Post and Berko, ‘Talking with Terrorists’, 146.
84 Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 8.
85 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 767.
86 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Gedragscode Voor Gebruik Van 
Persoonsgegevens.
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1.8 A note on terminology
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one or 
even a handful of causes. To avoid the implied causality attached to the 
word ‘causes’, this book prefers to use the term ‘factor’. However, because 
the literature on involvement in terrorism itself frequently uses the word 
‘causes’, this term will still be encountered during discussions of existing 
explanations. With regard to ‘involvement’, this book utilizes a broad defini-
tion that sees it as the process of becoming a participant in an extremist 
or terrorist group in some capacity. As such, involvement encompasses a 
spectrum of activities, ranging from the relatively benign, such as attending 
group gatherings, to the clearly violent, such as planning or perpetrating 
acts of terrorism. Chapter 2 discusses these and other core concepts in 
more detail.
1.9 Outline
This book consists of ten chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 
presents a theoretical perspective on researching terrorism. It underlines 
the need for a primary-sources-based approach and details why three levels 
of analysis are used to study the factors that governed involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide the necessary background 
on the group. The f irst presents a chronological overview of the most 
important events in the Hofstadgroup’s timeline to familiarize readers 
with what happened. The second contextual chapter takes a critical look 
at what the group was; to what extent are the labels ‘homegrown’, ‘jihadist’, 
and ‘terrorist’ actually applicable to the Hofstadgroup and how can it be 
characterized organizationally?
The empirical analysis is presented in Chapters 5 through 9. The f irst 
of these looks at structural factors influencing involvement in terrorism, 
such as poverty, geopolitics, and intergroup inequality. Because of the 
large number of group-level hypotheses relevant to the Hofstadgroup, 
that analysis is spread over Chapters 6 and 7. The former deals with group 
formation whereas the latter looks at group-based motives for terrorist 
violence. The individual level of analysis is also spread over two chapters; 
Chapter 8 focuses on cognitive explanations for involvement in terrorism, 
essentially studying how distinct ways of thinking about and perceiving 
the world can contribute to involvement in terrorism. Chapter 9 utilizes 
numerous theories that relate involvement in terrorism to psychological 
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characteristics such as mental illness, or to the influence of emotions such 
as frustration, anger, and fear of death. Chapter 10 concludes the book 
by drawing together the main f indings, assessing their implications for 
academics and policy makers, and looking ahead to fruitful avenues for 
future research.

2 Studying involvement in terrorism
This chapter details the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of 
the multicausal framework used to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. 
This discussion is preceded by a look at the various issues affecting research 
on terrorism in order to underline the importance of using primary-sources-
based data. What are their benefits compared to secondary sources and why 
have terrorism researchers found it so diff icult to incorporate them into 
their work? The chapter closes by providing definitions for commonly used 
but highly-debated terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalism’, and ‘extremism’.
2.1 Issues in terrorism research
Research on terrorism has a strong multidisciplinary character. Academic 
perspectives used to study this form of political violence range from psy-
chology, sociology, political science, history, economics, criminology, and 
anthropology to international relations, law, the military sciences, and 
critical theory.1 Given this diversity in terrorism researchers’ backgrounds, 
the associated differences in the methodologies used, and the thus far 
limited attempts at integrating these perspectives, it is not surprising to 
f ind scholarship on terrorism spread over several subf ields.2 However, 
the absence of a single f ield of terrorism studies is not necessarily an 
impediment to academic progress. As Schmid concludes his 2011 review of 
the literature on terrorism; a ‘fairly solid body of consolidated knowledge 
has emerged’.3 More worrying are the various and longstanding concerns 
over the empirical quality of this research.
Contrary to the claims of the recently created discipline of Critical Terror-
ism Studies,4 there is a long history of critical reflection among established 
terrorism scholars.5 In the 1980s, authors like Crenshaw, Reich, and Schmid 
and Jongman critiqued existing research for being unsystematic, ahistorical 
1 Schmid, ‘The Literature on Terrorism’, 458; Duyvesteyn, ‘The Role of History and Continuity’, 
51-75; Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda; Sluka, 
Hearts and Minds.
2 Reid and Chen, ‘Mapping the Contemporary Terrorism Research Domain’, 44, 53; Sinai, 
‘New Trends in Terrorism Studies’, 32.
3 Schmid, ‘The Literature on Terrorism’, 470.
4 Jackson, ‘The Core Commitments’, 244-46.
5 Horgan and Boyle, ‘A Case against “Critical Terrorism Studies”’, 51-53.
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or alarmist,6 prone to unwarranted overgeneralizations and attempts to 
explain complex behavior in monocausal terms,7 as well as impressionistic, 
superf icial, and pretentious.8 More recently, critics have pointed to the 
discrepancy between the small number of dedicated terrorism scholars and 
the multitude of one-time contributors, many of whom are non-academics 
or lack terrorism-related expertise.9 This critical perspective on the f ield 
is perhaps best summarized by Sageman’s 2014 claim that research on 
terrorism had ‘stagnated’.10
Fortunately, research on terrorism has also seen important signs of pro-
gress and maturation in recent years.11 Improvements include an increase 
in collaborative research, a broadening of scholars’ interest beyond topics 
related to Islamist terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, a greater 
number of dedicated researchers and more variety in methodological ap-
proaches.12 Scholars have also drawn attention to the valuable knowledge 
gained since 9/11, for instance on risk factors for the occurrence of terrorism 
or the f inding that radical beliefs alone are insuff icient to explain involve-
ment in this form of violence.13 Given these encouraging signs, claims of 
a stagnant f ield seem overly pessimistic.14 Yet, a core issue among these 
various concerns, namely that terrorism research has been too heavily reli-
ant on secondary sources of information for too long, cannot be overlooked.
2.1.1 An overreliance on secondary sources
In 1988, Schmid and Jongman remarked that ‘there are probably few areas 
in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so 
little research’.15 They were referring to the fact that very few terrorism re-
searchers actually collected new data on their subject. Instead, most of them 
used the existing secondary literature, consisting of other academic works 
on terrorism but also media reports, as the basis for their own conclusions. 
6 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 381.
7 Reich, ‘Understanding Terrorist Behavior’, 261-71.
8 Ranstorp, ‘Mapping Terrorism Studies’, 14.
9 Ibid., 14-15; Silke, ‘An Introduction’, 1-2; Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 7, 12-13, 44, 46.
10 Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, 569-72.
11 Smith, ‘William of Ockham, Where Are You?’, 334.
12 Silke, ‘Contemporary Terrorism Studies’, 39-41, 46-47; Dolnik, Conducting Terrorism Field 
Research.
13 Stern, ‘Response to Marc Sageman’, 608; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Some Things We Think 
We’ve Learned’, 602; Schanzer, ‘No Easy Day’, 598.
14 Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, 569.
15 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 179.
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More than a decade later, Silke found that little had changed; publications on 
terrorism were still characterized by an overreliance on secondary sources 
and the predominance of literature-review-based methods.16 There has been 
little improvement since; a 2006 study found that just 3% of research on 
terrorism was based on empirical analysis.17 A 2008 publication reached the 
conclusion that only 20% of articles provided previously unavailable data.18 
More recently, Sageman’s 2014 piece lamented that terrorism researchers 
were still largely unable to access and utilize primary sources.19
An almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources means that research-
ers run the risk of developing theories that are insuff iciently rooted in 
empirical evidence or rehashing existing f indings rather than adding 
new insights. A second potential problem is that there is often a marked 
qualitative difference between secondary and primary sources, especially 
when those secondary sources are newspaper articles rather than academic 
publications. Whereas primary sources typically provide information based 
on the direct observation of, or participation in, a certain subject, secondary 
sources relate information indirectly. The lack of a f irst-hand perspective 
may introduce inaccuracies and the subjectivity inherent in the act of 
relaying information may have diminished its reliability.20 The qualitative 
differences between primary and secondary sources become all the more 
pronounced when the complexity of the subject of study increases.
There is little room for a reporter to make factual errors or misinterpret 
what happened when reporting on something as straightforward as a 
car crash. But the chances of this occurring when covering terrorism are 
considerably greater. The illegal and secretive nature of terrorism means 
that even such an ostensibly straightforward task as establishing a chronol-
ogy of events can be a diff icult undertaking. Journalists are often among 
the f irst to tackle these questions, a fact well illustrated by the numerous 
books on al-Qaeda written by investigative journalists shortly after the 9/11 
attacks.21 When such accounts are well researched, they can form invalu-
able sources of information. The more problematic aspect of relying on 
the journalistic literature is terrorism scholars’ heavy use of much shorter 
and less extensively researched newspaper articles, which are frequently 
published mere hours after the events they relate transpired and thus raise 
16 Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 4-9.
17 Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley, ‘The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies’, 8.
18 Silke, ‘Holy Warriors’, 101.
19 Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, 569-72.
20 Stewart and Kamins, ‘Evaluating Secondary Sources’, 17-32.
21 E.g. Bergen, Holy War; Burke, Al-Qaeda.
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critical questions concerning their accuracy and the comprehensiveness 
of the account presented.
On the one hand, media sources are a necessary staple in terrorism 
research as they are often the only readily available type of information. Yet 
assessments of their usefulness should take into account several potential 
concerns. First of all, newspapers and their reporters are selective in the 
stories they pursue.22 For instance, they tend to under-report or simply 
ignore failed or foiled terrorist attacks.23 Secondly, newspapers and other 
media outlets may be of questionable objectivity, colored by political lean-
ings, or a desire to attract readership through sensationalist reporting. 
Furthermore, the reliability and objectivity of reporters’ sources can be 
hard to ascertain.24 Perhaps most problematic of all, media sources too 
frequently contain factual errors.25 In sum, these problems make media 
sources ill-suited to functioning as the main, let alone the only source of 
data used in academic research on terrorism.
Recent years have seen signs of a broadening of methodological approach-
es and indications that the overreliance on secondary sources may not be as 
pronounced in every subfield of terrorism research.26 These are promising 
trends, yet the scarcity of primary-sources-based research remains a key 
concern in the academic study of terrorism.27 Given that most publications 
cite secondary literature that, in turn, refers to yet another set of academic 
works, and that at the end of this referral chain the empirical data often 
consists of media accounts, a worrisome situation has developed. Much 
research on terrorism resembles a ‘highly unreliable closed and circular 
research system, functioning in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop’.28 
More empirical work that utilizes high-quality sources is needed to move 
the study of terrorism forward.29
Why has this lack of primary-sources-based research persisted? Crucially, 
terrorism is a diff icult subject to study empirically.30 One way to gather 
22 Franzosi, ‘The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data’, 6.
23 Schmid, ‘The Literature on Terrorism’, 461.
24 Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 6; Franzosi, ‘The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data’, 6.
25 Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 5-6; Quiggin, ‘Words Matter’, 71-81; Schulze, ‘Breaking the 
Cycle’, 163.
26 Silke, ‘Contemporary Terrorism Studies’, 40-41, 48; Neumann and Kleinmann, ‘Radicaliza-
tion Research’, 372.
27 Schmid, ‘The Literature on Terrorism’, 460; Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’, 
565-80; Sageman, Turning to Political Violence, xv.
28 Dolnik, ‘Conducting Field Research’, 5.
29 Schuurman and Eijkman, ‘Moving Terrorism Research Forward’, 1-13.
30 Horgan, ‘The Case for Firsthand Research’, 30; Silke, ‘The Devil You Know’, 2.
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primary sources is through interviews with (former) terrorists. While these 
are more common than might be assumed,31 f inding and gaining access to 
individuals that engage(d) in illegal and violent activities is time-consuming 
and by no means guaranteed to succeed.32 All the more so when interviews 
are undertaken during f ieldwork abroad. Although the potential dangers 
of f ieldwork are generally described as manageable, they cannot be over-
looked.33 Fieldwork or interviews also require ethics approval, which may 
form a considerable obstacle in itself.34 Especially after the 2014 Boston 
College controversy, where researchers were forced to hand over interviews 
with members of the Irish Republican Army to the Northern Irish police, 
breaching the interviewees’ confidentiality and leading to the arrest of Sinn 
Féin leader Gerry Adams.35
Government organizations such as law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies are another potential source of primary data on terrorism. How-
ever, most researchers lack security clearances and organizations involved 
in counterterrorism are generally reluctant to share their information for 
security and privacy-related reasons.36 Databases with information on 
terrorists and terrorist events constitute a third source of empirical data.37 
However, the media-based foundation of many databases raises important 
questions about their reliability.38 Gaining primary-sources-based data 
on terrorism is certainly not impossible, but these obstacles go some way 
towards explaining its scarcity.
2.2 Making sense of involvement in terrorism
No less important than high quality-data is making sense of it.39 The ra-
tionale behind the multicausal approach to understanding involvement in 
the Hofstadgroup stems from a review of the literature on involvement in 
31 Horgan, ‘Interviewing the Terrorists’, 195-211.
32 Orsini, ‘A Day among the Diehard Terrorists’, 337-51; Toros, ‘Terrorists, Scholars and Ordinary 
People’, 279-80, 286-90.
33 Dolnik, ‘Conducting Field Research’, 4; Horgan, ‘The Case for Firsthand Research’, 48-50; 
Schulze, ‘Breaking the Cycle’, 181-82.
34 Dolnik, ‘Conducting Field Research’, 7-14.
35 Marcus, ‘Oral History’.
36 Lentini, ‘“If They Know Who Put the Sugar”’, 7; Sageman, ‘Low Return’, 616; Horgan, ‘Issues 
in Terrorism Research’, 193.
37 Bowie and Schmid, ‘Databases on Terrorism’, 294-340.
38 Silke, ‘Contemporary Terrorism Studies’, 40-41; Weenink and Cohen, ‘Trends in Terrorisme’.
39 Taylor, ‘If I Were You’, 583.
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terrorism,40 which revealed four key insights. First of all, there is no single, 
generally applicable ‘theory of terrorism’.41 Instead, with regard to its causes 
alone the literature is able to identify almost f ifty separate hypotheses.42 
Secondly, most of these explanations lack robust empirical verif ication.43 
Both issues make it diff icult to choose one particular theoretical approach 
to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. After all, how to justify choosing 
one out of dozens of possible approaches, particularly when the validity of 
many of them has not been adequately ascertained?
Thirdly, studies that emphasize one particular hypothesis, such as a pre-
sumed link between poverty or discrimination and involvement in terrorism, 
tend to be unable to explain why only a minority of the individuals exposed 
to such factors turn to terrorism.44 Vice versa, monocausal approaches f ind 
it diff icult to account for why not all of the people who do become involved 
in terrorism were exposed to the factor in question. For example, the ubiq-
uitous use of ‘radicalization’ as an explanation for terrorism obscures the 
fact that the majority of individuals with ‘radical’ ideas never act on them, 
and that not all terrorists are strongly ideologically motivated.45 Because no 
single factor has been found that is both necessary and sufficient to explain 
involvement in terrorism, the potential factors underlying involvement in 
this phenomenon should be assessed in conjunction with one another, rather 
than independently or as mutually exclusive competitors.46
A fourth reason for choosing a multicausal analytical framework is that 
it is well-established that involvement in terrorism is best understood as the 
result of a complex process in which multiple factors play a role.47 Not only 
that, but these causative factors can reside at different levels of analysis and 
their relative importance may change over time.48 In other words, although 
a particular factor may convincingly explain why someone became involved 
40 As there presently does not exist a specif ic set of explanations for the homegrown jihadist 
typology of terrorism, a wide net was cast that focused on terrorism in general.
41 Crenshaw, ‘Terrorism Research’, 557; McAllister and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 202, 261.
42 McAllister and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 261.
43 Aly and Striegher, ‘Examining the Role of Religion’, 849-50; King and Taylor, ‘The Radicaliza-
tion of Homegrown Jihadists’, 616; Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Why Terrorism Occurs’, 28; McAllister 
and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 261.
44 Newman, ‘Exploring the “Root Causes”’, 756.
45 Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want’, 78-105; Borum, ‘Rethinking Radicalization’, 1-2.
46 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 10; Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicalization in Europe’, 810.
47 Bjørgo, ‘Conclusions’, 257; Horgan, ‘Understanding Terrorist Motivation’, 111-14; Taylor and 
Horgan, ‘A Conceptual Framework’, 586-87. 
48 Bjørgo, ‘Conclusions’, 260; Della Porta, Social Movements, 9-10; Horgan, Walking Away from 
Terrorism, 7-10.
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in a terrorist group in the f irst place, it may lose its explanatory potential 
when it comes to ascertaining how or why that person came to commit an 
actual act of violence. As Della Porta states, ‘different analytical levels may 
dominate different stages of the evolution of radical groups’.49
For these reasons, it would be diff icult to justify using a single theoretical 
perspective to study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. An alternative is to 
use a multicausal approach. Not only does this reflect the complexity of ter-
rorism, it also utilizes the explanatory power of the body of literature on the 
various factors relevant to understanding involvement in this phenomenon 
to its fullest potential. Such an approach can count on considerable support 
from the literature.50 In the words of Borum, ‘[a]ny useful framework [to 
understand radicalization] must be able to integrate mechanisms at micro 
(individual) and macro (societal/cultural) levels’.51 Similarly, Stern argues 
that ‘[humans] catch the f ire of terrorism in myriad ways – some environ-
mental, some individual (or more likely, in most cases, a mix of the two)’.52
Many authors referenced in the previous paragraphs (implicitly) utilize 
three ‘levels of analysis’. A concept borrowed from the f ield of international 
relations, which commonly distinguishes between individual, state, and 
international system perspectives.53 The study of terrorism similarly 
utilizes a distinction between micro, meso, and macro perspectives, but 
generally translates these as the individual, the group, and structural, or 
environmental conditions in which they operate.54 That is not to say that 
there are no other useful analytical divisions that could be made.55 But it is 
this tripartite distinction that is most commonly used to capture the myriad 
potential factors that may lead to involvement in terrorism, making it most 
suited for the goals of this book. Its utility is also well demonstrated by Della 
Porta’s work on post-1945 left-wing terrorism in Italy and Germany, which 
shows that by studying these three levels in conjunction with each other, 
49 Della Porta, Social Movements, 10.
50 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 380; Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization 
in Europe’, 810; Horgan, ‘Understanding Terrorist Motivation”, 109, 113-14; Hudson, ‘The Sociology and 
Psychology of Terrorism’, 15, 23; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 
429; Miller, ‘Rationality, Decision Making’, 3-4; Ross, ‘A Model of the Psychological Causes’, 129; 
Sinai, ‘New Trends in Terrorism Studies’, 36-37; Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 21-26.
51 Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I’, 8.
52 Stern, ‘Response to Marc Sageman’, 607.
53 Rourke, International Politics, 65.
54 See also: Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 1-82; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 13-16.
55 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as Social Movement, 10; McAllister and Schmid, 
‘Theories of Terrorism’, 255-60.
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a fuller understanding can be generated of how and why people become 
and remain involved in such groups.56
2.2.1 Structural-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Structural-level factors relate to specif ic characteristics of the social, cul-
tural, economic, and (geo)political environment that are seen as potential 
enablers, motivations, or triggers for involvement in terrorism.57 Examples 
include widespread poverty, profound social inequality, war or regional 
instability, and lack of political freedoms.58 In addition to forming environ-
mental characteristics that can exert their influence over a longer period 
of time, structural factors can also relate to specif ic events in which people 
become embroiled. A government’s violent crackdown on a protest can be 
considered an example of such an event as it leaves a signif icant number 
of people with little choice but to undergo the violence that has suddenly 
become a part of their surroundings. Such events, and the grievances they 
may feed or form, can potentially form decisive moments in people’s lives 
that may set them on a path towards militancy and terrorism.
The above discussion is inspired by Crenshaw’s influential 1981 article 
on the causes of terrorism, in which she distinguishes between structural 
factors that function as preconditions and those that act as precipitants.59 
Preconditions can provide both opportunities and motives for involvement 
in terrorism.60 With access to the Internet, for instance, people can easily 
f ind information on how to construct explosives, facilitating the acquisi-
tion of violent means. Ability alone, however, is unlikely to lead to an act 
of terrorism unless it is matched by a willingness to do harm. Structural 
factors that can motivate involvement in terrorism include widespread 
grievances against the government and intergroup inequality.61 The onset of 
Northern Ireland’s violent ‘Troubles’ in 1968, for instance, was influenced by 
the Catholic population’s political underrepresentation and socioeconomic 
disadvantagement vis-à-vis their Protestant neighbors.62
56 Della Porta, Social Movements, 9-10.
57 Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 17-63; Ross, ‘Structural Causes’, 317.
58 Newman, ‘Exploring the “Root Causes”’, 749-72.
59 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 379-99.
60 Ibid., 381.
61 Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 17-63.
62 Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins, 39-41.
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Precipitants are what Crenshaw identif ies as ‘specif ic events that im-
mediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’.63 Excessive use of force by 
the authorities can instigate a violent response, but precipitants need not 
be violent in nature. As Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, the broadcast of 
a controversial short f ilm criticizing Islam was a key structural-level event 
for the Hofstadgroup as it exposed its participants to criticism of very closely 
held beliefs, triggering a violent response from one participant that led to 
the murder of Van Gogh. In more recent publications, the basic distinc-
tion between preconditions and precipitants that Crenshaw suggested 
in 1981 has been maintained, making this a valuable way of structuring 
the various explanations found at the structural level of analysis.64 Table 1 
provides an overview of the most commonly encountered structural-level 
explanations for terrorism found in the literature, divided over the three 
categories described here.
Table 1  Structural-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Preconditions: Opportunities Preconditions: Motives Precipitants
the internet (relative) deprivation government’s excessive 
use of force
popular support for terrorism intergroup inequality government attempts 
reforms
External assistance political grievances
social/ cultural facilitation of 
violence
clash of value systems
ineffective counterterrorism Economic globalization
political opportunity structure cultural globalization
modernization urbanization
population growth/ youth bulge modernization
shifts ethnic/ religious balance 
society
spillover from other conflicts
urbanization state sponsorship of terrorism
mass media power structure international 
system




63 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 381.
64 Bjørgo, ‘Conclusions’, 258; Newman, ‘Exploring the “Root Causes”’, 751.
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2.2.2 Group-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
As a form of ‘organized violence’, considerable attention has been paid to the 
role of group dynamics in initiating, sustaining, and precipitating involve-
ment in terrorism.65 Indeed, some authors believe this level of analysis to 
be an especially salient lens through which to study the phenomenon.66 In 
this book, explanations are categorized as belonging to the group level of 
analysis when they have their basis in the interaction between individuals 
or in the tangible and intangible attractions that group participation offers. 
Peer pressure, which under specif ic circumstances can push individuals 
towards participation in a terrorist group, is an example of the former.67 The 
possibility to acquire status, increased self-esteem, and a sense of belong-
ing are some examples of the latter.68 Most explanations at this level of 
analysis focus on person-to-person interactions within the terrorist group 
itself. However, group effects can also stem from virtual social connections 
enabled by the Internet.69
A literature review of group-level factors relevant to involvement in 
terrorism identif ied a wide variety of possible explanations. Some of these 
account for the formation of terrorist groups; how and why do people 
become involved in these violent organizations? Research indicates that 
preexisting social ties are especially important in this regard.70 Other 
explanations focus on how an actual act of terrorism comes about. What 
rationales underlie the decision of terrorist groups to commit attacks? One 
thing that this level of analysis lacks, however, is a broadly accepted way 
of distinguishing between the various explanations. Unlike the structural 
level of analysis, which could build on Crenshaw’s distinction between 
preconditions and precipitants, there is no common way of categorizing 
the various hypotheses to make for a more structured overview.
Instead, the author relies on work by Taylor and Horgan because it 
convincingly argues that the factors influencing people’s involvement in 
terrorist groups are distinct from those that govern a group’s decision to 
65 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 69.
66 Kleinmann, ‘Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants,’ 288; Sageman, Leaderless 
Jihad, 22.
67 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 310.
68 McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 336.
69 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as Social Movement, 19.
70 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 309-10.
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commit a terrorist attack.71 In other words, joining a terrorist group does not 
automatically lead to involvement in (preparations for) an act of terrorist 
violence. As a result, explanations for the former do not necessarily extend 
to cover the latter. The distinction between group-level factors that can 
account for the process of becoming and remaining involved in a terrorist 
group, and those that can contribute to the rationale for committing an 
act of terrorist violence, forms the overarching structure for the group 
level of analysis. Because both subjects cover a large number of relevant 
explanations, they have been turned into separate chapters (see Tables 2 
and 3). The second of these has been subdivided further based on the themes 
to emerge from the review of the relevant literature.
Table 2  Group dynamics I: Becoming and staying involved in terrorist groups
terrorist group formation
social identity and the benefits of group membership
socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
the underground life
social learning theory
the influence of leaders
peer pressures
Brainwashing
Table 3  Group dynamics II: Committing acts of terrorist violence
Organizational lethality Overcoming barriers to violence Rationales for terrorism
organizational lethality diffusion of responsibility strategic
deindividuation organizational
authorization of violence
2.2.3 Individual-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
The individual level of analysis seeks explanations for terrorism in the 
distinct psychological characteristics and ways of thinking of the terrorists 
themselves.72 During the 1970s and 1980s, as research on terrorism was 
emerging as a distinct subject of academic study, there was a strong focus 
on explaining terrorism as stemming from some form of psychopathology 
71 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 13, 142-46; Taylor, ‘Is Terrorism a Group Phenom-
enon?’, 125-26; Taylor and Horgan, ‘A Conceptual Framework’, 592.
72 Della Porta, Social Movements, 9, 12-13; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 3-42.
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or as a result of psychological trauma incurred during childhood and 
adolescence.73 More recently, individual-level explanations have been 
particularly strongly wedded to the concept of ‘radicalization’. This is the 
idea that involvement in terrorism stems from the adoption of increasingly 
extremist political or religious worldviews.74
Of the three levels of analysis, the individual one has arguably been 
affected most by the diff iculties of gaining reliable data on terrorism. For 
instance, sound empirical evidence for serious mental health issues among 
terrorists has generally been lacking.75 Nevertheless, the individual perspec-
tive is a crucial complement to the other analytical lenses. As Crenshaw 
remarks, ‘terrorism is not the direct result of social conditions but of in-
dividual perceptions of those conditions’.76 Although a host of factors may 
exert an influence, involvement in terrorist groups and terrorist violence is 
still predicated on the deliberations and decisions of individuals.
The literature on individual-level explanations for involvement in terror-
ism is extensive. In keeping with this study’s goals, only those hypotheses 
that focus directly on involvement in terrorism have been included for 
analysis. Publications on, for instance, the psychological impact of terrorism, 
biological explanations for violent behavior, or evolutionary psychological 
accounts for why certain behaviors exist in the f irst place, are not taken 
into consideration. In the end, two main areas of inquiry were identif ied 
that, because of their size, formed the basis for two separate chapters. The 
f irst of these deals with cognitive explanations for involvement in terrorism 
(Table 4). It essentially looks at how particular ways of thinking about and 
perceiving the world can make it more likely that someone becomes involved 
in extremism and terrorism. The second chapter discusses explanations for 
involvement that center on terrorists’ presumed distinctiveness in terms 
of psychology, character, or emotional state (Table 5).
Table 4  Individual-level analysis I: Cognitive explanations
radicalization
Fanaticism
cognitive openings and ‘unfreezing’
cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
73 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 384-90; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the 
Terrorist’, 23-24.
74 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 1-91.
75 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 31-32.
76 Crenshaw, ‘Questions to Be Answered’, 250.
studying involvEmEnt in tErrorism 47
Table 5  Individual-level analysis II: Terrorists as psychologically distinctive
psychopathology
psychoanalysis, significance loss and identity-related alienation




Each level of analysis offers unique explanations for involvement in terror-
ism. Although they are each treated in separate chapters, the distinctions 
between these various perspectives is in reality quite artif icial. Structural, 
group, and individual-level factors do not exert their influence independent 
of one another, but frequently operate in an interdependent and interrelated 
fashion. To gain a comprehensive understanding of involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup, these various perspectives separately must also be discussed 
in relation to each other. Although each chapter refers to other levels of 
analysis where relevant, drawing together the various explanatory strands 
is the primary purpose of the concluding chapter.
2.3 Limitations
By studying the available empirical data on the Hofstadgroup through 
the various lenses provided by these three levels of analysis, a com-
prehensive understanding of how and why involvement in this group 
came about can be realized. However, several limitations should be 
acknowledged. A general f irst point is that, while the author has tried to 
be comprehensive in his approach, he does not claim to have found and 
utilized all possible explanations for terrorism. Undoubtedly, readers 
will remark upon omissions. Partly this may be because in the absence of 
clear naming conventions, the author has used unfamiliar designations, 
or because similar explanations have been grouped together under a 
single heading. Given the large amount of literature on, or relevant to 
understanding involvement in terrorism, a truly exhaustive overview is 
practically unfeasible.
A more specif ic limitation is the omission of social movement theory 
as a potential explanation for involvement in terrorism. According to 
Tarrow, social movements are ‘collective challenges, based on common 
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purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, op-
ponents, and authorities’.77 While the Hofstadgroup’s adoption of a militant 
interpretation of Islam could be seen as a collectively mounted form of 
contention targeted at both the Dutch authorities, non-militant Muslims, 
and unbelievers, a clearly def ined common purpose was strikingly absent. 
This f inding, which is discussed in considerable detail in later chapters, 
forms an impediment to viewing the Hofstadgroup from a social move-
ment perspective.
In addition to lacking collective goals, the Hofstadgroup also failed to 
engage in collective action. According to Beck, terrorism can be seen as a 
form of collective action focused on making political claims and seeking 
political influence, which in turn allows terrorist groups to be studied as 
movements with political goals.78 The very absence of such claims and 
the associated instrumental use of violence problematizes seeing the 
Hofstadgroup’s activities in this light. The only terrorist attack to actually 
materialize was the murder of Van Gogh, which was not the result of a col-
lective effort but the work of one man. Furthermore, there are no indications 
that the killer was pursuing political goals. While there were some signs that 
the Hofstadgroup was beginning to undertake collective efforts towards the 
end of its existence in 2005, later chapters will demonstrate that collective 
action, like a common purpose, was for all intents and purposes not part 
of the group’s repertoire.
A f inal reason why social movement theory is not used to study involve-
ment in the Hofstadgroup is its emphasis on contention and social interac-
tions, which leaves only a secondary role for the explanatory potential of 
ideas, beliefs, and the biographies or characteristics of individuals.79 This 
comes back to the assumption that involvement in terrorism is a multicausal 
process with explanations at the structural, group, and individual levels 
of analysis. Focusing on one of these at the expense of another would go 
against the central aim of constructing a multifaceted understanding 
of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. None of this means, however, that 
social movement theory is abandoned altogether. Various elements, such 
as political-opportunity structure and the importance of looking at how 
terrorist groups frame their causes and their justif ications for violence are 
discussed in the relevant chapters.
77 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 4, italics removed from original.
78 Beck, ‘The Contribution of Social Movement Theory’, 1566.
79 See, for instance: Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, 7-8.
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2.4 A definitional debate
The terms ‘terrorism’, ‘radical’, ‘extremist’, and ‘jihad’ are used throughout 
these pages. Virtually all of them can be interpreted in multiple ways and 
constitute subjects of an ongoing and sometimes controversial definitional 
debate. To avoid confusion, it is therefore important to make clear at the 
outset how these terms are understood here. On account of its especially 
divisive nature, ‘terrorism’ is discussed at some length whereas the other 
terms are introduced more succinctly.
2.4.1 Terrorism
The debate on what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and when individuals or groups 
become ‘terrorists’, is a contentious one. After decades of discussion, a 
broadly accepted definition is still not at hand.80 Some authors believe that 
such efforts are futile because terrorism ‘is a term like war or sovereignty that 
will never be def ined in words that achieve full international consensus’.81 
This quote suggests that the study of terrorism is not the only discipline to 
be affected by def initional quandaries. But that does little to diminish the 
adverse effects produced by the absence of a clear understanding of what 
‘terrorism’ is. This issue has stood in the way of the development of a general 
theory of terrorism, ‘scattered and fragmented’ the focus of research efforts 
and complicated the comparison of research results.82 Some scholars have 
even argued that ‘it is time to stop using the “t word”’ altogether.83 Why 
has achieving consensus on the meaning of terrorism proven so diff icult?
An immediate problem with the word ‘terrorism’ is that it has strong 
negative connotations, conjuring an image of ‘cowardly violence, fear, and 
intimidation’.84 A closely related second issue is the politicized nature of 
the term. The ‘terrorism’ descriptor is frequently used to delegitimize an 
oppositional regime, movement, or organization while simultaneously 
legitimizing violence against that opponent.85 Used in this fashion, the term 
terrorism becomes part of a ‘war of words’, aimed at condemning rather 
80 Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, 39; Toros, ‘“We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!”’, 408-09.
81 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 7, italics in original.
82 Sánchez-Cuenca, ‘Why Do We Know So Little?’, 594-95; Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, 
43; Silke, ‘An Introduction’, 3-4.
83 Bryan, Kelly, and Templer, ‘The Failed Paradigm’, 94.
84 Kiras, ‘Terrorism and Irregular Warfare’, 210.
85 Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘The Psychology of Terrorism’, 201.
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than understanding a certain form of violent behavior.86 Such definitions 
are essentially political tools that serve the def ining party’s interests, for 
instance by limiting the scope of ‘terrorism’ to an activity only non-state 
actors can engage in, even though states can and have used terror on a 
much larger scale than most non-state groups are capable of.87 The biases 
inherent in such definitions make them unsuitable for research purposes.
A third obstacle is that the interpretation of what constitutes terror-
ism is highly subjective. This is best represented by the classic dichotomy 
between freedom f ighters and terrorists, with the choice for one or the 
other depending on the observer’s perspective and his or her stake in the 
conflict.88 Tellingly, few violent oppositional groups call themselves terror-
ists and most prefer to describe their activities in much more neutral terms 
such as ‘liberation’ or ‘resistance’.89 Delineating where terrorism begins and 
ends constitute a fourth stumbling block. How to disentangle terrorism 
from insurgency, two forms of political violence that are often used in 
conjunction with one another?90 Similarly, how is terrorism different from 
organized crime? Criminals and terrorists both place a premium on secrecy, 
they both use force and intimidation against civilians to achieve their aims, 
and both exert strong control over group members.91
These obstacles have not prevented the creation of many different legal, 
government, and academic def initions of terrorism.92 Of these three types 
of def initions, only academic ones are expressly intended to guide non-
partisan analysis, making them most suited to the task at hand.93 Within 
the subset of academic def initions of terrorism, it is hard to overlook the 
pioneering work of Alex Schmid, who has been working on the definitional 
question for decades.94 This book utilizes Schmid’s 2011 ‘revised academic 
consensus def inition’ because it convincingly addresses the issues raised 
above.95 Its neutral wording avoids issuing a value judgment on terrorism. 
By being applicable to state as well as non-state actors, Schmid’s def ini-
tion offers some protection against an overly politicized view of terrorism. 
86 Turk, ‘Sociology of Terrorism’, 271-73.
87 Schmid, ‘The Def inition of Terrorism’, 40.
88 Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 34-36.
89 Ibid., 35-36.
90 Duyvesteyn and Fumerton, ‘Insurgency and Terrorism’, 27-41.
91 Schmid, ‘The Def inition of Terrorism’, 64-67.
92 Ibid., 44-60; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoef ler, ‘Challenges of Conceptualizing 
Terrorism’, 780.
93 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 31-33.
94 See, for instance: Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 1-38.
95 Schmid, ‘The Def inition of Terrorism’, 39-98.
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Furthermore, its detailed nature allows it to differentiate terrorism from 
other forms of organized violence.
In these pages, therefore,
[t]errorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed 
effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive 
political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of 
calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral 
restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed 
for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences 
and conflict parties.96
2.4.2 Radicalism and extremism
The terms ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ are repeatedly used to describe the 
convictions of Hofstadgroup participants. Because both are inherently 
subjective and frequently used interchangeably, clear def initions are in 
order.97 Schmid once again provides a thoroughly researched and well-
reasoned definition of both terms. Radicalism comprises
two main elements ref lecting thought/attitude and action/behaviour 
respectively: 1. Advocating sweeping political change, based on a con-
viction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a 
fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical; 
2. The means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical 
solution for government and society can be non-violent and democratic 
(through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through 
coercion and revolution).98
Radicals may hold views that are deemed inappropriate, offensive, or 
disagreeable for other reasons, but they do not necessarily justify or support 
the use of violence. This marks an important difference with extremists.99
96 Ibid., 86-87, emphases in original.
97 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 11; Downs, Political Extremism in Democra-
cies, 13.
98 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 8.
99 Bartlett and Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence’, 1-21.
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While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extrem-
ists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity. They 
are also positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain 
political power […]. Extremists generally tend to have inflexible ‘closed 
minds’, adhering to a simplif ied mono-causal interpretation of the world 
where you are either with them or against them, part of the problem or 
part of the solution.100
For extremists, violence constitutes the preferred means to an end. This 
distinction is important, as it allows for a nuanced discussion of the beliefs 
held by Hofstadgroup participants and their views on the use of violence. 
It should be noted that some scholars refer to these dispositions using the 
terms ‘non-violent extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’.101 The author f inds 
that ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ better convey the different mindsets associated 
with these positions which, as Schmid’s definitions make clear, encompass 
more than differing views on the use of violence alone.
2.4.3 Jihad and homegrown jihadism
Islam, which translates as ‘submission to the will of God’, constitutes one 
of the world’s three great monotheistic religions.102 There is, however, no 
singular way in which Islam is interpreted or practiced. This is reflected, 
for instance, in the division of the global community of believers, known 
as the ‘ummah’, between Sunnis and Shiites, a rift with its origins in a 
centuries-old debate over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. 
Sunnis, who constitute the largest denomination within Islam, believe 
that essentially anyone can be proclaimed heir to the prophet. Shiites, 
on the other hand, accept only Muhammad’s descendants, specif ically 
the progeny of the prophet’s son-in-law Ali and his wife Fatima, who was 
Muhammad’s daughter. The Sunni-Shia divide is Islam’s most well-known 
internal division. But there are a multitude of other, smaller, denominations 
such as the Druze and the Alawis, as well as the more mystical approach 
to Islam known as Sufism, that further undermine the idea of Islam as a 
homogeneous religion.103
100 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 10.
101 Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, 873-93.
102 Esposito, Islam, 85.
103 Douwes, ‘Richtingen En Stromingen’, 162; Esposito, Islam, 2, 42-43, 47-48, 124-26, 291-94.
studying involvEmEnt in tErrorism 53
Just as there is no one Islam, there is no one view on the conditions under 
which Muslims are allowed or required to use violence, who and what can 
justif iably be targeted, and which means and methods of war are permit-
ted.104 The use of violence by Muslims has been closely linked to the concept 
of ‘jihad’, the Arabic word for struggle or effort.105 As a contested concept 
that has been the subject of centuries of debate and varying interpretations, 
there is not one clear way to def ine jihad.106 Moghadam notes that the 
Quran’s coverage of jihad allows a broad distinction to be made between a 
peaceful and an aggressive interpretation.107 The f irst form, which has also 
been called the ‘greater’ jihad, refers to an individual believer’s personal 
struggle against temptation and sin, his or her quest to live in accordance 
with god’s will, or a community’s efforts to better themselves.108 The ag-
gressive or ‘lesser’ interpretation of jihad sees it as religiously sanctioned 
or mandated warfare.109
Jihad is therefore not necessarily a violent undertaking. Unless specif ied 
otherwise, however, the use of the term jihad in this book refers to the ‘lesser’ 
or militant variety. Jihadist groups or individuals are thus those that believe 
their religious beliefs necessitate or sanction the use of violence against 
perceived enemies. Following Crone and Harrow’s definition, jihadists can 
be labeled ‘homegrown’ when they display a high degree of autonomy from 
internationally operating terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda, and a strong 
sense of belonging, e.g. through citizenship, to the countries they target.110
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter began by highlighting several issues that have affected 
research on terrorism. In particular, the qualitative difference between 
primary and secondary sources and the longstanding scarcity of the former 
in existing research on terrorism. Given that terrorism is in many ways 
a diff icult subject to study empirically, this situation is perhaps not that 
104 Moghadam, ‘Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom’, 126-29. Turner, ‘From Cottage Industry to 
International Organisation’, 544; Egerton, Jihad in the West, 17-21. 
105 Knapp, ‘Concept and Practice of Jihad’, 82.
106 Turner, ‘From Cottage Industry to International Organisation’, 544.
107 Moghadam, ’Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom’, 126.
108 Ibid.; Turner, ‘From Cottage Industry to International Organisation’, 544.
109 Turner, ‘From Cottage Industry to International Organisation’, 544; Moghadam, ‘Mayhem, 
Myths, and Martyrdom’, 126.
110 Crone and Harrow, ‘Homegrown Terrorism in the West’, 521-36.
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surprising. Nevertheless, it has had serious consequences. There exist many 
explanations for involvement in terrorism whose accuracy and reliability 
have been insuff iciently ascertained due to the diff iculties of gathering 
the high-quality data required to do so. Consequently, this book sees the 
use of primary sources as a prerequisite for making a contribution to exist-
ing knowledge on the Hofstadgroup and understanding involvement in 
homegrown jihadism more broadly.
The bulk of this chapter was dedicated to explaining the decision to 
use a multicausal analytical framework for studying involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Using literature reviews, a comprehensive inventory was 
made of the various explanations for involvement in terrorism at the 
structural, group, and individual levels of analysis. Applying these to the 
available data on the Hofstadgroup will enable a multifaceted and detailed 
understanding of the factors that shaped participants’ involvement in this 
group to emerge. Following this discussion, the chapter concluded with an 
overview of several key terms that are used throughout the text.
One task remains before it is possible to move on to the analysis of the 
factors that influenced involvement in the Hofstadgroup proper. That is 
to familiarize readers with the Hofstadgroup and its activities. The next 
chapter provides a detailed chronology of the most important events in 
the group’s 2002-2005 existence in order to create the necessary factual 
background for the analysis that is to follow. Chapter 4 then rounds off 
the introductory section of this book by discussing the Hofstadgroup’s 
organizational and ideological characteristics, and assessing to what extent 
it can be considered a group that engaged in (preparations for) acts of ter-
rorist violence.
3 A history of the Hofstadgroup1
This chapter provides a chronological description of the Hofstadgroup’s 
2002-2005 lifespan and concludes with a brief overview of the court cases 
against the group’s participants. This discussion will familiarize readers 
with the group and act as a reference for the analytical chapters that follow. 
Although several good overviews of the Hofstadgroup exist, none are as 
strongly embedded in primary sources as the present account.2
3.1 The emergence of homegrown jihadism in the 
Netherlands
Developments both within the Netherlands and beyond its borders created 
conditions favorable to the emergence of homegrown jihadism. Some of 
these began many years before the Hofstadgroup’s emergence, such as the 
growing influence of the fundamentalist Salafist interpretation of Islam, or 
the presence of small networks of veterans of jihadist conflicts in Afghani-
stan and Bosnia.3 Other underlying factors were rooted in the increasingly 
sharp and polarizing debates about immigration and Islam which came 
to dominate media headlines in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially 
after the rise of populist politicians such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.4 
Such tensions became more palpable after the 9/11 attacks, as immigrant 
communities were increasingly framed as ‘Muslims’ and sometimes even 
held responsible for jihadist attacks.5
As later chapters will explore in detail, the 9/11 attacks, the ensuing ‘War 
on Terror’, and the Dutch government’s decision to lend assistance to that 
f ight were key geopolitical developments underlying the development of 
jihadism in the Netherlands. They drew attention to the ideas, ideologues, 
and propaganda of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, especially 
so among some young Muslim citizens. Together, these factors created 
1 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker, ‘A 
History of the Hofstadgroup’.
2 Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor, 206-23; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 579-92.
3 De Poot et al., Jihadi Terrorism in the Netherlands, 42-43; General Intelligence and Security 
Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 15-16.
4 De Koning and Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 223-24; De Koning, ‘“Moge Hij Onze Ogen 
Openen”’, 52-53.
5 De Graaf, ‘The Nexus between Salaf ism and Jihadism’, 18.
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conditions favorable to the emergence of Islamist radicalism and extrem-
ism. In early 2002, two Dutch citizens of Moroccan descent were killed in 
Kashmir by Indian security forces, ostensibly after having been recruited by 
Islamist militants at a mosque in the Netherlands.6 That same year, dozens 
of people were arrested on suspicion of involvement in providing recruit-
ment, f inancial, and logistical support to internationally operating jihadist 
terrorist groups.7 Although the Hofstadgroup was the most infamous entity 
to arise in the Netherlands in the early 2000s, it was certainly not the only 
exponent of this broader trend.
3.2 2002: The Hofstadgroup’s initial formation
The earliest reference to the Hofstadgroup stems from 2002. Over the course 
of that year, a group of increasingly radical Muslims began to draw the 
attention of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD).8 
It was not until September 2003, however, that the Service began to label 
this particular set of people as the ‘Hofstadgroup’.9 The name refers to The 
Hague, a city colloquially known in Dutch as the Hofstad (court city) and 
one of the places in which the group gathered. Little is known about the 
group’s activities in 2002, although it appears that regular gatherings began 
taking place by the end of the year. A middle-aged Syrian asylum seeker 
known by the moniker of Abu Khaled occupied a prominent position during 
these so-called ‘living room meetings’ as a religious instructor.10 While 
he does not appear to have spoken of the use of violence or participation 
in jihad directly, his teachings conferred a dogmatic and fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam. This formed a fertile base for some participants’ 
subsequent adoption of a decidedly extremist, pro-violence, interpretation 
of Islam.11
The group’s meetings were held in a variety of locations in addition to The 
Hague, with an Internet café in Schiedam and the Amsterdam residence of 
the Hofstadgroup participant who would go on to murder Dutch f ilmmaker 
6 Ibid., 18-19.
7 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, ‘Jaarverslag 2002’, 21.
8 Donner and Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, Nr. 3’, 5.
9 Ibid., 18.
10 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 37.
11 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4095; VERD: 19480, 19705-706, 19747; NCTV 
Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 8.
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Theo van Gogh being used regularly.12 A f irst hint that elements within the 
group were developing extremist views manifested itself towards the end 
of 2002. Information provided to the police by the AIVD suggests that in 
November of that year, one person who would feature prominently in the 
group’s extremist core spoke out in favor of a mass-casualty bombing.13 
Regarding the group’s organizational development, it is interesting to 
note that initial group formation appears to have been based primarily 
on preexisting social bonds. Many participants had grown up in the same 
neighborhoods, attended the same schools, or knew each other through their 
local mosques.14 In the words of one former participant, the Hofstadgroup 
was a ‘circle of acquaintances’.15
3.3 2003: Would-be foreign fighters and international 
connections
At the start of 2003, a prominent Hofstadgroup participant together with a 
friend of his who does not appear to have been involved in the group, made 
an attempt to join Islamist rebels in Chechnya. They were arrested by the 
Russian authorities just after they left Ukraine and were sent back home 
after questioning. Upon return to the Netherlands they were interrogated 
further by both the Dutch police and the AIVD.16 That summer, two other 
participants separately undertook travel to Pakistan where they allegedly 
met each other for the f irst time at a Quran school. Their travels appear to 
have been facilitated through another Hofstadgroup participant.17 Mes-
sages written after their return and intelligence information imply that 
both underwent or at least sought paramilitary training in Pakistan or 
Afghanistan.18 That this trip was more than an opportunity to study Islam 
12 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA 01/18: 89-90.
13 Ibid., AHA 02/19: 100.
14 Ibid., VERD: 19444, 19459, 19675, 19717, 19858-860, 19877, 19916, 19980, 19994, 20079, 20112, 
20115, 20174; GET: 18215, 18312-313, 18374-375, 18414, 20348; 01/17: 4176; AHA03/20: 1227; Erkel, 
Samir, 78-79.
15 ‘een vriendenkring’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
16 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 33; GET: 18061-62; Calis, ‘Iedereen Wil Mar-
telaar Zijn’.
17 Erkel, Samir, 195; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 33.
18 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 140-41; AHA04/21: 1657, 1666; AHA05/22: 2176; 
AHD07/36: 8401-02; AHD08/37: 569-571, 595-597, 618-619, 635-637, 715-717, 767-769, 773-775, 880, 
919-931; AHD09/38: 9049, 9054-56.
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abroad is underlined by a farewell letter one of the two men left his family, 
in which he expressed a desire to remain in the ‘land of jihad’.19
These two men returned from Pakistan separately in September. Later 
that month, AIVD intelligence revealed that one of the Pakistan-goers 
may have returned on the instigation of an unnamed ‘emir’ who tasked 
him with ‘collecting balloons’.20 According to the AIVD’s information, a 
fellow Hofstadgroup participant had mentioned that this particular traveler 
had returned to ‘play a match’ before Ramadan that year (which began 
on 27 October). Around the same time, it was also discovered that this 
individual, together with the person who had tried to reach Chechnya and a 
third Hofstadgroup participant, were in contact with a Moroccan man living 
in Spain who was sought by the Moroccan authorities for his suspected 
involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings and for his membership of 
the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).21
The Hofstadgroup participant who may have been in touch with the 
unknown emir traveled to Barcelona in the first week of October to meet the 
Moroccan man, returning to Amsterdam on 8 October. While in Spain, he 
also met an acquaintance of the Moroccan suspect, a man who Spanish au-
thorities believed had ties to the Iraqi terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam. 
Another Hofstadgroup participant communicated with the Moroccan man 
via telephone from the Netherlands and apparently received instructions 
to procure ‘a notebook’ and ‘credit’.22 Other topics of conversation were 
‘shoes class 1 and class 2’ and ‘things that come from Greece or Italy’.23 The 
Moroccan suspect also mentioned that he would send a man from Belgium 
to meet the participant he had been phoning with. Whether this meeting 
occurred is unclear, although two of the participants who were in telephone 
contact with the Moroccan individual traveled to Belgium on 15 October 
for unknown purposes.24
On 14 October, the Spanish authorities arrested the Moroccan suspect. 
A day later, the AIVD informed the Dutch public prosecutor’s off ice about 
the travels to Pakistan or Afghanistan and the Spanish connection. The 
police then arrested f ive Hofstadgroup participants on 7 October. These 
included the three individuals who undertook travel abroad, two of whom 
were in contact with the Moroccan man, another person who was also in 
19 Ibid., 01/13: 163.
20 Ibid., 01/01: 23-24.
21 Ibid.; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 33.
22 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 24.
23 Ibid., AHA01/18: 81.
24 Ibid., 01/01: 23-25; AHA01/18: 80-81; RHV01/66: 18845-46.
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contact with the Moroccan individual and the middle-aged Syrian religious 
instructor Abu Khaled. House searches turned up books, tapes, and digital 
materials espousing an extremist interpretation of Islam, study notes on 
martyrdom, an at that point unknown person’s will expressing a desire 
to die as a martyr, and, in the case of one of those arrested, materials sug-
gestive of an interest in constructing an explosive device. However, all of 
the suspects were released at the end of October due to lack of evidence.25
The Dutch police were thus unable to substantiate the possibility that 
the suspects were planning a terrorist attack or assisting foreign groups or 
individuals in doing so. Given that two of those arrested had in September 
and October been trying to encourage other young Dutch Muslims to 
travel to Pakistan, a likely explanation for the ‘emir’s’ task is that it was to 
inspire others to make a similar trip. The communication with the Moroc-
can suspect in Spain is harder to explain, although a source close to the 
investigation thought it likely that the Hofstadgroup participants were 
providing logistical assistance with acquiring a passport (‘notebook’) and 
money (‘credit’), perhaps to help the Moroccan suspect avoid arrest.26 What 
the other terms referred to, and what type of ‘match’ was to be played before 
Ramadan has remained unclear.
On the very last day of 2003, one of the Pakistan travelers undertook a 
second journey to that country, this time accompanied by a fellow Hof-
stadgroup participant who had not been there before. Scarcely more than 
a week later, on 9 January 2004, both of them returned. The sources provide 
several different explanations for this rapid return.27 Regardless of which of 
these accounts is true, it is clear that this second trip abroad was not very 
successful, with little to indicate that the travelers were able to get any 
paramilitary training or make contacts with foreign jihadists.
Judging by the tone and contents of his writings and translations, 2003 
also saw the man who would murder Van Gogh in November 2004 rapidly 
embrace more fundamentalist and radical views.28 This process was ac-
companied by a withdrawal from ‘mainstream’ Dutch society; he quit his 
job, stopped volunteer work for his local community in June and distanced 
himself from non-religious old friends. Around the same time, he adopted 
the clothing and facial hairstyle of a fundamentalist Muslim, leading him to 
25 Ibid., 01/01: 24-27; RHV01/66: 18792; Donner and Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, 
Nr. 3’, 25-26.
26 Police Investigator 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 1.
27 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 141-43; GET: 18840, 188452.
28 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59.
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become known as ‘the Taliban’ among youths in his Amsterdam neighbor-
hood. Of particular interest is the f inding that he traveled to Denmark in 
October. Although the available sources do not reveal what the purpose of 
his trip was, it is possible that he visited a Syrian preacher who lived there. 
This preacher was a friend of the Hofstadgroup’s Syrian religious instructor 
Abu Khaled and occasionally traveled to the Netherlands to visit him.29
3.4 2004: Individualistic plots and the murder of Theo van 
Gogh
The Hofstadgroup appears to have undertaken few, if any, communal activi-
ties during 2004. Burgeoning collective efforts involving at least parts of the 
group could be identif ied in 2003, such as the contacts with the Moroccan 
suspect and the attempts to encourage other Dutch Muslims to travel to 
Pakistan. Yet 2004 was characterized by distinctly individualistic initiatives. 
When accounting for this change, the impact of the October 2003 arrests 
cannot be overlooked. A former participant explained that the arrests 
resulted in an acutely heightened sense of paranoia and a preoccupation 
with personal safety. This was debilitating to the point that he described 
the Hofstadgroup as being effectively crippled in early 2004.30
While the realization that they had come under surveillance dampened 
group-based activities, a small number of individuals were not deterred. 
Peters’s analysis of the writings of Van Gogh’s killer-to-be shows that this 
participant moved from radical convictions to distinctly extremist ones 
around March 2004.31 His rapidly developing extremism would lead him, 
around the summer of that year, to embrace the view that blasphemers 
needed to be killed.32 This provided him with both the ideological motive 
and justif ication for murdering writer and f ilmmaker Van Gogh, who was 
very outspoken in his criticism of Islam and Muslims and often presented 
his arguments in a coarse fashion intended to cause offense.33
29 Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’; Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 61; Com-
missie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrapport 
Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 11; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 32, 37; GET: 
18349, 18415; VERD: 9754; Kranenberg, ‘De Zachte Krachten Achter Mohammed B.’
30 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5.
31 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 152-55.
32 Ibid., 155-56.
33 E.g. Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 33-34.
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Several other notable developments took place before that time, however. 
On 8 April 2004, a supermarket in Rotterdam was robbed by two men armed 
with automatic weapons. Although the suspicion could not be substantiated 
by concrete evidence, it seems likely that the robbers received help getting 
into the store from one of its employees; the Hofstadgroup participant who 
tried to reach Chechnya a year earlier. Minutes after the robbers got away 
with approximately 700 Euros, one of them was arrested and later con-
f irmed as an acquaintance of the store’s Hofstadgroup employee.34 Several 
Hofstadgroup participants have since claimed that the second robber was 
also involved in the group and only managed to ‘evade’ the police because 
he was in fact an AIVD informant.35 Concrete evidence to support this claim 
was, however, not encountered.
On 19 May, the police received information which suggested that the 
supermarket employee was involved in preparations for a terrorist attack. 
On 7 June, that same individual was captured on security cameras walking 
around the AIVD’s headquarters in Leidschendam, apparently measuring 
distances by taking equally spaced steps. These events contributed to his 
second arrest, on 30 June (the f irst was in October 2003). Among the items 
encountered in the ensuing house search were photographs, maps, and 
directions of the AIVD headquarters, the nuclear reactor in the Dutch 
town of Borssele, the House of Representatives, the Ministry of Defense, 
Amsterdam Schiphol airport, and the barracks of the Dutch commandos 
in Roosendaal. Other f inds included a bulletproof vest, two magazines, 
and a silencer that could be f itted to the weapons used in the supermarket 
robbery, electrical circuits, night-vision goggles, household chemicals, 
fertilizer, documents espousing an extremist interpretation of Islam, jihad 
‘handbooks’, and a hand-written will in the suspect’s name.36
While indicative of an interest in improvised explosive devices (IEDs), it 
should be noted that the electrical circuits and chemicals were everyday, 
over-the-counter items that had not (yet) been combined into an explosive 
device or its precursor components. It should also be emphasized that the 
particular type of fertilizer found turned out to be unsuitable for making an 
explosive substance.37 Hence, the individual in question does not appear to 
have had the capability to construct an actual bomb at that point in time. 
34 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 38-39.
35 Erkel, Samir, 209; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 262; Alberts and Derix, ‘Het Mysterie’; 
Groen and Kranenberg, ‘“Saleh B. Wel Terroristisch Actief”’.
36 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 38-45.
37 Ibid., 01/01: 48-49.
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Interestingly, in the same month two other Hofstadgroup participants 
had inquired after fertilizer at a garden store. Whether this was related to 
an intention to construct an IED remains unclear. However, it is striking 
that the individual arrested on 30 June was found in possession of a list of 
addresses of that particular chain of stores.38
On 6 June, two other Hofstadgroup participants, in the company of two 
acquaintances who do not appear to have been directly involved in the 
group, traveled to Portugal. On a tip-off likely provided by the AIVD, which 
raised the possibility that the goal of this trip was to commit a terrorist at-
tack during the European soccer championships or to kill Portuguese Prime 
Minister Barroso, the four travelers were arrested by the Portuguese police 
on 11 June and their whereabouts searched. No evidence was uncovered 
to substantiate any of the terrorism related allegations or a later claim 
by a witness that the trip’s goal was to acquire weapons. In light of the 
lack of incriminating evidence, it may simply have been the case that the 
Hofstadgroup participant who came up with the idea for the trip in the f irst 
place, an illegal immigrant from Morocco, was telling the truth. He claims 
to have wanted to benefit from a Portuguese amnesty for asylum seekers. 
Similarly, there is little to contradict his companions’ assertion that they 
went along to enjoy a holiday.39
Despite the lack of incriminating evidence, all four travelers were handed 
over to the Portuguese immigration police on 14 June for ‘visa irregularities’ 
and sent back to the Netherlands several days later. Upon his arrival at 
Schiphol airport, the trip’s initiator was questioned by the Dutch police. 
One particularly interesting aspect of this conversation is that he warned 
the police about a friend of his who, he claimed, spoke a lot of jihad, adhered 
to the ideology of ‘takf ir’ (declaring other Muslims apostates) and who 
wanted to join Islamist insurgents in Chechnya. This friend would later 
commit the murder of Van Gogh.40 What exactly motivated this willingness 
to incriminate others is unclear, but it suggests the Hofstadgroup was not 
(yet) a particularly tightly-knit group of extremists.
Two other developments complete this overview of the eventful month 
of June 2004. On 14 June, the mother of two Hofstadgroup participants 
f iled a report with the police declaring that she and her daughters felt 
38 Ibid., 01/01: 40; 01/13: 175.
39 Ibid., 01/13: 104; AHA03/20: 859; GET: 18375; VERD: 20347-48; RHV02/67: 19216-18, 19291-92; 
Noivo, ‘Jihadism in Portugal’, 6; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 583; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders; 
Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 107.
40 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA03/20: 859-61; RHV02/67: 19292.
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threatened by her sons’ extremist and violent behavior to the point that 
they moved out of their own home.41 Investigations conducted later in 2004 
also revealed 14 June to be the f irst day on which an AIVD interpreter 
leaked conf idential information to two Hofstadgroup participants; one 
of them received a ‘weekly report’ on the group in June and the other a 
wiretap in August.42 The leak was discovered in September 2004 when a 
Dutch newspaper, which had also acquired the materials, faxed a part of the 
weekly report back to the AIVD. The interpreter was a prior acquaintance of 
one of the Hofstadgroup’s participants, for whom the AIVD employee had 
bought a ticket from Al Hoceima (Morocco) to Amsterdam in May 2003.43 
Why he leaked this information and what, if any, effect the f iles had on the 
Hofstadgroup remains unknown.
3.4.1 Towards the murder of Theo van Gogh
On 29 August 2004, the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali ap-
peared for an in-depth interview on the TV-program Zomergasten (summer 
guests). As part of the show, a short Islam-critical f ilm she had recently made 
with Van Gogh called Submission, part 1 was broadcast.44 The f ilm contains 
fragments in which Quranic verses are projected on semi-naked women 
and was supposedly met with either disgust or indifference by the Dutch 
Muslim community.45 But among the Hofstadgroup the f ilm evoked much 
stronger reactions, all the more so since, having renounced her Muslim 
faith, Hirsi Ali was already a particularly hated public f igure.46
A day after the f ilm was broadcast, a message appeared on an ‘MSN 
Group’, a type of ‘do-it-yourself’ online message board popular at the time, 
called MuwahhidinDeWareMoslims (‘Muwahhidin47 the True Muslims’). 
This website was administered and frequented by Hofstadgroup partici-
pants, for instance to propagate the increasingly extremist texts written 
by Van Gogh’s killer-to-be. The message, titled ‘The unbelieving diabolical 
41 Ibid., 01/01: 141; AHA03/20: 831.
42 Alberts and Derix, ‘AIVD-Stuk Lekte Uit Naar Extremisten’.
43 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 104; AHA05/22: 837, 1811-13, 1837; Alberts and 
Derix, ‘AIVD-Stuk Lekte Uit Naar Extremisten’; Kilcullen, ‘Subversion and Countersubversion’, 
657.
44 The f ilm can be viewed online: Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh, ‘Submission, part 1’ (YouTube). Last 
accessed 15 April 2014.
45 ‘Hirsi Ali Zoekt Tegenstanders Voor Haar Wedstrijd’.
46 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 74, 161-62; Erkel, Samir, 223.
47 ‘Muwahhidin’ refers to Muslims who uphold a strict belief in the concept of tawhid (the 
unity of god). See: Esposito, Islam, 146.
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mortada [apostate], Ayaan Hirsi Ali’, was posted by an individual on the 
group’s edges. In it, the author claimed that the ‘Muwahhidin Brigade’ 
had uncovered Hirsi Ali’s residence, proceeded to publish that presumed 
address in full and also posted a picture of Van Gogh.48 A second message 
followed on 4 September and was openly threatening. Writing of Hirsi Ali, 
the author claimed that ‘wherever she hides, death shall f ind her!’49 The 
messages’ author was arrested on 14 September.
A day later, the Dutch police received an anonymous e-mail warning them 
that two individuals might be preparing a terrorist attack. The anonymous 
source had supposedly been asked by two ‘terrorists’ to commit attacks 
in the Netherlands, with the House of Representatives in The Hague and 
Amsterdam’s red light district as possible targets. Unfortunately, the avail-
able sources divulge no further information on this potential terrorist plot.50 
Interestingly, however, one of the two supposed terrorists was an active 
participant in the Hofstadgroup. In September, he responded aff irmatively 
to a question posted on his website ‘TawheedWalJihad’51 inquiring whether 
it was a Muslim’s duty to kill those who insulted the Prophet Muhammad. 
To substantiate his argument, the participant relied on a translation of 
the influential fourteenth-century Salaf ist scholar Ahmad ibn Taymiyya’s 
argument to this extent. This translation had been written by Van Gogh’s 
killer-to-be. The individual acting as an ‘online help desk’ on extremist 
matters was arrested on 8 November because he had issued death threats 
to Dutch politician Geert Wilders using the aforementioned website.52
On 2 November 2004, Van Gogh was murdered while cycling to work 
in his hometown of Amsterdam. The killer cycled up alongside Van Gogh, 
shot him several times with a pistol and then tried to decapitate his dead or 
dying victim with a kukri knife. Without fully accomplishing this task, he 
decided to pin a note to the dead man’s chest with another knife in which 
he threatened Hirsi Ali with death. Calmly reloading the magazine of his 
HS model 95 pistol, the killer then walked towards a nearby park where a 
48 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA04/21: 1324-39, 1342; AHA05/22: 2339; 01/17: 
4002-03, 4025-26, 4047; Benschop, ‘A Political Murder Foretold’.
49 ‘waar ze maar schuilt, de dood zal haar achterhalen!’: Dienst Nationale Recherche,‘RL8026’, 
AHA04/21: 1325.
50 Ibid., 01/01: 179-80. 
51 ‘Monotheism and Jihad’, possibly a reference to a group by that name led by Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi which would later become known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. See: Benschop, ‘A Political 
Murder Foretold’.
52 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 160, 167, 200-01, 203; Benschop, ‘A Political 
Murder Foretold’; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 156.
a History oF tHE HoFstadgroup 65
shoot-out with police off icers ensued. After running out of ammunition 
and being shot in the leg, Van Gogh’s murderer was arrested. Three other 
people were also hit by the killer’s bullets; one bystander in the leg, another 
in the heel, and one police off icer in his bulletproof vest. Upon being taken 
into custody the killer was told that he was lucky to be alive; he responded 
that he had hoped to die.53
Van Gogh’s murder was a premeditated act of terrorism. The attacker 
utilized deadly violence against a civilian with the distinct intent of achiev-
ing propagandistic and psychological goals. For the attacker, Van Gogh’s 
death was not just an aim in itself, but an extreme form of communication 
that guaranteed him the attention of those he considered Islam’s enemies 
and those who he hoped to inspire to rise up in its defense. This follows not 
just from the ritualistic manner in which Van Gogh was killed in a public 
place in broad daylight, but also from the various letters that his assailant 
left behind for his compatriots to propagate. These alternately threatened 
death to specif ic Dutch politicians and the general public, and encour-
aged Muslim youngsters to embrace militancy.54 According to Schmid’s 
def inition used here, this differentiation between the immediate victim 
and a wider target audience to whom the violent act is meant to speak is a 
def ining characteristic of terrorism.55
Nine witnesses later reported having seen the killer at different locations 
along the route Van Gogh usually traveled to work between early October 
and the day of the murder. Two witnesses, independently of each other, 
claim to have seen the killer on the f irst of November standing with his 
bike along Van Gogh’s usual route, observing passing cyclists. This implies 
that Van Gogh’s attacker had carefully chosen where to strike and perhaps 
even that 2 November was not his f irst attempt to kill the f ilmmaker.56
There has been considerable speculation about the rest of the group’s 
involvement in or knowledge of the attack.57 In September 2014, a public 
prosecutor involved in the case voiced his suspicion, on national television, 
53 Donner and Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29854, Nr. 1’, 1-2; Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir 
in De Strafzaak Tegen Mohammed B.’, 10-27; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 95.
54 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschre-
ven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 32-46, 50-56.
55 Schmid, ‘The Def inition of Terrorism’, 62-63.
56 Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir in De Strafzaak Tegen Mohammed B.’, 9-10.
57 Derix, ‘Hoe Kwam Toch’.; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 4-5; 
NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3-4; Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir in De Strafzaak Tegen 
Mohammed B.’, 7; Public Prosecutor 2, “Personal Interview 1’, 3.
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that multiple people had been involved in the murder.58 In November 2015 a 
new report by the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security 
Services revealed that the AIVD had received ten pieces of information in 
the years after the murder indicating that others were aware of the murder, 
had assisted in preparations for it, or had even ordered it.59 While the report 
is careful not to dismiss this information out of hand, nine out of ten pieces 
of intelligence were based on hearsay and speculation; in all, there was no 
concrete evidence to suggest the involvement of others.60
Consequently, this book takes the position that the currently available 
evidence indicates that the murder was planned, prepared, and executed 
solely by the attacker himself.61 Based on his explanation in court, he ap-
pears to have been primarily driven by a sense that it was every individual 
believer’s duty to behead those who insulted Allah and his prophet, as he felt 
Van Gogh had done with his movie and writings. He took full responsibility 
for his actions and claimed that he would have done exactly the same had 
the blasphemer been his brother or father.62
The authorities responded to the murder by arresting most of the 
suspected members of the Hofstadgroup on the day of the attack. Two, 
however, managed to evade apprehension. One was Abu Khaled, the 
middle-aged Syrian man who had provided religious instruction to the 
group. Aided by several acquaintances, he left for Syria the day that Van 
Gogh was killed, traveling via Belgium and Greece, and entering the 
country illegally from Turkey. Despite the striking coincidence, the police 
investigation was unable to ascertain whether Abu Khaled was aware 
of the murderer’s plans. The second participant who got away was the 
member of the group’s extremist core who featured earlier as the initiator 
of the trip to Portugal. Although precisely where he went after evading 
arrest has remained unclear, he may have traveled back to his family in 
Morocco in November 2004 or spent the time until his arrest in June 2005 
alternately living in Brussels and possibly Luxembourg, from where he 
would occasionally travel to the Netherlands.63
58 ’T Sas and Born, ‘Hoofdoff icier: Mohammed Bouyeri Handelde Niet Alleen’.
59 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port over Eventuele Handlangers’, 14-16.
60 Ibid., 16.
61 Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir in De Strafzaak Tegen Mohammed B.’, 6-7.
62 NOS, ‘Verklaring Mohammed B. In Tekst’; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 27.
63 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA02/19: 755; GET: 4069; Public Prosecutor 1, 
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3.4.2 Violent resistance to arrest
The most dramatic episode in the arrests of alleged Hofstadgroup members 
occurred during the early hours of 10 November 2004. As a police arrest 
squad tried to force the door on the apartment of two suspects in The Hague 
around 02:50 in the morning, they found that it had been barricaded from 
within and could only be partially opened. The two men had prepared for 
the police’s arrival and discussed beforehand how to respond to it. Mere 
moments after the squad’s attempt to force entry to the apartment, one of 
its occupants threw a hand grenade through the crack between door and 
door frame, which passed the off icers standing on the landing and bounced 
down an outdoor stairwell to explode on the street below. Moments after 
realizing a grenade had been thrown at them, one of the off icers f ired twice 
at their attacker, both shots just missing his head. The grenade’s ensuing 
explosion injured f ive policemen, one of whom seriously, and forced the 
squad to pull back.64
During the day that followed, the suspects spoke on the phone with 
friends and family, announcing their imminent martyrdom. They hastily 
wrote a will and made several prank calls to the emergency services ask-
ing for the police to come and rescue them from the ‘masked scary men’ 
surrounding their home.65 Additionally, they threatened to blow up the 
entire street with twenty kilograms of explosives, provoked off icers to 
shoot them and were seen waving a sword and a f irearm that would later 
turn out to be a fake. Towards the end of the afternoon, a military special 
forces unit went into action. After eighteen tear gas canisters were f ired 
into the apartment, the two suspects clambered onto a balcony. Soldiers 
in an opposite building then ordered them to raise their hands and f ired 
a warning shot. The suspects were told to undress and descend into the 
garden via a ladder. Instead, one of them reached into his jacket pocket, 
prompting him to be shot in his shoulder. Subsequently, both suspects 
complied with the soldiers’ orders, climbed down, and were taken into 
custody. No explosives were found in the apartment but both suspects were 
found to have carried additional grenades in their pockets.66
64 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 38, 95-96, 105-06, 171; GET: 18011, 18235-237; 
AGV01/62: 7967-05.
65 ‘gemaskerde enge mannen’: Ibid., AHA07/24: 3112.
66 Ibid., 01/01: 131; 01/12: 9-10; 01/13: 71; AHA02/19: 610-14; AHA07/24: 3087-127; AGV01/62: 17969-
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3.5 2005: From ‘Hofstad’ to ‘Piranha’
The November 2004 arrests ended what could be called the ‘f irst wave’ 
of the Hofstadgroup. Yet from approximately April 2005 onward, a small 
group re-emerged that, with regard to its participants, ideological convic-
tions, and practical intentions, was a direct successor to the 2002-2004 
Hofstadgroup. This ‘second wave’ has become known under the name of 
the police investigation into its activities as the ‘Piranha’ group. Despite the 
separate investigations and court cases, the Piranha group was essentially 
a continuation of the Hofstadgroup and is treated here as such.
The 2005 resurgence was made possible by three factors. First of all, the 
individual arrested in June 2004 after reconnoitering the AIVD headquar-
ters was acquitted and released from custody in April 2005. Thus, one of 
the most extremist individuals in the Hofstadgroup was able to continue 
his activities. Secondly, another member of the Hofstadgroup’s extremist 
core had evaded arrest in November 2004 and remained at large until his 
apprehension in June 2005. During this interval, he contributed to the new 
group’s operational capabilities by procuring three firearms. These two men 
appear to have formed the new group’s main protagonists and are referred 
to here as its ringleaders. Of the remaining nine individuals ultimately 
earmarked as alleged members of the Piranha group, all but two had been 
on the original Hofstadgroup’s fringes. The arrest of most of the original 
participants seems to have brought these peripheral individuals forward 
into positions of increased prominence.67
The Piranha group displayed some interesting differences from its 
predecessor. Most importantly, there appeared to be a burgeoning sense 
of hierarchy, tenuous indications of a return to more group-based efforts 
and clearer signs that these efforts were in the service of terrorism-related 
goals.68 Police and intelligence information reveals that as many as three 
tentative terrorist plots may have been considered, all three of which were 
being shaped under the overall guidance of the individual released in 
April 2005. One of these potential plots targeted Dutch politicians, with 
particular emphasis on Hirsi Ali. The second aimed to bring down an El-Al 
airplane, while the third envisioned a double strike; f irst against the AIVD 
headquarters and then targeting several Dutch politicians.
67 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4085-86, 4128, 4179, 4201; Dienst Nationale 
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68 Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker, ‘The Hofstadgroup Revisited’
a History oF tHE HoFstadgroup 69
One of the f irst things the individual released in April 2005 did was 
approach an old acquaintance, someone who had been in contact with 
Hofstadgroup participants from approximately the end of 2003. During the 
trial against the Piranha suspects, this person claimed to have been coerced 
and threatened by the group’s two ringleaders, for instance into renting a 
house for the group in Brussels and occasionally supplying participants with 
money.69 In contrast, the other suspects in the Piranha case claimed that 
this individual was in fact very radical, not at all involuntarily associated 
with them, and purely motivated to give incriminating testimony in court 
to avoid being sentenced.70 Although the currently available data does not 
allow these conflicting claims to be convincingly resolved, it should be 
noted that this was one of the witnesses whose testimony a Dutch court 
qualif ied as unreliable.71
Police intelligence from early April 2005 indicated that the individual 
recently released from detention had gathered a new group around him, 
that he wanted to die as a martyr and that he was driven to rectify the 
‘1-0’ in the unbelievers’ favor.72 This latter point suggests that he was at 
least partially motivated by a personal desire for revenge for his arrest and 
incarceration. This motive also appears in various writings by and about this 
individual, which highlight his experience of poor treatment by the Dutch 
justice system and police and, especially, his adversarial relationship with 
the AIVD.73 Given this background, it is unsurprising that one of the three 
potential plots overseen by this person appears to have targeted the AIVD.
3.5.1 Spring and summer 2005: Renewed signs of terrorist intentions
May 2005 brought signs of a renewed interest in pursuing acts of terrorism 
in the Netherlands among some of the Piranha group’s participants. For 
instance, the Piranha ringleader who had been a fugitive since the murder 
of Van Gogh allegedly told two other participants that he had a CD-ROM 
with instructions on how to make a suicide vest and that the required 
components could be bought in Germany. This person also acquired three 
f irearms around this point in time; a CZ ‘Skorpion’ version 61 submachine 
69 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 61-63, 82-83, 85-86, 104-05, 158-60, 211-14.
70 ‘Getuige Piranha-Zaak Zelf Radicaal’; Kranenberg and Groen, ‘Kroongetuigen Vallen in 
Eigen Kuil’.
71 Kranenberg and Groen, ‘Kroongetuigen Vallen in Eigen Kuil’.
72 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 29; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie Uit 
Strafdossier’.
73 De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 273; Erkel, Samir, 199-200, 206-08, 218-19, 227-28, 240-41.
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gun (also referred to as a ‘baby Uzi’), an Agram 2000 submachine gun with 
a separate silencer, and a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver. In May, he 
instructed a participant to visit the group’s other leader, the man released 
from custody in April, to pick something up. This turned out to be a piece 
of paper printed in an Internet café which listed the names, addresses, and 
telephone numbers of several Dutch politicians.74
Events in June provided further indications that both the intent and 
capability to use terrorist violence was being developed, again with a 
particular focus on Dutch politicians. On or around 15 June, the fugitive 
and his female companion took two other participants to a large park in 
Amsterdam to f ire one of the submachine guns at a tree.75 Several days 
later, on 20 June, the aforementioned companion phoned a family member 
who worked at a pharmacy in The Hague. She asked for the addresses of 
the politicians who frequented it and was particularly interested in Hirsi 
Ali’s, but was not given the information.76 The next day, police off icers 
conducting surveillance in The Hague recognized the fugitive they had 
sought since November 2004. At the time, he had been staying with someone 
who appears to have been pressured into providing him and his companion 
with shelter and transportation.77
This was also the case a day later, on 22 June, when this acquaintance 
was instructed to drive the fugitive and his companion to Amsterdam. Both 
seemed tense and the fugitive twice made their driver attempt to shake off 
any possible tails. In Amsterdam, he took over the wheel and drove towards 
train station Amsterdam Lelylaan, where he and his companion got out. 
Upon reaching the platform, both were apprehended by a police special 
intervention unit. At the time, the fugitive was carrying the loaded Agram 
2000 in his backpack. In the driver’s home, the police found a handwritten 
and coded note listing the addresses of four Dutch politicians which ap-
pears to have belonged to the two people who had just been arrested. Their 
interest in the whereabouts of Dutch politicians and Hirsi Ali in particular, 
something corroborated by the statements of two inmates who met them in 
prison, lends further credence to the idea that they were considering plans 
to assassinate one or more of these individuals.78
74 Den Hartigh and Van Dam, ‘Requisitoir “Piranha” Deel 1’, 70; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
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Two days after the arrests, the group’s remaining ringleader phoned one 
of his imprisoned Hofstadgroup friends. He mentioned being unable to 
sleep since the arrests and that there was a story which had not yet made 
the newspapers which would astound his friend.79 The next day he phoned 
again and cryptically talked of a ‘soup’ that was still boiling but would 
make it onto television soon.80 Suspicions that the caller was involved in 
preparations for an act of terrorism were strengthened a month later. Just 
after midnight on 26 July, police officers observed this person enter a park in 
The Hague in the company of an unknown male. Not much later a bang was 
heard. Its source has never been discovered, leaving it uncertain whether 
this was potentially some kind of f irearms or explosives test. Two days later 
the AIVD off icially informed the police that they had indications that the 
group’s remaining leader was involved in terrorist activities.81
3.5.2 The second and third potential plots come to light
In early August 2005, signs of a second potential terrorist plot began to 
manifest themselves. Police intelligence reports indicated that a group 
of young men of Moroccan descent in Amsterdam West, including two 
Piranha participants, were working on a plan to shoot down an El Al plane 
at Schiphol airport, possibly using some type of Rocket Propelled Grenade 
(RPG). The reports raised the possibility that one individual had been tasked 
with conducting a reconnaissance of a particular area of Schiphol airport 
and that the plot was being funded by a levy on the criminal proceeds 
of acquaintances of the remaining Piranha ringleader. The intelligence 
information, however, could not be marked as ‘reliable’.82 Furthermore, 
subsequent police investigations were unable to substantiate the intel-
ligence. This suggests that the potential second terrorist plot attributable 
to the Piranha never proceeded beyond a conceptual phase.83
In contrast to the ‘f irst wave’ Hofstadgroup, ‘living-room meetings’ 
did not feature as prominently in its 2005 continuation. Participants did 
visit each other and some individuals provided religious instruction, yet 
relatively large-scale group meetings such as those that were held at the 
79 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 144-45.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., REL00: 39-40; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie Uit Strafdossier’.
82 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 40-42; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie 
Uit Strafdossier’.
83 Den Hartigh and Van Dam, ‘Requisitoir “Piranha” Deel 1’, 5; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En 
Politie Uit Strafdossier’.
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house of Van Gogh’s killer were not encountered in the available sources. 
A likely explanation is that the Piranha group had developed a much more 
acute sense of safety and was wary of indoor gatherings for security reasons. 
This is supported by several meetings held outdoors in public places, such as 
on 24 August in The Hague, when four Piranha participants were observed 
together, on 7 September in Amsterdam, when two individuals met and 
exchanged a package, and on 11 October, when f ive suspected members of 
the Piranha group met in The Hague.84
Arguably the most interesting such meeting occurred in September 2005, 
when the Piranha group’s principal remaining protagonist met a Belgian 
national of Moroccan descent at a train station in The Hague. According 
to police information, the Belgian man declined the protagonist’s request 
to participate in a suicide attack against the AIVD on the grounds that he 
was already planning something in Morocco.85 A different take is given by 
investigative journalists Groen and Kranenberg. They describe the Belgian 
man as a cousin of a participant of the ‘original’ Hofstadgroup and as sup-
posedly offering three female suicide bombers to his Piranha contact, who 
declined the offer because he wanted men only for his attack on the AIVD.86 
The Belgian man was arrested in Morocco in November 2005 on charges not 
related to the Piranha case. The available data offers no further information 
on the meeting, leaving it unclear exactly what happened.
Signs of the third potential terrorist plot came to the fore in October. 
AIVD information from the beginning of the month indicated that the Pira-
nha group’s participants were, to differing degrees, involved in preparations 
for a terrorist attack. This potential attack was to occur before 31 October 
2005, the date set for the main protagonist’s appeal hearing. The plot was 
thought to consist of two parts; one group of attackers would target politi-
cians while the second would force entry to the AIVD headquarters and 
blow it up. None of the perpetrators expected to survive the attacks. The 
AIVD information also indicated that the Piranha ringleader was looking 
for additional weaponry; ten AK-47 assault rif les, two silenced pistols, and 
ten vests containing eight kilograms of explosives each. The individual in 
question apparently expected a call from someone to discuss delivery of 
these goods. Phone intercepts revealed that a meeting between a possible 
supplier and the ringleader was arranged for 12 October. However, despite 
84 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 43-44; Den Hartigh and Van Dam, ‘Requisitoir 
“Piranha” Deel 1’, 7.
85 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 151-52.
86 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 144-45.
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agreeing to a time and place over the phone, the Piranha participant did 
not show up.87
The next day, the police received additional information from the AIVD 
that precipitated the remaining suspects’ arrest. Most important was a 
videotaped will in which the group’s main protagonist, seated next to the 
Skorpion submachine gun, threatened the Dutch state and its citizens with 
violence for, among other things, the country’s involvement in the Iraq 
war. Until the Dutch ‘left Muslims alone and chose the path of peace’ the 
‘language of the sword’ would reign.88 He also appeared to bid his family 
farewell by stating that he ‘commits this deed out of fear for the punishment 
of Allah’.89 In addition, he called upon the faithful to rise up in defense of 
oppressed Muslims worldwide and spoke out in support of his incarcer-
ated Hofstadgroup friends.90 Just how the AIVD got its hands on this video 
has remained unclear. The person seen on the video claims that an AIVD 
informant assisted him with the recording and then supplied it to the AIVD 
after staging a break-in of his home as cover for the tape’s disappearance.91
Acting on the above information, the police arrested the remaining 
Piranha suspects on 14 October without incident. Among the items found 
during house searches were three gas masks, several balaclavas, radical 
and extremist materials and, notably, a document made by one of the 
suspects called ‘lessons in safety’ which underlined the Piranha group’s 
greater awareness of and concern for the authorities’ interest in them.92 The 
remaining two f irearms – the Skorpion and the revolver – were, however, 
not recovered at this time. They were found on 28 August 2006 in a cellar 
belonging to one of the Piranha suspects by plumbers called in to address 
flooding on the premises.93 The October 2005 arrests effectively put an end 
to the Hofstadgroup; its most extremist elements were imprisoned and 
the remainder made no attempt to resuscitate the group a third time. As 
Chapter 5 explores in more detail, the group’s lack of widespread popular 
support and the absence, at least at that time, of a sizeable community 
87 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 46-53; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie 
Uit Strafdossier’.
88 ‘Ik zeg jullie dat er tussen ons en jullie alleen de taal van het zwaard zal gelden tot jullie de 
moslims met rust laten en de weg van de vrede kiezen’: NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
89 ‘weet dat ik deze daad verricht uit vrees voor de straf van Allah’: Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 273-74.
92 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 57, 161; Meijer, ‘Inhoud Van De Religieuze’, 
1-74.
93 Den Hartigh and Van Dam, ‘Requisitoir “Piranha” Deel 1’, 8; Groen and Kranenberg, Women 
Warriors, 134-35.
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of like-minded individuals in the Netherlands, essentially prohibited the 
development of a successor group.
3.6 An overview of the court cases
The f irst decade of the 21st century saw the Dutch government enact vari-
ous legal and policy measures intended to increase its counterterrorism 
effectiveness.94 One of these was the Crimes of Terrorism Act, which was 
passed in August 2004. This Act enabled judges to pass heavier sentences 
on suspects if they were found to have committed their crimes with terrorist 
intent. It also specif ied recruitment for terrorism and membership of an 
organization that intended to commit terrorist crimes as distinct offenses. 
The latter became known as article 140a of the Dutch Criminal Code, which 
was based on article 140 that deals with organized crime.95
On 26 July 2005, Van Gogh’s assassin was found guilty of, inter alia, murder 
with a terrorist intent, multiple counts of attempted murder on bystanders 
and police off icers, and threatening Hirsi Ali with terrorist intent. He was 
sentenced to life in prison.96 In March 2006, the f irst judgment was passed 
on whether the Hofstadgroup had constituted a terrorist organization. On 
10 March, the Rotterdam District Court found nine out of fourteen suspects 
guilty of membership of a terrorist organization as described in the recently 
minted Article 140a.97
However, in early 2008 The Hague Court of Appeal acquitted seven of 
them on this particular count, arguing that ‘[t]he Hofstadgroup had insuf-
ficient organizational substance to warrant the existence of an organization 
as intended in articles 140 and 140a’.98 This judgment was in turn revoked in 
February 2010, when the Supreme Court ordered a partial retrial after ruling 
that the Court of Appeal’s grounds for acquittal had been partly based on 
an incorrect interpretation of the law.99 The cases of these seven individuals 
were referred to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. In December 2010, that 
Court ruled that the defendants had indeed participated in a criminal 
94 Commissie Evaluatie Antiterrorismebeleid, ‘Naar Een Integrale Evaluatie Van Antiter-
rorismemaatregelen’, 16-18.
95 Donner, ‘Wet Van 24 Juni 2004’, 1-9.
96 Amsterdam District Court, ‘LJN AU0025’, 15-16.
97 Rotterdam District Court, ‘LJN AV5108’, 3, 42-44.
98 The Hague Court of Appeal, ‘LJN BC4178’, 1; ‘LJN BC4183’, 1; ‘LJN BC4182’, 1; ‘LJN BC4171’, 1; 
‘LJN BC2576’, 1; ‘LJN BC4129’, 1; ‘LJN BC4177’, 1.
99 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ‘LJN BK5175’, 1.
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and terrorist organization.100 After another referral to the Supreme Court, 
however, the Den Bosch Court of Appeal ruled in June 2015 that two of 
these suspects had not been members of a terrorist organization after all.101
The trials against the six Piranha suspects followed a similar course. On 
1 December 2006, the Rotterdam District Court found five of the defendants 
guilty of preparation for or furtherance of a terrorist offense. However, 
the Court did not convict them of constituting a terrorist organization. 
One suspect was acquitted of the charges brought against him.102 On the 
second of October 2008, however, The Hague Court of Appeal ruled that 
four of those convicted in 2006 had indeed been members of a terrorist 
organization.103 In late 2011, the Supreme Court decreed a retrial for three 
of them. In one case, the Supreme Court found that the defense had not 
been given access to all relevant intelligence sources.104 With regard to 
the other two individuals, the Court ruled that participation in a terrorist 
organization had been insuff iciently demonstrated.105 On 25 March 2014, 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal once again convicted two of these three 
individuals for membership of a terrorist organization, but acquitted the 
third on this count.106
3.7 Conclusion
The preceding pages reveal more about the Hofstadgroup than simply the 
most prominent activities of its participants. For instance, this overview 
has made clear that on the whole the Hofstadgroup did very little that 
had any direct bearing on (preparations for) terrorism. Only a small inner 
circle of extremist participants showed signs of interest in conducting an 
attack or joining jihadist insurgents overseas. Secondly, even among the 
minority of participants who appeared to be interested in conducting acts of 
terrorism, there were very few indications of communal efforts. After initial 
signs of working together in 2003’s trips abroad and the connections that 
were established with a jihadist suspect in Spain, 2004 was characterized 
100 Amsterdam Court of Appeal, ‘LJN BO7690’, 35-36; ‘LJN BO8032’, 40-43; ‘LJN BO9014’, 39-40; 
‘LJN BO9015’, 41-42; ‘LJN BO9016’, 36-37; ‘LJN BO9017’, 38; ‘LJN BO9018’, 41-44.
101 ‘Terreurverdachten Hofstadgroep’.
102 Rotterdam District Court, ‘LJN AZ3589’, 40, 42-44.
103 The Hague Court of Appeal, ‘LJN BF3987’, 1.
104 Willems, ‘Zaak Tegen Terrorismeverdachte’.
105 Beentjes, ‘Zaken Terreurverdachten Moeten Over’.
106 Amsterdam Court of Appeal, ‘GHAMS:2014:914’, 23; ‘GHAMS:2014:905’, 21; ‘Drie Jaar Cel’.
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by individual and ad hoc activities. Not until 2005’s ‘Piranha’ continuation 
did the Hofstadgroup once again show signs of a communal pursuit of 
shared goals.
These f indings thus provide some f irst insights into the group’s organi-
zational characteristics, providing a link to the focus of the next chapter. 
They also suggest that involvement in the Hofstadgroup could take on a 
variety of forms. Only a minority of participants actually became involved 
in (preparations for) acts of terrorism. This underlines the importance of 
keeping in mind that ‘involvement’, and the processes that preceded it, were 
distinctly heterogeneous in nature. A crucial question that this poses, is 
what distinguished those who planned or perpetrated acts of terrorism from 
those who did not. Before the analysis can turn to the factors underlying 
the various involvement processes, however, the descriptive part of this 
study needs to be completed. To that end, the next chapter delves deeper 
into what the Hofstadgroup was by discussing the group’s ideological and 
organizational nature, as well as shedding further light on the degree to 
which it was communally involved in terrorism.
4 The ideological and organizational 
nature of the Hofstadgroup1
The Hofstadgroup is frequently described as a homegrown jihadist terrorist 
network2 and has even been labeled a ‘quintessential’ one.3 But to what extent 
is this designation justif ied? Before examining how and why involvement in 
this group came about, it must be made clear what participants were becom-
ing involved in. The present chapter discusses what the Hofstadgroup was by 
critically examining the characteristics commonly attributed to it, beginning 
with its ‘homegrown’ dimension and continuing to its ideology. Subsequently, 
the chapter discusses the Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics and 
f inally the degree to which it was communally involved in terrorism.
4.1 Drawing the Hofstadgroup’s boundaries
When discussing what the Hofstadgroup was, a f irst diff iculty is def ining 
the group’s size; who exactly were its participants? Due to its ambiguous 
organizational structure and lack of anything resembling a formal list 
of ‘members’, this is a diff icult question to answer. In this book, the Hof-
stadgroup is assumed to have encompassed approximately 38 individuals.4 
This number includes all those arrested as suspected group members 
during the various police investigations, witnesses who participated in 
group meetings at least once, as well as any individuals listed in suspects’ 
or witnesses’ statements that also matched this criterion. This def inition 
of ‘participation’ is by no means def initive but it provides a basic way of 
demarcating the group’s boundaries. It is also supported by an interviewee, 
who explained that the group was broader than those arrested following 
Van Gogh’s murder.5 It appears that the public prosecutor was aware of this, 
but decided to keep several individuals out of the criminal case against the 
Hofstadgroup in order to keep it manageable.6
1 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Schuurman, Eijkman, and Bakker, 
‘The Hofstadgroup Revisited’.
2 E.g. Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 332-33; Silber and Bhatt, ‘Radicalization in the West’, 6.
3 Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 579.
4 Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor, 206-24.
5 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3-4.
6 Police Investigator 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1.
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4.2 Homegrown jihadism
What exactly makes a jihadist group a homegrown one? Crone and Har-
row argue that the concept of homegrown terrorism has two dimensions; 
belonging, or the extent to which the terrorists are raised in or attached 
to the West, and their degree of operational autonomy from foreign terror-
ist groups.7 The 9/11 attacks, for instance, were clearly not a homegrown 
operation, as the attackers were foreign nationals rather than U.S. citizens 
and because the attacks were coordinated by and executed on behalf of al-
Qaeda. Seen from this perspective, how ‘homegrown’ was the Hofstadgroup?
4.2.1 The Hofstadgroup’s homegrown aspects
Looking at ‘belonging’ f irst, the majority of the 38 participants were born in 
the Netherlands or held double nationalities. However, there was a sizable 
minority of foreigners (seven Moroccans, one Syrian). Some of these foreign 
nationals had spent a signif icant part of their lives in the Netherlands, 
making it likely they felt a considerable degree of belonging to the country 
despite not being citizens. Yet two of the foreign nationals with prominent 
positions in the group’s radical and extremist inner circle were recent im-
migrants and thus unlikely to have felt strongly attached to the country; 
the middle-aged Syrian man known as Abu Khaled who f irst arrived in 
Germany as an asylum seeker in 1995 and a young Moroccan man who 
played an important role in the group’s 2005 resurgence.8 The group was 
thus mainly but not exclusively a Dutch phenomenon.
Similarly, the Hofstadgroup seems to have enjoyed a high, but not 
absolute degree of autonomy. Several participants had connections to 
foreign nationals whose backgrounds suggest a possible link with Islamist 
terrorist groups. For instance, Van Gogh’s murderer was acquainted with 
two Chechen men, one of whose uncle was suspected by the American 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of supplying Chechen jihadists with 
weapons.9 In addition to Abu Khaled, the Syrian preacher mentioned above, 
three other middle-aged Syrian men with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood 
also appeared on the group’s fringes.10 Characterizing the nature of these 
connections is diff icult as they were never investigated in detail. It appears, 
7 Crone and Harrow, ‘Homegrown Terrorism in the West’, 521.
8 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 40.
9 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 93-96; Derix, ‘Hoe Kwam Toch’.
10 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 32, 37; VERD: 19664-825; GET: 8349, 8415.
tHE idEological and organizational naturE oF tHE HoFstadgroup 79
however, that none of these men tried to exert any kind of direct control 
over the Hofstadgroup, leaving its autonomy intact.
The clearest examples of foreign extremists exerting some form of 
operational control over (parts of) the group stem from October 2003. The 
f irst concerned an Islamist militant residing in Spain, the second centered 
on an unnamed Pakistani or Afghan ‘emir’ who had apparently instructed 
one of the Hofstadgroup participants to return to the Netherlands to ‘collect 
balloons’.11 Suspicions that these connections might be in some way related 
to an impending terrorist attack could not be substantiated. Instead, it 
seems likely that the militant in Spain sought the group’s assistance with 
acquiring a passport and f inances and that the emir’s instructions revolved 
around trying to motivate other young Muslims to travel to Pakistan or 
Afghanistan. The latter point is supported by the fact that two Hofstadgroup 
participants undertook a ‘recruitment drive’ via the Internet during the fall 
of 2003 with precisely that purpose in mind.12
As detailed in the previous chapter, the f irst round of arrests in October 
2003 and the failure of the second trip to Pakistan or Afghanistan at the 
end of the year made the group more cautious and inward looking. While 
some participants continued to have connections with foreign nation-
als suspected of extremist views or even terrorist intentions, there were 
no indications that such links impinged on the group’s autonomy in any 
clear sense. In short, it appears that the Hofstadgroup was predominantly 
an autonomously operating group and that it became relatively more so 
from late 2003 onward. At the same time, the small number of examples 
of outside interference and the prominent positions held by at least two 
foreign nationals mean that the group was not some kind of ‘ideal type’ of 
the homegrown jihadist typology.
4.3 Ideology and terrorism
Maynard defines ideology as ‘a distinctive system of normative, semantic, 
and/or reputedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or 
societies, which underpins their understandings of their political world 
and shapes their political behavior’.13 Ideologies are cognitive frameworks 
that provide a way of ordering information about the world and imbuing 
11 Ibid., 01/01: 23.
12 Ibid., 123-26.
13 Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology’, 824.
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it with meaning.14 Extremist ideologies can justify violence through their 
ability to provide motives, (e.g. by painting a specif ic group as a dangerous 
threat) legitimacy (e.g. by depicting the use of force as the only option) 
and rationalizations (e.g. utopian ideals justify using violence).15 Extremist 
ideological beliefs are also an effective way of attenuating individuals’ 
inhibitions against killing or harming others by coupling an acute sense 
of crisis with a black and white worldview; the in-group’s existence is 
threatened by implacable foes; exceptional circumstances that legitimize 
and necessitate the use of violence.16
As later chapters will explore in detail, ideological convictions alone are 
insufficient to explain involvement in a terrorist group or participation in an 
act of terrorism. Ideological beliefs may directly motivate such behavior, but 
they are generally one of many factors and not a suff icient explanation in 
and of themselves. That being said, ideological beliefs can play an important 
role in guiding behavior. As Sageman writes, the global jihadi movement is 
driven by a ‘Salaf i ideology [that] determines its mission, sets its goals, and 
guides its tactics’.17 A group’s ideology can therefore provide important clues 
to its stance on the use of political violence, identifying perceived enemies 
and allies, clarifying the goals being strived for and, crucially, the conditions 
under which the use of violence is seen as legitimate. Examining a terrorist 
or extremist group’s ideology is therefore a key aspect of reaching a more 
accurate understanding of its nature.
The Hofstadgroup is commonly designated a ‘Salaf i’, ‘jihadist’, or 
‘Salaf i-Jihadist’ group.18 Salaf i-Jihadists form the militant branch of the 
heterogeneous and international Salaf ist movement. Its devotees share 
a desire to return to a ‘pure’ Islam as practiced by the faith’s earliest ad-
herents (the Salafs) and place a strong emphasis on a strict and literalistic 
adherence to the precepts found in the Quran and the examples set by the 
Prophet Muhammad.19 Contemporary Salaf ists also share a stringent form 
of monotheism that stresses the concept of ‘tawhid’, or the oneness of god 
14 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 90.
15 Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology’, 828-30.
16 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 90; Della Porta, Social Movements, 174-76; Juergensmeyer, 
Terror in the Mind of God, 149-63, 174-79; Neumann, ‘The Message’, 47-48; Pyszczynski, Motyl, 
and Abdollahi, ‘Righteous Violence’, 26.
17 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 1.
18 Bartolo, ‘Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism’, 51; Nesser, ‘Lessons Learned’, 
3; Nesser, ‘Chronology of Jihadism’, 936; Noivo, ‘Jihadism in Portugal’, 6; Sageman, ‘Confronting 
Al-Qaeda’, 5; Silber and Bhatt, ‘Radicalization in the West’, 16; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 587; 
Vidino, ‘Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity’, 4.
19 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 207, 209.
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and his exclusive right to be worshiped as the sole creator and lawmaker in 
the universe. As such, secular laws and institutions are rejected as idolatry 
in the sense that they violate tawhid by worshiping the man-made instead 
of the divinely-inspired.20
Ref lecting the multiple perspectives from which Islamist thinkers 
throughout history have looked to the Salafs for guidance on worldly 
problems, several key distinctions can still be drawn in today’s Salaf ist 
movement. These distinctions stem not so much from key principles or 
the goals being pursued, but from disagreements on how to achieve them. 
Wiktorowicz has popularized a three-fold division of the Salafist movement 
into ‘politicos’ who strive to achieve their theocratic ideals through political 
participation, ‘purists’ who eschew politics in favor of proselytization and 
religious education, and ‘jihadists’ who believe revolutionary violence is 
necessary to bring about change and safeguard a community of believers 
beleaguered by apostasy, heresy, and the aggressive geopolitics of unbeliev-
ers such as the United States.21
Although their ultimate goal is to bring about change in Muslim lands, 
prominent Salaf i-Jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda have internationalized 
their struggle. This development is at least partly based on the idea that 
the ‘near enemy’ of corrupt, un-Islamic Middle Eastern regimes cannot be 
toppled until the ‘far enemy’ of Western governments that support them, 
and which have invaded Muslim states, have been forced to withdraw their 
influence and presence from the Islamic regions of the world.22 As such, 
Salaf i-Jihadist ideology provides a justif ication for the use of political vio-
lence against Western targets based on a fusion of geopolitical and religious 
motives. A second ideological justif ication for violence that is important for 
understanding the Hofstadgroup revolves around the practice of ‘takf ir’, 
or excommunication. Because apostasy is a grave offense within Islam, 
denouncing Muslims as unbelievers is a powerful theological weapon that 
legitimizes the use of violence against rulers and people who are ostensibly 
co-religionists.23
It should be pointed out that Salaf i-Jihadists are themselves not a ho-
mogeneous group. Important differences in terms of strategy and principle 
20 Ibid., 207-10; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 151.
21 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 207-39. For an alternative typology, see: 
Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, 8-13.
22 Brooke, ‘Jihadist Strategic Debates’, 212-18; Turner, ‘From Cottage Industry to International 
Organisation’, 544-45.
23 Cozzens, ‘Al-Takf ir Wa’l Hijra’, 500-01, 503; Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 
229-30.
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remain. For instance, although al-Qaeda eventually focused its efforts on 
f ighting the ‘far enemy’ epitomized by the United States, the organization 
was initially hamstrung by internal discord over this matter. Another im-
portant distinction to keep in mind for the discussion of the Hofstadgroup’s 
ideology is that although the principle of takf ir is recognized by a broad 
range of radical and extremist groups, they differ in their interpretation of 
when the criteria for excommunication are met.24 As the following para-
graphs illustrate, many of the divisions within the contemporary Salaf ist 
movement, and discussions over the legitimate use of takfir, were mirrored 
among the Hofstadgroup’s participants.
4.3.1 The Hofstadgroup’s ideology
Shared religious beliefs were the most important factor binding Hof-
stadgroup participants together.25 In a general sense, the entire group can be 
positioned within the broad Salafist revivalist movement. This is evidenced 
f irst and foremost by the primacy attached to a strict interpretation of 
tawhid and the related necessity to reject all secular governments and 
institutions. These themes appear to have been the most frequent subjects 
of group meetings, and the essence of the teachings of Abu Khaled, the mid-
dle-aged Syrian man who provided the group with religious instruction.26 
Equally revealing, one interviewee declared that the f irst question asked 
of newcomers was ‘do you know what tawhid means?’27 Many participants 
possessed (parts of) a large digital ‘library’ containing a wide range of works 
by Islamic scholars, jurists, and theologians representing various strands of 
Salaf ist thinking.28 These ranged from the influential thirteenth-century 
jurist and Salaf ist scholar Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya to more contemporary 
and politicized authors such as Sayyid Qutb, an erstwhile militant leader 
of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
24 Cozzens, ‘Al-Takf ir Wa’l Hijra’, 500-01, 503; Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 
228-34.
25 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 1; 
Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
26 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 136-40; 01/17: 4002, 4026, 4048-50, 4090-91, 4096, 
98, 4129, 4179, 4146, 4201; AHB02/26: 3796-803; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 2-3; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 8-9; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 24; Erkel, Samir, 190-92; Vermaat, 
Nederlandse Jihad, 140, 94.
27 ‘weet je wat Tawheed inhoudt?’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
28 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 47; NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 
2; Wubbels, ‘Mohammed B. Strijdt Verder’.
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Surprisingly, however, the Hofstadgroup’s participants were largely 
but not exclusively drawn to the Salaf i-Jihadist strand of thinking.29 For 
instance, two persons with misgivings about the ideas espoused by the more 
extreme elements within the group asked a Dutch Salaf ist imam loyal to 
the Saudi-Arabian regime for advice, thereby displaying an allegiance to 
such established religious authority reminiscent of ‘purist’ sensibilities.30 
Two others candidly declared during police questioning that they sup-
ported the introduction of Islamic law, but only if a majority of people in 
the Netherlands voted for it, thus hinting at opinions more in line with 
politicos than jihadists.31 Another three seem to have had little interest in 
radical or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam altogether.32
Within the confines of the Hofstadgroup’s largely Salaf ist interpretation 
of Islam, there appears to have been a surprising degree of tolerance for 
differing opinions. It seems that this was due in part to a sense among the 
more extremist participants that newcomers could not be expected to 
immediately embrace ‘true’ Islam.33 Once someone was considered a true 
brother or sister in the Hofstadgroup’s extremist views on Islam, dissension 
was treated with markedly less indifference and could trigger considerable 
verbal outrage.34 Still, the lack of a singular, exclusively extremist, and 
rigorously enforced ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’ is striking.
These f indings add a degree of nuance to discussions about the beliefs 
of the Hofstadgroup’s participants. But they should not detract from the 
overarching conclusion that most of the group’s participants displayed an 
aff inity with an extremist Salaf i-Jihadist interpretation of Islam. This can 
be gleaned from their possession of documents, videos, and audio recordings 
which emphasized the legitimacy and necessity of waging armed jihad 
and their adoration of key f igures in the jihadist movement such as Bin 
Laden and the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the outspokenly violent Jordanian 
militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.35
29 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 128-29, 83.
30 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4018-20, 4129, 4132, 4146, 4148, 4159; Groen and 
Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 98-99.
31 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 20083, 20567.
32 Ibid., VERD: 19477-78, 19480, 19597, 19654, 20522, 20535, 20566; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-4, 6-7.
33 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 1; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3.
34 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3.
35 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 131, 134, 142-47, 160-61, 171-72; 01/13: 47; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 21, 33; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 9; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 7.
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Although a large segment of the Hofstadgroup subscribed to an ideology 
that legitimizes and even calls for the use of violence against Western states 
and impious Muslims, this did not immediately translate into a desire to 
commit terrorism. Initially, the group’s most militant participants took 
from Salaf i-Jihadism the understanding that jihad was a personal duty, 
yet saw it as a defensive form of warfare against foreign aggressors. In 2003, 
this led four participants to attempt to reach conflict zones in Chechnya 
and Pakistan or Afghanistan.36 There is little to suggest that these trips 
were made to prepare for a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. Instead, the 
available data, such as a farewell letter left by one of them, indicates they 
intended to stay with the insurgents.37 Essentially, for the main part of 2003, 
core participants in the Hofstadgroup were would-be foreign f ighters, but 
not yet would-be terrorists.38
Towards the fall of 2003, the group’s most militant participants increas-
ingly began to see jihad as something that could be waged offensively as 
well. Two developments were central to this change. In October 2003, the 
Dutch police arrested several participants and found one of them in pos-
session of materials indicating an interest in constructing an improvised 
explosive device.39 Based on an unfinished autobiography written while 
in custody and a martyr’s video recorded in 2005, this individual came 
to justify violence against the Netherlands for its (military) support of 
the United States and what he saw as unwarranted aggression against 
Muslim countries.40 Numerous other participants developed a strong 
sense of antipathy towards the Dutch government for similar reasons.41 
One interviewee explicitly named the Dutch military presence in Iraq 
as contributing to changing the group’s focus from participation in the 
international jihad to using violence in the Netherlands.42 Catalyzing this 
shift was the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid. To the group’s most militant 
participants, the bombing represented a dramatic demonstration that 
36 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 33; 01/13: 140-43; GET: 18061-62, 18840, 18452; 
A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 10-19.
37 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 163; AHD08/37: 8571, 8767; AHD09/38: 9055-56; 
A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 10-11; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 258-59; Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 349.
38 Making them similar to other jihadist extremists in the Netherlands. See: De Bie, De Poot, 
and Van der Leun, ‘Shifting Modus Operandi’, 422-35.
39 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 25-26.
40 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4-5, 9; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
41 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 131; 01/13: 61; 01/17: 4069; AHA05/22: 2228; 
Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, Appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven 
of vertaald door Mohammed B., 32-34.
42 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 23.
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terrorism in Europe was both practically feasible and seen as permissible 
by the international jihadist movement.43
Late 2003 also saw the group’s extremist inner circle begin to consider 
terrorism in the Netherlands for religious reasons. During the fall, one 
individual jubilantly chatted online about slaughtering ‘all those fake Mus-
lims’ and in a later conversation claimed that Dutch Member of Parliament 
Geert Wilders, known for his strong criticism of Islam, should be killed for 
insulting the religion.44 Another condemned 90% of the mujahedeen in 
Chechnya as apostates.45 At this time, however, other participants includ-
ing Abu Khaled who led many gatherings still advocated a modicum of 
restraint in wielding takfir as a theological weapon.46 Based on participants’ 
accounts, it seems that the use of takfir became increasingly indiscriminate 
from 2004 onward, leading to internal disagreements, and causing several 
participants to distance themselves from the group.47 According to one 
former participant, judging whether other Muslims’ actions and words were 
grounds for excommunication was an almost everyday practice.48
Some participants went so far as to excommunicate virtually everyone 
who was not a part of their group; one allegedly even ‘did takf ir’ on Bin 
Laden while others excommunicated each other.49 The extremes to which 
some took takf ir problematizes the extent to which these individuals can 
be considered as falling within the Salaf i-Jihadist ideological current. 
While a broad range of Islamist groups wield takf ir, they usually do so to 
delegitimize Muslim governments in order to justify violent resistance.50 
Excommunicating vast swathes of Muslims appears to be more in line with 
extremist sects such as Egypt’s now defunct Takfir wal Hijra.51 There are no 
signs that (elements of) the Hofstadgroup ever claimed to be successors to 
this extremist offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, some former 
participants did refer to the Hofstadgroup’s most avid excommunicators 
43 Ibid., 22; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 5.
44 ‘al die nep moslims’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 125; AHD09/38: 9077; 
Alberts and Derix, ‘Balkenende in 2003’.
45 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8550.
46 Ibid., AHA05/22: 2167-68; AHA09/26: 3799-803; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 1.
47 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002-03, 4018-20, 4030, 4048-58, 4062, 4085-86, 
4092, 4100, 4125-127, 4129, 4204; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 36-37, 93.
48 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3.
49 Ibid., 3; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 166, 181.
50 Cozzens, ‘Al-Takf ir Wa’l Hijra’, 497, 500-01.
51 Ibid., 489-510.
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as ‘takf iris’, and one interviewee classif ied the group as ‘sect like’.52 Like 
the Salaf ists and jihadist that inspired it, the Hofstadgroup was clearly not 
an ideologically homogeneous entity, but one in which various currents of 
thought were reflected.
Crucial in sustaining and strengthening this trend towards a greater 
emphasis on religious justif ications for violence, was the murderer-to-be 
of Van Gogh. In July 2004, he translated a section of Ibn Taymiyya’s work 
which postulates that it is a Muslim’s duty to kill anyone who insults the 
Prophet Muhammad.53 This led the assassin to believe it was his personal 
duty to commit violence in defense of his faith. Although the murderer was 
the only one to act on his beliefs, his ideas on religiously justif ied violence 
were shared by at least the group’s inner circle. Several other participants 
made explicit statements in favor of murdering Ayaan Hirsi Ali, especially 
after the short Islam-critical f ilm she had made with Van Gogh, Submission, 
part 1, was broadcast at the end of August 2004.54 Likewise, various sources 
suggest tacit and even outspoken support for the killing of Van Gogh on 
religious grounds. One inner-circle participant openly told the police that 
Van Gogh deserved to be executed for his offenses to Islam.55
Given these developments, it is interesting to note that the participants 
in 2005’s ‘Piranha’ resurgence of the Hofstadgroup appear to have reverted 
to predominantly geopolitical justif ications for terrorist attacks in the 
Netherlands. While the police found evidence that the suspects had been 
gathering information on the addresses of several Dutch politicians, most 
of them did not have an outspokenly ‘anti-Islam’ profile. More importantly, 
in a martyr’s video recorded in late 2005, one of the ringleaders strongly 
condemned the Dutch government for its involvement in the Iraq war and 
threatened violence against the Dutch people for their complicity in this 
endeavor.56 These f luctuations in the justif ications for violence, from an 
emphasis on geopolitics in 2003, to religious motives in 2004 and back to 
geopolitics in 2005, indicate just how diff icult it is to speak of a clearly 
def ined or commonly shared ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’.
Like the militants and scholars who inspired them, the group’s most 
extremist participants held differing and changing views on the form jihad 
52 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002-204; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, 
‘Personal Interview 1’, 3.
53 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 155-56; Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 11.
54 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 74, 161-62.
55 Ibid., VERD: 20462; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 21; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 41.
56 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 34-35; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; Groen and 
Kranenberg, ‘Samir A. In Afgesplitste Terreurgroep’.
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was to take. While some were narrowly motivated to punish blasphemers, 
others were inspired by geopolitical events to defend the Muslim ummah; 
while some practiced takf ir without restraint, others acknowledged at 
least some boundaries. While in 2003 militant participants saw jihad in 
a defensive light and sought to aid overseas Islamist insurgents in their 
f ight against foreign aggressors, an ‘offensive’ interpretation of jihad that 
legitimized violence in the Netherlands began to take hold from late 2003 
onward. Furthermore, while most participants adhered to the Salaf i-
Jihadist current, a minority more closely resembled its political and purist 
strands of thought, and some even appeared completely disinterested in 
religious matters.
These conclusions are important not just because they infuse some nu-
ance into the debate about the group’s nature. The relative ‘tolerance’ for 
views not completely in line with Salaf ist-Jihadist principles, the sect-like 
elements that took the excommunication of Muslims to extremes, and the 
different opinions on how to implement jihad meant that the Hofstadgroup 
remained an ideologically somewhat ambiguous entity. As a result, there 
was never a concrete blueprint for what the group hoped to achieve, no clear 
ideological foundation that could form the basis for communal efforts. This 
relative diversity of ideological views also contributed to ambiguity in an 
organizational sense, as at least initially it appears that essentially anyone 
who subscribed to basic Salaf ist principles could participate. Ideologically, 
the Hofstadgroup was largely but never exclusively wedded to views that 
supported the use of terrorist violence.
4.4 Defining terrorist organizations
The Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics are assessed using three 
contrasting perspectives found in the literature on terrorism. The f irst is 
Crenshaw’s view of terrorist groups as organizations characterized by a de-
f ined structure, a systematic decision-making process, clearly defined roles 
and tasks for members, recognized leadership and authority and, lastly, the 
collective pursuit of clearly def ined organizational goals.57 Second, there is 
Sageman’s concept of contemporary jihadist groups as ambiguously defined 
networks.58 One of the few at least somewhat specific definitions of a jihadist 
network is given by the Dutch intelligence service AIVD, who describe it 
57 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 69.
58 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 140-43.
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as a ‘f luid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure comprising a number of 
interrelated persons (radical Muslims) who are linked both individually and 
on an aggregate level (cells/groups). They have at least a temporary common 
interest, i.e. the pursuit of a jihadism-related goal (including terrorism)’.59 
Finally, Ligon et al. describe groups as social arrangements that lack shared 
efforts directed at attaining a commonly held goal.60
4.4.1 The Hofstadgroup’s organizational structure
Evidence for a defined organizational structure is almost entirely absent 
in the case of the Hofstadgroup until its second incarnation in early 2005. 
To begin with, many participants have categorically denied the existence 
of any kind of formal group or organization.61 Furthermore, no ‘off icial’ list 
of participants was ever encountered and there does not appear to have 
been an initiation process for aspirants nor any other sort of (semi-)formal 
mechanism for distinguishing between those within the group and those 
outside of it.62 Instead, the Hofstadgroup resembled an amorphous com-
munity of like-minded individuals spread over several nearby cities.63 It was 
not truly one group but a collection of smaller subgroups, revolving around 
a nucleus in The Hague and one in Amsterdam.64 As a result of this lack of 
centralization, not all participants knew each other.65 The spread-out nature 
of the group further underlines the ambiguity of its organizational structure.
There is even considerable confusion over whether a commonly accepted 
name for the group existed. Some publications, videos, and websites related 
to the Hofstadgroup began to feature a logo bearing the titles ‘Lions of 
Tawheed’ and ‘Polder Mujahideen’66 from early 2004 onward. Yet there 
are contradictory accounts regarding the degree to which these monikers 
59 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 14.
60 Ligon et al., ‘Putting the “O” in VEOs’, 120.
61 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19476-77, 19866, 19918, 20005, 20017, 20080, 
20228, 20363; GET: 18415; 01/17: 4099-4100; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Inter-
view 1’, 3-4; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 14-15.
62 Although one participant did drink the breast milk of the Syrian preacher’s wife, this 
seemingly ritualistic act of bonding was not performed by others within the group and appears 
to have aff irmed a private bond of friendship bordering on kinship rather than a pledge of 
allegiance. Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19744-45; Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 345.
63 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3-4; Van der Hulst, ‘Terroristische 
Netwerken’, 8-27.
64 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 1.
65 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 164; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1.
66 A ‘polder’ is a characteristic feature of the Dutch landscape.
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were used by the wider group.67 While one witness recalled hearing one 
or two individuals referring to themselves as ‘Lions of Tawheed’, an inter-
viewee mentioned that this term was used largely in jest.68 Another former 
participant did identify himself as a ‘Lion of Tawheed’ but implied that it 
was not so much a specif ic group name as a broader term used to express 
one’s adherence to this core tenet of Salaf ist Islam.69 The name ‘Lions of 
Tawheed’ seemed to play a more prominent role during 2005’s Hofstadgroup 
resurgence, where it turns up in association with numerous publications 
and videos produced and promulgated by one of the core participants.70 It 
remains unclear, however, whether the other participants in the Piranha 
group designated themselves as such.
In the wake of Van Gogh’s murder, two individuals within the extrem-
ist inner circle were overheard identifying themselves with the murderer 
and using the name the ‘Brigades of the Islamic Jihad’.71 Like the ‘Lions 
of Tawheed’ designation, it remains unclear whether this truly reflected 
a commonly used group name or merely individual braggadocio. Based 
on the currently available data, it seems likely that these examples reflect 
the shared kinship of the group’s extremist inner circle and indicate some 
early ad hoc attempts at forging a stronger collective identity among them. 
It is unlikely, however, that these designations reflected the existence of a 
tangible group structure or that they encompassed the wider Hofstadgroup.
The Hofstadgroup lacked true leadership or even a rudimentary 
hierarchical structure for the better part of its existence.72 But it did 
have individuals who stood higher on the social pecking order through, 
for example, their greater command of Arabic. Van Gogh’s murderer 
was esteemed for his knowledge of Islam, yet he does not appear to 
have occupied a leadership position and is frequently referred to as a 
rather quiet and withdrawn individual.73 The person who most closely 
resembled the group’s leader was Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian 
67 The logo may not even have been made by a participant: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 1.
68 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4099; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, 
‘Personal Interview 1’, 5.
69 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 17.
70 Meijer, ‘Inhoud Van De Religieuze’, 29-30.
71 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA07/24: 3082; Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 353-54.
72 Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 51; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 4; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 31-32; Dienst Nationale 
Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19479, 19876.
73 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 13; NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 2; Dienst Nationale 
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man mentioned earlier. His role as a religious instructor gave him a 
prominent and well-respected position within the group and a good deal 
of authority.74 At the same time, there is little to suggest his inf luence 
extended beyond providing religious instruction; there are no concrete 
signs that he took a leadership position in the sense of shaping the 
Hofstadgroup organizationally or setting out operational goals.75 Two 
former participants labeled the Syrian as an important source of religious 
knowledge and a good teacher, but not a leader or even a particularly 
inspiring individual.76
The conclusion that the Hofstadgroup lacked clear leadership needs to be 
qualif ied somewhat when looking at 2005’s Piranha case. This ‘second wave’ 
of the group brought with it tentative signs of a burgeoning hierarchy. Most 
notably, two individuals who had belonged to the ‘original’ Hofstadgroup’s 
inner circle began to direct the activities of some other group participants, 
for instance by instructing them to rent an apartment in Brussels that 
was used to hold meetings.77 Additionally, there were signs that these two 
ringleaders provided direction to group participants on matters related to 
the planning of as many as three tentative terrorist plots.78 The Piranha 
group never developed a formal hierarchy, but these developments indicate 
it might have been headed in that direction had arrests in June and October 
2005 not put an end to the group.
Two other attributes of terrorist organizations, a systematic decision-
making process and the distribution of clearly defined organizational roles 
and tasks, were also largely absent. For the most part, the group did little 
beyond holding frequent meetings where they discussed their extremist 
religious views or simply chatted and relaxed.79 Whatever activities were 
undertaken were initiated on an ad hoc basis by individuals or by small 
groups of two or three, such as the attempts to reach foreign conflict 
zones during 2003.80 There is little to indicate that these attempts were 
the result of a collectively made decision. Perhaps the strongest reference 
Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19868, 20212, 20227; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 586-87; Public 
Prosecutor 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
74 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19480, 19705-706, 19747; 01/17: 4095.
75 NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 8.
76 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 33; Former Hofstadgroup Par-
ticipant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
77 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 63, 187, 11782-85.
78 Ibid., 34-35, 8357-59, 8382-83, 8388, 8390-91; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 584.
79 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 2.
80 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 140-43; Erkel, Samir, 194-97.
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to a decision-making process stems from one of the letters left by Van 
Gogh’s murderer, in which he advises the group to discuss whether or not 
to publish a pamphlet in which he threatens the Dutch people.81 Examples 
of a distribution of tasks and roles are similarly weak and limited to the 
joint administration of at least one website and one participant’s avowedly 
self-appointed task of publishing online anything written by Van Gogh’s 
assassin-to-be.82
No data was encountered to suggest that participants in the 2005 Piranha 
case had developed a systematic decision-making process. There were, 
however, some indications that tasks relevant to the preparation of the three 
terrorist plots under consideration were distributed among participants. 
For instance, one participant was used as a courier, fetching a package 
containing information on potential targets for an attack from one of the 
group’s ringleaders and bringing it to the other.83 Likewise, the Islamic wife 
of one of these main protagonists actively tried to gather information on the 
addresses of several Dutch politicians.84 Once again it should be stressed 
that these signs of a division of tasks were distinctly tentative. Even so, they 
do mark a change from the ‘f irst wave’ Hofstadgroup that again underscores 
the Piranha group’s development towards a slightly more organizationally 
def ined entity.
To summarize, until the Hofstadgroup’s resurgence during 2005’s Piranha 
case, it appears to have lacked virtually all of the characteristics of a ter-
rorist organization as defined by Crenshaw. Its boundaries were vague and 
ambiguous and there was no hierarchy to speak of. Neither does the avail-
able data allow for the existence of a decision-making process or anything 
but the most basic division of tasks. While some of these organizational 
aspects became noticeably more pronounced in 2005, this development 
fell well short of qualifying the Hofstadgroup as an actual organization. 
The very absence of clear organizational aspects points instead towards 
the greater applicability of viewing the Hofstadgroup as a jihadist network. 
But the accuracy of this qualif ication revolves around the existence of one 
crucial element from the AIVD’s def inition of a jihadist network that has 
not yet been discussed in detail; namely, a common effort directed towards 
preparing an act of terrorism.
81 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4043.
82 Ibid., AHA04/21: 1324-43; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 32.
83 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 61.
84 Ibid., 36, 40-64, 156-62.
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4.5 Group involvement in terrorism?
The available evidence suggests that, between the fall of 2003 and the f inal 
wave of arrests in October 2005, several participants considered committing 
acts of terrorism in the Netherlands. One of them carried out his intentions 
and murdered Van Gogh, whereas the other alleged plots did not advance 
beyond rudimentary planning stages. For the ‘network’ label to be applicable 
to the Hofstadgroup, these plots and the murder of Van Gogh need to have 
represented a communal effort. The crux of the matter is, however, that the 
only actual terrorist attack that took place appears to have been the work 
of an individual and that the majority of all the other potential or alleged 
attempts to plan an attack were likewise projects initiated by individuals or 
small sub-groups. Clear group involvement in terrorism was almost entirely 
absent until 2005’s Piranha case.
House searches conducted by the Dutch police in October 2003 and 
June 2004 uncovered materials indicative of an interest in constructing 
an explosive device, but on both occasions those items belonged to one 
individual.85 Although two other participants had made inquiries about 
fertilizer in a garden store in June 2004 as well, it is unclear whether this was 
a related development.86 In any case, the police did not uncover evidence to 
substantiate a suspicion that the wider group was involved with the arrested 
individual’s attempts at constructing a bomb. This was the same person 
who, also by himself, carried out the potential reconnaissance of the AIVD 
headquarters in June 2004.87 Similarly, as chapter 3’s chronological overview 
of events described in more detail, the police investigation failed to uncover 
any concrete evidence to support a conclusion other than that the murder 
of Van Gogh was planned, prepared, and executed by a single person.88
The hand grenade thrown at police off icers in November 2004 was a pre-
meditated act of violence. The two Hofstadgroup participants who occupied 
the apartment that was stormed by the police had discussed beforehand 
that they would use the weapon to resist arrest.89 But as an essentially 
defensive measure, the intended effect of the violent act was limited to 
keeping the police at bay. It was not meant as a means of communicating 
with audiences beyond the direct targets of that violence and can therefore 
85 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 38-45.
86 Ibid., 01/01: 40; 01/13: 175.
87 Ibid., 01/01: 38-45.
88 Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir in De Strafzaak Tegen Mohammed B.’, 6-7.
89 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA07/24: 3034, 3047.
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not be classif ied as an act of terrorism. As such, this incident is given no 
further attention in this discussion of whether or not the Hofstadgroup was 
communally involved in (preparing) acts of terrorism.
In April 2005, the individual who had been found in possession of 
materials indicating an interest in constructing an explosive device was 
released from custody. Together with another extremist participant of the 
Hofstadgroup who had evaded capture following Van Gogh’s murder, he 
tried to breathe new life into what was left of the Hofstadgroup. With the 
assistance of several other individuals who had been on the fringes of the 
Hofstadgroup during 2004, as many as three rudimentary plots appear to 
have been considered. The f irst, which came to the police’s attention in 
June, revolved around attacking specif ic Dutch politicians. The second 
potential plot came to the fore in August and centered on shooting down 
an El-Al plane at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. In October 2005, the police 
received information indicating the possible existence of a third plot aimed 
at striking the AIVD headquarters. It was the brainchild of the remaining 
key player within the group, the same individual who was suspected of 
plotting a terrorist attack in October 2003 and June 2004.90
None of these plots appear to have developed beyond basic planning and 
preparatory stages and the alleged plan to attack an El-Al plane using an 
RPG comes across as distinctly fanciful. Given the controversial use of intel-
ligence information as the evidentiary basis for these terrorist conspiracies, 
care must be taken not to accept their existence as simple facts.91 Neverthe-
less, while the plots apparently developed during 2003 and 2004, as well as 
the attack on Van Gogh, were predominantly the work of individuals, the 
revitalization of the Hofstadgroup during 2005’s Piranha case produced the 
f irst tentative signs that terrorist aims were being developed communally. 
This designates 2005 as the f irst time that the Hofstadgroup clearly began 
to resemble a jihadist terrorist network.
Given the necessary time and freedom of operation, it is likely that the 
Hofstadgroup would have developed into a more clearly def ined terrorist 
network. One former participant opined that there was within the group a 
clear trend towards the communal use of violence.92 However, there is a risk 
in attaching too much importance to such statements and succumbing to 
‘what if ’ history. Given the tentative nature of the signs toward communal 
90 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 40-41, 44, 49, 51-53, 60, 158, 1056, 6386, 7273, 7278, 
8326, 11404.
91 Eijkman and Van Ginkel, ‘Compatible or Incompatible; ‘Hoge Raad Vernietigt Veroordeling’.
92 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 4-5.
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involvement in terrorism, and the fact that they did not manifest themselves 
until late in the group’s lifespan, the Hofstadgroup’s organizational nature 
is best captured by Ligon et al.’s use of the term ‘group’, which expressly 
omits the communal focus on the achievement of a shared goal.93 For the 
largest part of its existence, the Hofstadgroup was closer to what Sage-
man has called a ‘bunch of guys’, rather than a terrorist organization or 
network.94 Consequently, the Hofstadgroup is deliberately labeled as a 
group throughout this book.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined to what degree the ‘homegrown’, ‘jihadist’, ‘network’, 
and ‘terrorist’ descriptors commonly ascribed to the Hofstadgroup were 
accurate reflections of its nature. The results suggest the need for a nuanced 
perspective on all of these elements, problematizing previous claims that 
the group was a ‘quintessential’ example of this typology of terrorism.95 
Instead, it was in many ways an ambiguous entity; not entirely homegrown, 
not exclusively Salaf i-Jihadist in ideological orientation, neither clearly a 
network nor an organization but more accurately described as a ‘group’, 
and largely lacking signs of communal involvement in terrorism until its 
2005 ‘Piranha’ resurgence.
Nevertheless, some contours can be drawn. Throughout its existence, the 
group resembled a set of concentric circles. At its core was a relatively small 
number of participants who married Salafi-Jihadist beliefs to the conviction 
that jihad was a personal duty. Surrounding them was a larger group of 
individuals who shared an interpretation of Islam largely in line with Salafi-
Jihadist beliefs but who showed no real interest (yet) in becoming involved 
in acts of violence. A much smaller third group of participants adhered to 
Salaf ist principles but did not see the use of violence as legitimate. Finally, 
at the very edges of the group, there was a very small minority of individuals 
who appear to have had very little interest in fundamentalist, radical, or 
extremist interpretations of Islam altogether.
A second important conclusion is that the Hofstadgroup was never static 
but undergoing a continuous process of ideological and organizational 
development. Although the group had very few identif iable organizational 
93 Ligon et al., ‘Putting the “O” in VEOs’, 120.
94 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 69.
95 Vidino, ‘Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity’, 4.
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characteristics between 2002 and 2004, it began to develop a rudimentary 
hierarchy and division of tasks in 2005. Crucially, the Hofstadgroup was 
in an ideological sense not always and never entirely a terrorist group. In 
2003, its most militant participants wanted to become foreign f ighters, not 
terrorists conducting attacks in the Netherlands. That changed from late 
2003 onward, as several of them began to show a clear interest in carrying 
out acts of violence at home.
Although the group showed clearer signs of communal involvement in 
terrorism from 2005 onward, it always contained participants who did not 
fully, or even not at all, share the inner-circle’s beliefs in the legitimacy 
and personal necessity of engaging in this form of political violence. These 
nuances make it diff icult to close this chapter with a single, clear response 
to the question of what the Hofstadgroup was. On the one hand its extremist 
and militant inner circle made it a terrorist network under construction. On 
the other, for most of its participants the Hofstadgroup was a venue to meet 
like-minded individuals and a place where both world affairs and religion 
were discussed from a point of view that was always fundamentalist, often 
radical but not necessarily violent.

5 Structural-level factors: Facilitating 
and motivating involvement1
Following the multilevel analytical framework set out in Chapter 2, this 
second part of the book begins by looking at the influence of structural-level 
factors. Terrorist groups are shaped by the social, political, and economic 
environment in which they f ind themselves. How did such factors influence 
involvement processes in the Hofstadgroup? This chapter is organized using 
Crenshaw’s division of structural-level factors into those that enable and 
those that motivate involvement in terrorism. Consequently, the analysis 
begins with a discussion of facilitating conditions such as popular support 
for terrorism and potential counterterrorism shortcomings. It then turns 
to motivational ones such as relative deprivation and political grievances 
before concluding with a brief look at the structural-level precipitant that 
most likely triggered the murder of Theo van Gogh.
5.1 Structural-level factors influencing involvement in 
terrorism
The structural level provides an ‘ecological’ understanding of involvement 
in terrorism based on the relationship between terrorists and their sur-
roundings.2 There is no simple causal relationship between structural-level 
factors, such as illiteracy or political grievances, and terrorism.3 After all, 
of the millions of people exposed to such factors, only a handful become 
involved in terrorism. That is why referring to such structural factors as ‘root 
causes’ of terrorism, as especially politicians are sometimes apt to do, is 
misleading.4 Structural conditions are not a ‘special’ category of explanatory 
variables. They must be complemented with insights from the group and 
individual levels of analysis to provide a holistic understanding of involve-
ment in terrorism. Their contribution to this understanding, however, is 
an important one. Structural-level factors influence the opportunities and 
1 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Schuurman, Bakker, and Eijkman, 
‘Structural Influences on Involvement’.
2 Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 40.
3 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 85-86.
4 Forest, ‘Exploring Root Causes’, 1-2; Bakker, ‘Zin En Onzin’, 542-47.
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motives for involvement in terrorism as well as potentially precipitating an 
actual attack.
This tripartite distinction is based on Crenshaw’s classic work on the 
causes of terrorism. It distinguishes between ‘preconditions, factors that set 
the stage for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specif ic events 
that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’.5 Crenshaw further 
distinguishes between preconditions that ‘provide opportunities for ter-
rorism to happen’, and those that ‘directly inspire and motivate terrorist 
campaigns’.6 This distinction usefully emphasizes that structural factors 
can provide opportunities and motives for involvement in terrorism, as well 
as triggers for an actual attack. Indicative of the staying power of Crenshaw’s 
subdivision of terrorism’s structural factors, is that it has been maintained 
in more recent publications.7 Consequently, it is used here to organize the 
discussion of the various structural-level hypotheses.
A review of the literature reveals a large number of potential structural-
level factors relevant to understanding involvement in terrorism (Table 6). 
After undertaking an initial assessment of their applicability to the Hof-
stadgroup case study, it became apparent that several of them could be 
excluded as potential explanations at the outset. These omissions were 
based on one of two considerations: either the explanation was of limited 
applicability to the Netherlands as a country, or the available data simply did 
not support seeing a particular variable as relevant to the Hofstadgroup and 
its participants. Examples of the former include absolute poverty, sudden 
and marked population growth, and state collapse; conditions that have not 
existed in the Netherlands for decades. Neither was the country undergoing 
a process of urbanization or modernization, beset by war or violent social 
unrest, or suddenly exposed to the vagaries of a globalized economy.
With regard to the Hofstadgroup, it rapidly became apparent that its par-
ticipants did not attempt to manipulate the mass media for their own ends 
and there was no evidence that an overlap between criminal and terrorist 
networks exerted an influence on the group’s development. Furthermore, 
despite the Dutch involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, 
the Hofstadgroup cannot be seen as ‘spillover’ from those conflicts as the 
group was predominantly Dutch, not Afghan or Iraqi in origin. Rather than 
introduce and discuss all of the structural-level factors listed in Table 6 in 
detail only to conclude their irrelevance, the discussion limits itself to those 
5 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 381. Emphases in original.
6 Ibid.
7 Bjørgo, ‘Conclusions’, 258; Newman, ‘Exploring the “Root Causes”’, 751.
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that are in theory applicable to the Netherlands as a country and for which 
there is at least some empirical support in the data. Those excluded from 
analysis have been struck through.
Table 6  Structural-level explanations for involvement in terrorism
Preconditions: Opportunities Preconditions: Motives Precipitants
the internet (relative) deprivation government’s excessive 
use of force
popular support for terrorism intergroup inequality government attempts 
reforms
External assistance political grievances
social/ cultural facilitation of 
violence
clash of value systems
ineffective counterterrorism Economic globalization
political opportunity structure cultural globalization
modernization urbanization
population growth/ youth bulge modernization
shifts ethnic/ religious balance 
society
spillover from other conflicts
urbanization state sponsorship of terrorism
mass media power structure international 
system




5.2 Preconditions: Providing opportunities for terrorism
The preconditions discussed in this section primarily influence the oppor-
tunities for engaging in terrorist activities. The qualif ication is important, 
as several of the factors discussed in this section not only enabled involve-
ment in the Hofstadgroup, but, as will be seen, also exerted an (indirect) 
motivational influence.
5.2.1 The Internet
The Internet can provide opportunities for involvement in terrorism in 
several ways. In a practical sense, it can be used to gain knowledge about 
the construction and use of explosives. The Internet can also bring together 
like-minded individuals regardless of their physical distance from one 
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another and it can link local militants to broader global movements, all 
of this while providing at least a degree of anonymity.8 The web can also 
function as an easy-to-use propaganda platform, making a terrorist group’s 
message instantly available to a potential audience of millions. By projecting 
images of war and injustice across the globe, the Internet invites some of its 
users to suffer vicariously.9 As such, the Internet can have a crucial influence 
on what Egerton calls the construction of a ‘political imaginary’ in which 
young Muslims from Western countries establish a common cause with 
‘brothers and sisters’ they will most likely never meet.10
All of these functions of the Internet facilitated the Hofstadgroup’s 
growth. By providing easy access to large amounts of information on Islam, 
jihadist groups, and geopolitical affairs, the Internet f irst of all became 
a key enabler of participants’ adoption of radical and extremist views.11 
Data suggests that for some, the Internet became a source of answers to 
questions that parents and imams were unwilling or unable to discuss.12 
Questions such as: Does Islam condone terrorism? What is the cause of 
the Palestinians’ plight? Why did the United States and its allies intervene 
in Afghanistan and Iraq? Secondly, the World Wide Web made available 
information of a more practical sort. One participant was found in posses-
sion of photographs and maps of Dutch government buildings and critical 
infrastructure that he had downloaded from the Internet, possibly as part 
of a reconnaissance of potential targets.13 Several others had downloaded 
bomb-making manuals.14
A number of participants met each other online before developing ‘real-
world’ connections.15 In the fall of 2003, two participants used the web to 
reach out to other young Muslims in order to entice them to travel to 
8 Sageman, ‘The Turn to Political Violence’, 122-23; Stenersen, ‘The Internet’, 216-31.
9 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as Social Movement, 28.
10 Egerton, Jihad in the West, 92, 94-96; Egerton, ‘The Internet and Militant Jihadism’, 116, 
124-25.
11 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 12; ‘Personal Interview 3’, 1; A[.], 
‘Deurwaarders’, 3-9; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1; Groen and 
Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 21; Benschop, ‘A Political Murder Foretold’.
12 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3-4, 10; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, “Personal Interview 3’, 1; 
Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7-9; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 11-12.
13 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 40, 42.
14 Ibid., 01/01: 42, 144, 160-61, 171; 01/13: 102-04; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 163-66; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 43-44.
15 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 33; 01/17: 4002, 4084, 4114; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 22.
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Pakistan or Afghanistan.16 From the summer of 2004 until early 2005, one 
member of the group’s inner circle in particular utilized online communica-
tion tools to instill the ‘right’ interpretation of tawhid and the necessity 
of takf ir in aspirants.17 Thus, the Internet also provided opportunities for 
the group’s organizational and ideological development and enabled its 
activities. Finally, the Internet served as a propaganda tool.18 Hofstadgroup 
participants made and administered simple websites that expounded 
radical and extremist interpretations of Islam, advocated the rejection of 
democracy, and glorif ied terrorism. Such sites also offered practical advice 
on preparing for jihad, advertised materials published by participants, in 
particular Van Gogh’s murderer-to-be, and threatened the group’s enemies 
in texts and videos.19
The Internet was thus an essential enabling factor for the Hofstadgroup’s 
emergence. It provided an easy way for (future) participants to meet each 
other, propagate their views, and gain access to ideological and practical 
information that fueled their increasing radicalism. That is not to say 
the group was entirely dependent on this medium. For instance, as later 
chapters will show, preexisting ties of friendship, introductions, and chance 
encounters were also crucial group-formation mechanisms. Nonetheless, 
it is hard to imagine that the group’s participants would have experienced 
the same degree of exposure to extremist’s ideologies, terrorist propa-
ganda, and vicarious experiences of injustice had they not had access to 
the Internet.
5.2.2 Popular support for terrorism
The importance of popular support for groups who violently challenge a 
state’s power has long been recognized in the context of guerrilla warfare 
and counterinsurgency operations.20 Popular support can be seen as a vital 
resource for terrorist and insurgent groups, as it enables their access to 
the weapons, f inances, recruits, and intelligence information necessary 
16 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 123-26; 01/13: 134-36.
17 Ibid., 01/17: 4002-03, 4026-27, 4048-53, 4084-87.
18 Ibid., AHD08/37: 8771-72; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5; 
‘Personal Interview 2’, 18-19, 30.
19 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 163, 200-03; 01/13: 165-67; AHA04/21: 1326-27, 
1423-443; AHA05/22: 2021; AHA06/23: 339; AHD03/32: 6440-42; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 18-19, 32; Benschop, ‘A Political Murder Foretold’.
20 Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare; Petraeus and Amos, ‘FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency’.
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to carry out a prolonged campaign of violence.21 Conversely, when such 
non-state actors lose the support of the people they claim to represent, 
they are frequently unable to persevere against the materially stronger 
government forces that hunt them.22
Leiken has claimed that the Hofstadgroup enjoyed far more popular 
support than ‘marginal’ terrorist groups such as the Italian Red Brigades 
or the German Red Army Faction.23 However, the truth is that both these 
groups could count on substantial support, especially among students, 
while there simply is no evidence that the Hofstadgroup was receiving 
similar support from the Muslim community in the Netherlands.24 Unlike 
the BR and RAF, the Hofstadgroup did not inspire imitation; no follow-up 
generations of terrorists materialized after the October 2005 arrests.25 
The group’s extremist stance on what constituted ‘true’ Islam and the 
(implied) allegations of apostasy that it leveled against the majority of 
(Dutch) Muslims, effectively ruled out the possibility of it acquiring broad 
support among Dutch Muslims.26 The Hofstadgroup was not a popularly 
supported vanguard movement but a fringe group that intimidated its 
potential supporters almost as much as it threatened declared enemies.27 
Concrete popular support was therefore not a factor that meaningfully 
enabled participants’ involvement processes.
5.2.3 External assistance
Similar to broad-based popular support, specif ic sources of external as-
sistance, whether other terrorist groups, state sponsors, or transnational 
private support networks, can signif icantly increase opportunities for 
engaging in terrorism.28 These parties can make available funding, weapons, 
and access to paramilitary training camps. They can also provide guidance 
or even outright operational leadership that can facilitate preparations for 
21 Ross, ‘Structural Causes’, 324; Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, ‘(Counter) Terrorism and Public 
Support’.
22 Schuurman, ‘Defeated by Popular Demand’, 152-75.
23 Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, 126.
24 Hewwitt, ‘Terrorism and Public Opinion’, 145-70.
25 Merkle, ‘West German Left-Wing Terrorism’, 173-90; Weinberg, ‘The Red Brigades’, 32-37.
26 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3.
27 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven 
of vertaald door Mohammed B., 7-8, 10-11, 15, 21-24, 29-30, 42-53; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
28 Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 18-21, 53-56; Ross, ‘Structural Causes’, 324; Pearce, 
‘Religious Sources of Violence’, 121.
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a terrorist attack.29 Although the Hofstadgroup was not a widely-support 
group, it may still have benefited from more tightly demarcated external 
help. The next two sections assess whether the Hofstadgroup was subject 
to external guidance and whether external sources of support provided 
practical benefits conducive to involvement in terrorism.
The police f iles make numerous suggestions that the Hofstadgroup was 
under some form of external guidance. At one point the Dutch intelligence 
service AIVD claimed that the group’s religious instructor belonged to 
a group that ‘could be seen as a successor or branch of the Bin Laden 
organization’.30 The f iles contain no information of any kind to support this 
claim, however. Another intelligence report held that a second participant 
had links to unspecif ied foreign terrorist organizations.31 Although this 
individual did have an uncle who was detained in Guantanamo Bay, there 
is nothing to suggest that this had any bearing on the events surrounding 
the Hofstadgroup.32 The absence of factual evidence to corroborate claims 
such as these suggests that they should be treated as highly speculative.
The Hofstadgroup was also acquainted with three middle-aged Syrian 
men who like its religious instructor, held fundamentalist views. At least 
one of them had been involved with the Muslim Brotherhood before he fled 
Syria in the 1990s.33 Yet, once again, there is nothing to actually suggest that 
these men provided leadership or that there was a connection between the 
Hofstadgroup and the Muslim Brotherhood. Then there is the Chechen man 
whose f ingerprints were found on the farewell letter of Van Gogh’s killer 
and whose uncle the FBI suspected of being an illegal arms dealer involved 
with Chechen terrorist groups.34 This individual was arrested in early 2005, 
not long after the arrest of a fellow countryman whose f ingerprints had 
also been found on the murderer’s belongings. Both were quickly released 
for lack of evidence of involvement in the Van Gogh murder. While it has 
remained a mystery how the f ingerprints got on the letter, the absence 
29 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 22-23.
30 ‘een organisatie die gezien kan worden als opvolger of tak van de Bin Laden-organisatie’: 
Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA01/18: 82.
31 Ibid., AHA01/18: 106.
32 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 51; AIVD Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1.
33 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 32, 37; VERD: 19669, 19675, 19684, 19693, 19703, 
19708, 19703-704, 19740-741, 19754, 19820; GET: 8349; Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de 
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrapport Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 11.
34 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 93-96; NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 
1’, 6; Derix, ‘Hoe Kwam Toch’.
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of evidence to suggest they had a role in the murder is another argument 
against the notion that the Hofstadgroup was under external guidance.35
Of all the possible ties between the Hofstadgroup and foreign extremists 
or even terrorist organizations, the most plausible are those that came to 
light in October 2003. Intelligence information and the behavior of the 
participants concerned bore out that there were contacts between the 
travelers to Pakistan or Afghanistan and an unnamed ‘emir’, as well as 
with a Moroccan man in Spain who was suspected of involvement in the 
2003 Casablanca bombings.36 Yet there is no concrete evidence to suggest 
that these ties amounted to outside operational guidance. The ‘emir’ most 
likely tasked the Hofstadgroup participants in question with convincing 
other Dutch Muslims to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan and the Moroccan 
man appears to have solicited the group’s help in order to remain at large.37 
Beyond speculation, there is little to suggest these men were instructing 
the Hofstadgroup to carry out acts of terrorism.
There are also numerous pieces of information in the police f iles which 
suggest that external parties provided the Hofstadgroup with practical 
benef its conducive to carrying out acts of terrorism. Several intelligence 
reports raise the possibility that the group received funding. Possible 
donors were Saudi-Arabians, Dutch Muslim extremists who wanted Hirsi 
Ali and Van Gogh killed and a leading participant’s criminal associates.38 
Given the absence of any supporting evidence, these claims should once 
again be treated as distinctly speculative. Investigations also failed to 
support the idea that the group’s weapons were externally supplied.39 A 
Hofstadgroup participant did claim that the hand grenades were provided 
by an AIVD informant. These accusations led to the alleged informant’s 
arrest in late 2005, but charges were dropped in March 2006 due to lack 
of evidence.40
Another instance of possible external support stems from September 
2005. At that time, the Piranha group’s main protagonist met a Belgian 
35 Derix, ‘Hoe Kwam Toch’.
36 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 23-25; AHA01/18: 80-81; RHV01/66: 18846.
37 Ibid., 01/01:23-27; 01/13: 134-36, 140-46; RHV01/66:18791-879; Police Investigator 1, ‘Personal 
Interview 3’, 1.
38 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA01/18: 82; AHA03/20: 1188-89; Dienst Nationale 
Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 40-42. 
39 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 38, 89-90; 01/13: 95-98; Dienst Nationale 
Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 62, 13157; Police Investigator 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3; Public Prosecutor 
1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 18.
40 Groen, ‘Saleh B. Blijft Leveren Granaat Ontkennen’; ‘Saleh B. Niet Meer Verdacht Van Ter-
roristische Daden’.
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national at a train station in The Hague. Accounts of what transpired differ. 
The Dutch police believe that the Belgian man asked his Dutch counterpart 
to participate in a suicide operation while investigative journalists claim 
that the Belgian offered three female suicide terrorists to the Hofstadgroup 
participant but was turned down.41 As neither of these scenarios material-
ized, there is little basis to assume this meeting had any actual influence 
on the Piranha group’s possibilities for engaging in terrorism.
The most plausible claim of external assistance concerns the possibility 
that two participants underwent paramilitary training during their 2003 
trip to Pakistan or Afghanistan. A trip that may have been facilitated by 
an individual who some participants later claimed had been working on 
behalf of the AIVD.42 Although the paramilitary training hypothesis is 
similarly based on intelligence information, it is corroborated by at least 
some circumstantial evidence; a participant’s statement that he heard one 
of the travelers claim as much and this same traveler’s repeated online 
bragging about his prof iciency with weapons.43 In November 2004, the 
latter also threw a hand grenade at the police off icers that came to arrest 
him and used a mirror to peek at them while remaining behind cover.44 
Both of these actions may be further hints that he had received at least 
some basic training.
In short, the Hofstadgroup’s emergence does not appear to have been 
meaningfully enabled by either external guidance or support. The one 
possible exception being that the two participants who traveled to Pakistan 
or Afghanistan may have undergone some basic paramilitary training. 
Several participants clearly had the desire to travel to foreign jihadist battle 
zones and they would probably have reveled in the chance to receive guid-
ance from actual jihadist militants or ideologues. Why such connections 
did not materialize remains grounds for speculation; perhaps the trips to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan were simply too short to make meaningful con-
nections, perhaps their youth and lack of experience with militancy made 
the Hofstadgroup’s travelers unappealing to potential foreign handlers. 
Whatever the case, the inapplicability of external support underlines the 
group’s homegrown status.
41 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 151-52, 191-92; Groen and Kranenberg, Women War-
riors, 144-46.
42 Erkel, Samir, 195; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 33.
43 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 123-26; 01/13: 140-45; AHD08/37: 8595, 8774-775; 
8880, 8919, 8928-929.
44 Ibid., AGV01/62: 17978; Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 37-38.
106 BEcoming a EuropEan HomEgrown JiHadist 
5.2.4 Social or cultural facilitation of violence
Individuals exposed to cultural or social values that convey a negative 
attitude towards out-groups or glorify violence may be more likely to see 
the use of terrorism as justif iable.45 Several empirical studies indicate that 
Muslims in general are not more likely than non-Muslims to commit or 
suffer from political violence.46 At the same time, research also suggests 
that fundamentalist and militant interpretations of Islam can inculcate 
intolerance, hatred, and a positive disposition towards the use of force as 
a means of dealing with perceived enemies.47
A 2015 study by Koopmans indicates that fundamentalist views are wide-
spread among Sunni Muslims in a variety of European countries, including 
the Netherlands, and that these views correspond with hostility toward 
out-groups.48 For instance, more than 50% of Muslims polled believed that 
the West was out to destroy Islam, a figure that rose to more than 70% among 
‘very religious fundamentalist Muslims’.49 The data for this particular study 
were collected in 2008 and it presents an aggregate of several countries, 
meaning that the f indings are not directly applicable to the situation in the 
Netherlands as encountered by the Hofstadgroup’s participants. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that these views did not suddenly develop and 
thus that many participants grew up in a social environment in which similar 
views were prevalent. All the more so since numerous participants attended 
mosques in which the fundamentalist Salafist brand of Islam was preached.50
Koopman’s study is not the only one that provides insights into the at-
titudes and beliefs of Dutch Muslims. A 2004 report commissioned by the 
Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) concluded that there was a 
trend towards secularization among Dutch Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish 
origin.51 This f inding seems to contradict Koopman’s work, however the SCP 
report also noted that close to 100% of respondents indicated that Islam was 
45 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 94-96; Milla, Faturochman, and Ancok, ‘The Impact of 
Leader-Follower Interactions’, 93-95; Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, ‘Terrorism’, 540-42.
46 Conrad and Milton, ‘Unpacking the Connection’, 316, 331; Fish, Jensenius, and Michel, ‘Islam 
and Large-Scale Political-Violence’, 1328, 1342.
47 Loza, ‘The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism’, 144, 149.
48 Koopmans, ‘Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility’, 33-57.
49 Ibid., 43, 45.
50 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 14; Dienst 
Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA03/20: 860; 01/17: 4019, 4084, 4159; VERD: 19652, 19853, 
20004, 20114, 20234; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 8; Groen and 
Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 239.
51 Phalet, Ter Wal, and Van Praag, ‘Moslim in Nederland’, 11, 13, 17.
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very important to them, 57% of respondents with a Moroccan background felt 
individuals should follow Islamic rules and 30% of this same group thought 
Islam and ‘modern life’ were incompatible.52 Additionally, a majority of Dutch-
Moroccans adhered to an orthodox interpretation of their faith.53
Interestingly, a 2012 follow-up study by the SCP criticized the ‘seculariza-
tion’ thesis, f inding instead that mosque attendance was no longer declining 
and that there were relatively few differences in the strictness of religious 
attitudes between f irst- and second-generation Muslim immigrants.54 
Neither the 2004 nor the 2012 SCP report directly supports Koopmans’s 
conclusions. However, by providing indications of the (growing) prevalence 
of orthodoxy among Dutch Moroccan Muslims and the great importance 
this group attached to its Islamic identity, they do lend further credibility 
to the f indings presented by Koopmans.
The above discussion leads to the tentative conclusion that, by instilling 
a sense of hostility towards the Western world, social facilitation of funda-
mentalism likely lowered Hofstadgroup participants’ threshold to seeing the 
use of violence as legitimate. This is anecdotally supported by the f inding 
that family members of the murderer who resided in Morocco, together with 
some of the other residents of their village, showed support for the murder.55
However, it would go too far to argue, on what is circumstantial evidence, 
that exposure to fundamentalist Islam facilitated the use of violence. After 
all, with so many Dutch Muslims exposed to similar attitudes, how can it be 
explained that only the Hofstadgroup displayed such outspokenly militant 
views and behavior? Furthermore, the fundamentalist Salaf ist variety of 
Islam to which the Hofstadgroup by and large subscribed, comes in at least 
three varieties of which only the Salafi-Jihadist one openly advocates the use 
of force.56 Explaining some participants’ (intended) acts of violence therefore 
necessitates broadening the analysis beyond structural-level factors to incor-
porate social dynamics and personal backgrounds, as the next chapters will do.
5.2.5 Ineffective counterterrorism
According to Crenshaw, one of the most important permissive causes of 
terrorism is a government’s ‘inability or unwillingness’ to prevent it.57 The 
52 Ibid., 18.
53 Ibid., 19.
54 Maliepaard and Gijsberts, ‘Moslim in Nederland 2012’, 12, 16.
55 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 33-35.
56 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 208.
57 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 382.
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various police investigations into the Hofstadgroup’s activities and the 
AIVD’s monitoring of the group indicate the Dutch authorities were certainly 
not unwilling to address the threat posed by this group. But can hindsight 
indicate areas where the response was ineffective or counterproductive?
After Van Gogh’s death, the Dutch Review Committee on the Intel-
ligence and Security Services (CTIVD) concluded that the AIVD had 
incorrectly dismissed the f ilmmaker’s murderer as a peripheral member 
of the Hofstadgroup.58 A conclusion shared by the Service’s acting direc-
tor at the time.59 Although the AIVD had possessed information that the 
killer-to-be fulf illed a central role in the Hofstadgroup, had a history of 
violent outbursts, and was writing increasingly extremist tracts, this data 
had not been analyzed in its totality before the murder.60 The CTIVD was 
careful to stress that the AIVD did not possess information indicating that 
Van Gogh’s murderer was planning to commit an attack.61 Whether extra 
attention from the AIVD would have prevented Van Gogh’s killer from 
striking therefore remains highly speculative. But at the very least, the 
AIVD’s misdiagnosis benefited the killer by allowing him to carry out his 
preparations largely unnoticed.
What clearly did enable Van Gogh’s killer to strike was the fact that his 
target’s accessibility. As a public f igure, Van Gogh was easily recognized 
and because he cycled to his work in Amsterdam he was also easy to f ind. 
Crucially, he had steadfastly refused the Dutch authorities’ offer of increased 
personal protection in the wake of the negative fallout produced by the 
airing of Submission, part 1 in August 2004. By contrast, the f ilm’s co-author 
Hirsi Ali had been under round-the-clock protection since November 2002.62 
This difference probably explains why the killer chose Van Gogh over Hirsi 
Ali, whose status as an apostate would otherwise have made her the more 
attractive target.63 Arguably, Van Gogh’s decision not to accept personal 
protection provided a larger opportunity for his killer to strike than the 
AIVD’s misdiagnosis. The attack on the f ilmmaker can in any case not 
simply be put down to ‘counterterrorism failure’.
58 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 21-22.
59 ‘AIVD Geeft Verkeerd’. Is this citation complete?
60 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 27-28.
61 Ibid., 14.
62 Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 123-24, 171-76; Van Straelen, ‘Requisitoir in De Strafzaak 
Tegen Mohammed B.’, 9.
63 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 20.
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On 10  November 2004, f ive police off icers were wounded when a 
Hofstadgroup participant threw a hand grenade at them during an arrest 
attempt. The AIVD had wired the apartment sometime prior to the raid 
and, read with the benefit of hindsight, one of the recorded conversations 
strongly hints that the occupants possessed grenades and planned to use 
them against the police; ‘you wait until they enter and then you throw one, 
yes?’64 Having gotten hold of this text during the spring of 2005, the Dutch 
television program Netwerk reported that the AIVD could have known 
grenades were present in the apartment, implying that the service had failed 
to properly alert the police.65 In October 2005, the Hofstadgroup participant 
who threw the grenade told Netwerk that he had gotten the weapon through 
an acquaintance who, he claimed, worked for the AIVD. His lawyer and 
those of other Hofstadgroup participants shared these suspicions, leading 
to the alleged AIVD agent being heard in court as a witness.66
As previously mentioned, charges against the alleged informant were 
dropped in early 2006. There was no forensic evidence tying him to the hand 
grenades. Neither could it be proven that he had been the elusive second 
perpetrator of the supermarket robbery conducted by a Hofstadgroup par-
ticipant in early 2004; one Hofstadgroup defendant claimed the individual 
in question only ‘got away’ because he was already working for the AIVD.67 
Other than the testimony of an individual with a stake in alleging that 
the AIVD had enticed his use of violence by supplying him with grenades 
through an informant, and a wiretapped conversation that makes an im-
plicit reference to the weapons, there is no concrete evidence to support 
the notion that the AIVD could have forewarned their police partners. On 
the whole, ineffective counterterrorism does not appear to have been a 
major enabler of the Hofstadgroup’s activities. However, had the Service 
not misdiagnosed Van Gogh’s killer, it might arguably have made it more 
diff icult for the latter to plan and prepare his attack.
5.2.6 Political opportunity structure
The ‘political opportunity structure’ concept essentially bridges the gap 
between preconditions that provide opportunities and those that supply 
64 ‘jij wacht totdat zij binnenkomen en dan doe jij eentje gooien, ja?’: Dienst Nationale Re-
cherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA07/24: 3047.
65 Remkes, ‘Kamerstukken 2, 2004-2005, 29754, Nr. 22’, 1-3.
66 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 61; ‘Saleh B. Niet Meer Verdacht Van Terroristische Daden’.
67 Groen, ‘Saleh B. Blijft Leveren Granaat Ontkennen’, 62-63; ‘Saleh B. Niet Meer Verdacht Van 
Terroristische Daden’; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 63.
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motives for involvement in terrorism.68 Adherents of the ‘strategic school’ 
posit that the openness of democratic societies can enable violent acts of 
resistance.69 Institutions such as a free press and an independent judiciary 
limit the power of the government over its citizens; basic rights such as 
freedom of assembly and the largely unrestricted movement of people 
and goods make it easier to prepare acts of violence.70 By contrast, because 
autocratic regimes lack such freedoms and suffer no restraints on their 
executive power, the opportunities for engaging in terrorism are fewer.71
With regard to motive, the ‘political access school’ argues that democra-
cies discourage terrorism because they provide avenues for the non-violent 
resolution of conflicts and afford citizens influence in the political process.72 
Here it is the autocratic regimes that are at a disadvantage, as their lack of 
freedoms, frequent human-rights abuses, and the absence of opportunities 
for peaceful political participation make violent opposition the only option 
for people wishing for change.73 While this seems to put democracies ahead 
on paper, there is considerable empirical evidence that democratic states 
are no less vulnerable to terrorism.74 This may at least in part stem from the 
fact that, while democratic states are less likely to experience domestic ter-
rorism, their frequently assertive foreign policies increases their exposure 
to international or transnational terrorism.75
The Hofstadgroup clearly benefited from the democratic freedoms avail-
able to it. Arguably, it would have been far more diff icult in an authoritar-
ian regime to hold frequent private meetings, use the Internet to espouse 
extremist views and attract like-minded individuals, and to travel abroad 
to Belgium, Spain, and even Pakistan or Afghanistan. At the same time, 
the Dutch authorities did not stand idly by. Tempering the opportunities 
provided by the Dutch political system was the fact that group partici-
pants were effectively under AIVD surveillance from mid-2002 onwards. 
Combined with numerous rounds of arrests between 2003 and 2005, this 
68 Oleson and Khosrokhavar, Islamism as Social Movement, 21-22; Collier and Hoeff ler, ‘Greed 
and Grievance’, 587-88.
69 Eyerman, ‘Terrorism and Democratic States’, 151-52.
70 McAllister and Schmid, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 251-52.
71 Eubank and Weinberg, ‘Terrorism and Democracy’, 156; Piazza, ‘Draining the Swamp’, 522-23.
72 Eyerman, ‘Terrorism and Democratic States’, 152.
73 Li, ‘Does Democracy?’, 278; Piazza, ‘Draining the Swamp’, 523.
74 Piazza, ‘Democracy and Free Markets’, 83-84; Eubank and Weinberg, ‘Terrorism and 
Democracy’, 160; Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins, ‘The Social Origins’, 2019.
75 Savun and Phillips, ‘Democracy, Foreign Policy’, 879, 886, 893-94; Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes 
of Terrorism’, 35-36.
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proved a considerable impediment to its ability to operate.76 One former 
participant described the October 2003 arrests as having a paralyzing effect 
on the group, leading to such a preoccupation with personal safety that 
group meetings became less frequent and attempts to reach foreign conflict 
zones ceased altogether.77
The second conclusion is that access to the political system had little 
dampening effect on the Hofstadgroup’s more committed participants’ 
motivation to use violence. Initially, some participants appeared to have 
a modicum of faith in democratic forms of protest. Two attended rallies; 
one in support of Palestine in 2002, and one against the Iraq war in 2003.78 
One of these individuals was also temporarily a member of the Arab Euro-
pean League (AEL) in 2003, but quickly disowned it because ‘[they] want 
everything via democracy’.79 Other participants never even considered 
such avenues. One interviewee argued vehemently that the AEL had never 
held any appeal for himself or the others because its leader was a Shiite, 
a denomination they considered heretical and worse than unbelievers.80 
More generally, data suggests that the group saw democratic means for 
voicing dissent or achieving change as ineffective and even illegitimate as 
it meant working with and within a man-made democratic system rather 
than a divinely inspired one.81
Civil liberties and constraints on the Dutch government’s powers enabled 
the Hofstadgroup’s emergence, yet not to the degree that the authorities 
were impotent. As the multiple arrests and prison sentences indicate, the 
state was still able to mount an assertive response. Despite access to the po-
litical system, the country’s political opportunity structure also motivated 
involvement in militancy because democratic laws and institutions were 
seen as unpalatable and illegitimate. The net effect of these various influ-
ences cannot be quantified, yet it seems clear that the Netherlands’ political 
76 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 8; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 5-6.
77 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4-5.
78 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 10; Community Policing Off icer 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4-5; Erkel, 
Samir, 119-20.
79 ‘ze willen alles via de democratie’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD09/38: 9201. 
See also: A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 31.
80 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 29; ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
81 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 28-30; Dienst Nationale Re-
cherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB02/26: 3776-77; AHD02/31: 5611; De Koning, ‘“We Reject You”’, 98-99; 
Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 4.
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opportunity structure both enabled involvement in the Hofstadgroup and 
helped bring about the adoption of radical and extremist views.
5.3 Preconditions: Providing motives for terrorism
Opportunities alone are unlikely to lead to terrorism unless groups or indi-
viduals with the motive to carry out acts of violence make use of them. It is 
to this second category of structural-level preconditions that the discussion 
now turns.
5.3.1 (Relative) deprivation and intergroup inequality
A common-sense assumption frequently voiced by politicians is that 
poverty and lack of education are causes of terrorism.82 Scholarship on 
the issue provides a more nuanced picture. Some studies lend support to 
this view, f inding that countries experience less terrorism as they become 
economically more developed83 and that increased personal wealth is linked 
to decreased support for political violence.84 For instance, in research based 
on opinion polling, Fair and Shepherd found that the moderately poor 
were more likely to support terrorism.85 Looking specif ically at European 
homegrown jihadism, Bakker’s study shows that most individuals in his 
sample came from a relatively low socioeconomic background.86
Conversely, Piazza f inds no signif icant relationship between low eco-
nomic development and terrorism.87 Various scholars posit that terrorists 
are actually less likely to come from impoverished backgrounds than their 
peers.88 In contrast to the Bakker study, the jihadists in Sageman’s sample 
mostly enjoyed a relatively well-off middle-class existence.89 Although 
Sageman looked at internationally operating jihadists and Bakker focused 
on European jihadists, the differences are still striking. A similar dichotomy 
82 See the examples in: Piazza, ‘Rooted in Poverty’, 159-60.
83 Li and Schaub, ‘Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism’, 254; Barros, Faria, 
and Gil-Alana, ‘Terrorism against American Citizens’, 56, 66; Feridun and Sezgin, ‘Regional 
Underdevelopment and Terrorism’, 229.
84 MacCulloch, ‘The Impact of Income’, 843; Schbley, ‘Torn between God, Family, and Money’, 182.
85 Fair and Shepherd, ‘Who Supports Terrorism?’, 52, 71.
86 Bakker, ‘Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists’, 140.
87 Piazza, ‘Rooted in Poverty’, 170-71.
88 Berrebi, ‘Evidence About the Link between Education’, 17-18; Krueger and Malečková, 
‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism’, 131, 135; Pape, Dying to Win, 215.
89 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 73-74. 
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emerges with regard to the relationship between education and terrorism. 
Some studies encourage the idea that terrorism attracts the uneducated.90 
Others fail to support such hypotheses or reach diametrically opposed 
conclusions.91 Given these conflicting findings, it is unclear whether poverty 
and lack of education as such can function as motives for terrorism.
Research suggests that deprivation’s ability to contribute to the onset of 
political violence is particularly pronounced when it is experienced relative 
to other individuals or groups. Gurr defines relative deprivation as the per-
ceived discrepancy between the ‘values’ people expect to achieve, such as 
political influence or material well-being, and their actual capacity for doing 
so.92 When groups perceive that they are unfairly economically disadvan-
taged or politically disenfranchised vis-à-vis another class, religious group, 
or ethnic minority, relative deprivation can become a powerful motivation 
for political action and, potentially, violence.93 Poverty or socioeconomic 
disadvantages become markedly more potent motivational preconditions 
for terrorism when they overlap with intergroup inequality.94
A 2005 report on the integration of minorities in the Netherlands indicated 
that non-Western immigrants and their children were socioeconomically 
disadvantaged compared to the indigenous population. For instance, they 
had lower educational qualif ications, were more likely to be unemployed, 
earned less income, underperformed at school, and were disproportionally 
represented in statistics on crime.95 Another report showed that Dutch 
Muslims also faced discrimination on the labor market.96 Given the pre-
dominance of Dutch Moroccans in the Hofstadgroup, it is interesting to 
note that the Moroccan community is frequently cited as the one most 
strongly affected by these problems.97 Researchers have also argued that 
90 Bravo and Dias, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Terrorism’, 337; Post, ‘The Socio-Cultural Under-
pinnings’, 64; Von Hippel, ‘The Roots of Terrorism’, 28-30.
91 Krueger and Malečková, ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism’, 125-26,131-32, 135; Bakker, ‘Char-
acteristics of Jihadi Terrorists’, 140; Berrebi, ‘Evidence About the Link between Education’, 17; 
Pape, Dying to Win, 214; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 74-77; Testas, ‘Determinants 
of Terrorism’, 262-63.
92 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 13, 25-26.
93 Gurr, ‘Why Minorities Rebel’, 166-67, 188-89; Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 9, 13, 33-34, 37; Stewart, 
‘Crisis Prevention’, 252-53.
94 Piazza, ‘Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination’, 348-50; Murshed and Gates, ‘Spatial-
Horizontal Inequality’, 132-33.
95 Jaarrapport Integratie 2005, 45, 50-51, 75-76, 83, 85-86, 89, 90-91, 98, 100-01, 132-44, 148-62.
96 Andriessen et al., Liever Mark Dan Mohammed?, 11-22.
97 General Intelligence and Security Service, ‘Violent Jihad in the Netherlands’, 35-36; Jaar-
rapport Integratie 2005, 45, 83, 148-62.
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the increasingly vituperative debate on Islam and multiculturalism in the 
Netherlands has engendered feelings of alienation among (young) Dutch 
Muslims.98 Was such relative deprivation also a factor underlying involve-
ment in the Hofstadgroup?
Perhaps surprisingly, there are virtually no indications that income 
inequality, lack of access to educational opportunities, political representa-
tion, or other examples of intergroup inequality played a role in the adoption 
of radical or extremist views or motivated involvement in the Hofstadgroup. 
Admittedly, one individual’s involvement began when he failed to obtain 
an internship through what he believed was discrimination because of his 
Moroccan heritage.99 However, this person was quick to emphasize that 
this experience did not motivate his involvement but indirectly facilitated it. 
Without an internship to go to he simply had more time to spend on other 
pursuits, one of which turned out to be a growing interest in radical Islam 
that in time would lead him towards the group.100
There are, however, several indications that participants experienced 
a sense of being second-rate citizens because of their faith. It is here that 
emphasis must be placed on the polarizing influence of the debate on Islam 
and the integration of (Muslim) minorities that had been waged in Dutch 
society since the late 1990s. Politicians such as Pim Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk, 
and Geert Wilders led a debate that was increasingly critical of Islam and im-
migration. Moreover, it was often voiced in crude or harsh tones; Van Gogh’s 
writings being a case in point. These developments not only had a polarizing 
influence on Dutch society by seemingly setting Muslim immigrants and 
their children against the ‘autochthonous’ population, but also strengthened 
feelings of exclusion amongst young Muslim citizens in particular.101 Keeping 
this sociopolitical context in mind, several f indings stand out.
Particularly telling is the reaction of one Hofstadgroup participant to 
news that a Dutch prisoner who murdered an Iraqi man was released from 
jail; ‘your blood is blood, but our blood is water’.102 Several encountered (ver-
bal) aggression aimed at their religious convictions or Moroccan heritage.103 
98 Bakker, ‘Islamism, Radicalisation and Jihadism in the Netherlands’, 169-70; De Koning and 
Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 223-24.
99 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3.
100 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 1.
101 De Koning and Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 223-24.
102 ‘jullie bloed is bloed, maar ons bloed is water’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 
AHA05/22: 1876.
103 Ibid., 01/17: 4145, 4198; AHD08/37: 8569-70, 8574; Groot Koerkamp and Veerman, Het Slapende 
Leger, 24; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
struc tural-lEvEl Fac tors: Facilitating and motivating involvEmEnt 115
During police questioning, one suspect lamented that the murder of Van 
Gogh would only increase the gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims.104 
Another told off icers that Dutch society had become more intolerant and 
callous towards Muslims after 9/11.105 Others spoke out angrily against what 
they saw as the media’s unfavorable portrayal of Islam, its perceived ten-
dency to under-report Muslim suffering around the globe and its vilif ication 
of men like Bin Laden as terrorists.106 In some of his writings, Van Gogh’s 
murderer-to-be criticized the Dutch government’s integration policies, 
which he saw as thinly veiled attempts to encourage Muslims to abandon 
their faith.107
Such experiences with discrimination strengthened participants’ convic-
tions and fed their hatred for unbelievers. But, one potential exception 
notwithstanding,108 there is little to suggest that these experiences trig-
gered or motivated involvement, or that they were central to planned and 
perpetrated acts of terrorism. In fact, various f indings disavow this line of 
reasoning. Several participants spoke positively about their experiences 
as Muslims in the Netherlands, praising the country’s religious freedom.109 
More importantly, the Hofstadgroup’s extremist elements advocated vio-
lence not because they felt alienated or discriminated, but as punishment 
for those who insulted Islam.110 Although the Dutch ‘debate on Islam’ had 
been gaining momentum since the 1990s, it did not really become a topic 
of conversation within the group until the release of the Islam-critical f ilm 
Submission in August 2004.111 As one former participant put it, the debate on 
Islam was ‘secondary’; while Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh deserved to be killed, 
this individual was primarily focused on supporting Islamist insurgents in 
places such as Afghanistan.112
104 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 20105.
105 Ibid., VERD: 20456.
106 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3, 9-10; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA05/22: 1876; 
AHB02/26: 3776-77; AHD08/37: 8614-17, 8733-734; Erkel, Samir, 215; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En 
Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed 
B., 18-19, 22; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
107 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschre-
ven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 15, 22, 48.
108 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3.
109 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 68, 94-95, 195; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, AHA04/21: 1633; VERD: 20229; 01/17: 4004.
110 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4131.
111 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 23-24.
112 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 5.
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As the example given above illustrates, Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali became 
hated public f igures because of how they spoke about Islam and its prophet, 
not because they engendered or exacerbated feelings of exclusion from 
Dutch society.113 Which is not to say that experiences of exclusion, or feelings 
of being second-rate citizens did not exert an inf luence on the group’s 
development. They contributed to the drawing of sharper boundaries be-
tween Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in the Netherlands and increased 
participants’ antagonistic views of the latter. The available data on the 
Hofstadgroup, however, does not allow relative deprivation to be ascribed 
more than such a supportive role when explaining how its participants 
became involved. Although the Dutch debate on Islam certainly had its 
influence on the Hofstadgroup, and despite the emphasis frequently placed 
upon it when explaining involvement in homegrown jihadism, it does not 
appear to have been a particularly salient explanatory variable.
5.3.2 Political grievances
The perception that governments or their policies are unjust and lack 
legitimacy can provide a powerful impetus for participation in political 
violence.114 From this perspective, people turn to terrorism because they 
see it as a tool they can use to redress such grievances and exert political 
influence through violence.
The data reveals that numerous participants reacted strongly to armed 
conflicts involving Muslims. News about the suffering of co-religionists in 
places like Palestine or about terrorist attacks carried out by Muslims had 
a range of effects. As vicarious experiences of injustice and shock, they 
helped bring about an interest in Islam and geopolitics, triggering searches 
for information that contributed to the adoption of radical and extremist 
interpretations of Islam.115 As an interviewee recalled his reaction to the 
9/11 attacks: ‘At f irst you think like “terrible, what happened there […] No 
religion can justify that”. So, you investigate. […] And then I found a fatwa 
by [Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi] […] in which he approved of [the attacks] 
113 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 23-24.
114 LaFree and Ackerman, ‘The Empirical Study of Terrorism’, 360-62; Crenshaw, ‘The Causes 
of Terrorism’, 383-84; Sprinzak, ‘The Process of Delegitimation’, 50-68.
115 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3, 5-9; Erkel, Samir, 48-49, 69; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 
19, 79; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 10-11; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke 
Vrouwen, 249-50; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1; Vermaat, Neder-
landse Jihad, 163.
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[…] and I thought it was nice to see how he explained all that and actually 
also presented evidence [of its permissibility]’.116
These geopolitical events also helped shape a Manichean outlook in 
which ‘true’ Muslims were assaulted by both external and internal enemies; 
principally, the United States, its Western-European allies, Israel, and what 
participants considered apostate or heretical Muslim regimes.117 Particularly 
inf luential in this regard was the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’, which many 
participants saw as a war against Islam.118 As one wrote, ‘I gained feelings 
of hate towards anyone who supported Bush in his crusade, not just the 
Netherlands, but also Arabic apostate leaders’.119 Another important ef-
fect of these geopolitical grievances was their ability to justify violence by 
portraying it as a defensive and righteous response to Muslim suffering.120 
One of the travelers to Pakistan or Afghanistan wrote his mother explaining 
that he had left because the ummah was under attack; he had gone to help 
expel the unbelievers from the land of jihad.121
In early 2003, the desire to help Muslims in conflict zones led one of the 
group’s most committed extremists to attempt to reach Islamist insur-
gents in Chechnya.122 Later that year, three others traveled to Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, likely with a similar purpose in mind. By late 2003, however, 
the focus of the Hofstadgroup’s militant core began to shift towards possible 
actions within the Netherlands. This transition was partly practical; by 
116 ‘In eerste instantie denk je van “verschrikkelijk, wat daar gebeurt […] Dat kan toch geen 
enkele religie goedkeuren”. Dus dan ga je onderzoeken. […] En dan kwam ik een keer een fatwa 
tegen van Hammoud bin Aqla […] waarin hij [de aanslagen] goedkeurt. […] En ik vond het wel 
mooi om te zien hoe hij dat allemaal uiteenzette en eigenlijk ook met bewijzen kwam’: Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 11.
117 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4-5, 7, 9; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 163; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6-7; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze 
Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 33.
118 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4, 7, 9; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 173; GET: 4127-28; 
Erkel, Samir, 74-75; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6-7; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 5; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 
19; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven 
of vertaald door Mohammed B., 33.
119 ‘ik kreeg haatgevoelens jegens iedereen die achter Bush stond in zijn kruistocht, niet alleen 
Nederland, maar ook de Arabische afvallige leiders’: A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 9.
120 Ibid., 3, 5-8; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 131; AHA04/21: 1666; 01/13: 163; 
AHB01/25: 3166-68; GET: 4128, 18116; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 
1’, 6; Erkel, Samir, 65-67; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 68-70, 169-70; Peters, ‘De 
Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald 
door Mohammed B., 33.
121 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 163.
122 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 10.
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this time the group had clearly attracted the attention of the police and 
AIVD, making foreign travel much more diff icult. It was also influenced 
by political grievances; as a loyal ally of the United States and Israel, and 
as a contributor to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Dutch 
government was increasingly seen as sharing responsibility for the harm 
that had befallen Muslims. In the eyes of some participants it had become 
a legitimate target.123
Geopolitically inspired grievances formed key explanatory factors. They 
were crucial to understanding how and why many participants came into 
contact with radical and extremist interpretations of Islam. The vicarious 
sense of outrage and injustice that images of their co-religionists’ suffering 
induced were key to the establishment of a common cause between the 
Hofstadgroup’s (future) participants and the global ummah. For some, 
these grievances motivated and justif ied a desire to strike back, to avenge 
perceived injustices against fellow Muslims. Indeed, the Dutch role in the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq motivated some participants to 
pursue plans for terrorism in the Netherlands. In the absence of geopolitical 
events involving the perceived victimization of Muslim populations, the 
Hofstadgroup would arguably not have existed or developed in the way it did.
5.3.3 A clash of value systems?
Several authors have argued that European homegrown jihadism arose 
out of a fundamental incompatibility between radical Islam and liberal 
democracy.124 It is a line of reasoning that resembles Huntington’s thesis 
that the dominant source of post-Cold War conflict would be ‘[t]he fault 
lines between civilizations’.125 The broader literature on political violence 
is, however, equivocal on the matter. For instance, while Senechal de la 
Roche argues that greater ‘cultural distance’ is positively associated with a 
higher probability of collective violence,126 Fearon and Laitin f ind no clear 
123 Ibid., 4-5, 9; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke 
Vrouwen, 256-57; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 131; 01/13: 61; 01/17: 4069; AHA01/18: 
100; AHA05/22: 2228; Erkel, Samir, 74-75, 118-19; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 20-21; 
NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appen-
dix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 32-34; Van San, Sieckelinck, 
and De Winter, Idealen Op Drift, 47-48.
124 Spruyt, ‘Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam’, 318-24; Cliteur, ‘De Lankmoedige Elite’, 
232-34; Leiken, ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’, 121-22; Leiken, ‘Europe’s Mujahideen’, 3.
125 Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, 22.
126 Senechal de la Roche, ‘Collective Violence’, 108-09.
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link between ethnic or religious diversity and the outbreak of civil wars 
and insurgencies.127
At f irst glance, the Hofstadgroup’s radical and extremist views and its 
participants’ rejection of democratic laws, values, and institutions certainly 
made them incompatible with Dutch liberal democracy. Furthering this 
divide, many participants did not see themselves as Dutch.128 A crucial 
point to make, however, is that these attitudes do not appear to have 
motivated involvement in the Hofstadgroup but rather to have stemmed 
from it. Prior to their involvement in the group, most participants led ap-
parently well-integrated lives; attending school, holding (part-time) work, 
and enjoying recreational activities like other Dutch citizens their age. 
Several individuals did not become practicing Muslims until contact with 
Hofstadgroup participants led to a reorientation on their faith.129 Others 
were converts to Islam.130
Even among those who had had a religious upbringing, clear signs of 
outright hostility towards Western culture and politics did not manifest 
themselves until after they had adopted radical or extremist interpretations 
of Islam.131 As previously discussed, many did grow up in a social environ-
ment in which negative out-group stereotypes were prevalent, arguably 
lowering barriers to seeing violence against these perceived enemies as 
justif ied. This social facilitation potentially made it easier for Hofstadgroup 
participants to come to see terrorist violence as necessary and legitimate. 
However, most did not appear to have started their participation in the 
group with pro-violence convictions already f irmly in place.
These f indings underline the importance of distinguishing between 
Islam and radical or extremist interpretations of the religion such as Salafi-
Jihadism. The available data provide little to suggest that the Hofstadgroup 
was a manifestation of an inherent incompatibility between Islam and 
Western democracy. They do, however, show that such an adversarial re-
lationship developed once radical and extremist views were adopted. This 
speaks to the power of the Salaf i-Jihadist ideological narrative to instill or 
sharpen preexisting in-group/out-group distinctions and thus lay the basis 
for intergroup hostility and violence.
127 Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, 75-76, 78, 83-84.
128 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
129 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002, 4047, 4051, 4061; GET: 18157, 18215; VERD: 
9917, 9935, 20012, 20225, 20131; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7.
130 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4084, 4145, 4177; VERD: 20461, 20518.
131 Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 44-53; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 1-3.
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5.4 Structural-level precipitants: Submission, part 1
Precipitants are ‘specif ic events that immediately precede the occurrence 
of terrorism’.132 Given that Van Gogh’s murder was the only terrorist attack 
to actually be carried out by a Hofstadgroup participant, can a precipitant 
event be identif ied in the time period leading up to it? It seems highly likely 
that the killer was triggered by the broadcast of the short f ilm Submission, 
part 1 on 29 August 2004 on Dutch national television.133 Although Van 
Gogh’s assailant never explicitly referred to the f ilm in his writings or in 
court, he chose to murder its director and he left a note on his body threaten-
ing Hirsi Ali, who came up with the idea for the f ilm in the f irst place.
Additional, albeit circumstantial, corroboration for the conclusion that 
Submission triggered the murder of Van Gogh is that other Hofstadgroup 
participants also reacted strongly, if only in words, to the f ilm. Death 
threats were posted on Hofstadgroup-administered forums,134 at least one 
individual told another participant that he wanted to see Hirsi Ali and Van 
Gogh killed because of Submission135 and several, while disagreeing with 
the murder, believed Van Gogh had ‘asked for it’.136 One interviewee claimed 
that the f ilm helped swing the group’s focus towards waging jihad in the 
Netherlands.137 Despite the shared antagonism, however, it was only Van 
Gogh’s killer who acted.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter focused on structural-level factors relevant to understanding 
how and why involvement in the Hofstadgroup materialized. It did so by 
utilizing Crenshaw’s distinction between ‘preconditions’ that enable or 
motivate involvement in terrorism and ‘precipitants’ that spark an actual 
attack.138 Structural factors not only provided opportunities for the Hof-
stadgroup’s emergence, but also formed parts of some of its participants’ 
motivation to engage in violence, and contributed to a change in those 
132 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 381.
133 Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 28; Public Prosecutor 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4; 
NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
134 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 165-66.
135 Ibid., 01/13: 74.
136 Ibid., 01/17: 4231; VERD: 20226-28, 20231, 20319, 20462.
137 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 23-24.
138 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’.
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motives from becoming a foreign f ighter to waging violent jihad in the 
Netherlands. Structural factors also played a key role in triggering the 
terrorist attack on Van Gogh.
With regard to facilitation, the role of the Internet was especially 
important. It exposed Hofstadgroup participants to geopolitical develop-
ments, militant interpretations of Islam, practical knowledge on the use of 
weapons and explosives and formed an easy-to-use communications tool 
and propaganda platform. Another facilitating factor was the openness of 
Dutch society, which afforded the group considerable freedom to organize, 
travel, and propagate their views. Thirdly, it is likely that growing up in a 
social environment in which Islamic fundamentalist views were prevalent 
lowered at least some participants’ threshold to seeing the use of violence as 
legitimate by instilling a sense of out-group hostility directed at the Western 
world. Finally, the AIVD’s misdiagnosis of Van Gogh’s killer as a peripheral 
group participant and, in particular, Van Gogh’s refusal to accept police 
protection, increased the attacker’s opportunities to strike.
Looking at motivational preconditions, geopolitical grievances stand out. 
Conflicts involving Muslims populations, the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’, and 
terrorist attacks such as those orchestrated on 9/11 had several influences. 
They triggered searches for answers that contributed to group participants’ 
eventual adoption of radical and extremist views, instilled the conviction 
that a war against Islam was being waged, and made retaliatory violence 
seem both justif ied and necessary. Political grievances also motivated some 
participants to start thinking about conducting a terrorist attack in the 
Netherlands, as opposed to joining Islamist insurgents overseas.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are no clear indications that socioeconomic 
inequality, the harsh tone of the Dutch integration debate, or lack of access 
to the democratic political system directly motivated involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup. Experiences with discrimination did, however, strengthen 
participants’ convictions and feed their hatred of unbelievers. Finally, the 
precipitant event that likely triggered the murder of Van Gogh was the 
broadcast of Submission, a short Islam-critical f ilm that he had directed 
and which caused considerable offense among Hofstadgroup participants.
Structural-level factors were crucial to understanding how and why 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup’s emerged. Yet the present analysis falls 
short in that the factors described are experienced by many more people 
than those that actually become involved in the Hofstadgroup. Why, with so 
many other Dutch Muslims exposed to images of war and conflict involving 
their co-religionists, and with similar opportunities for engaging in violence, 
did only the Hofstadgroup’s participants react by embracing radicalism 
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and militancy? The inability of the structural level of analysis to account 
for the variable influence of factors such as political grievances or relative 
deprivation points to the need to utilize other analytical perspectives. This 
chapter has hinted at the importance of group dynamics on numerous 
occasions. It is to this topic that the discussion now turns.
6 Group dynamics I: Initiating and 
sustaining involvement
Terrorism is predominantly a group phenomenon.1 This draws attention 
to the second part of the multilevel analytical framework outlined in 
Chapter 2; namely, the role of group dynamics. How do terrorist groups 
influence the worldview and behavior of their participants? In this f irst of 
two chapters on group dynamics and involvement in terrorism, the focus 
is on the group processes that draw and bind people to terrorist groups. 
Seven group-level hypotheses are analyzed and applied to the data on the 
Hofstadgroup to understand the role of group dynamics in bringing about 
participation and how they subsequently influenced participants’ adoption 
of radical and extremist beliefs. The analysis of the role of group dynamics 
is completed in the next chapter, which discusses their influence on the 
commission of actual terrorist attacks.
6.1 Group dynamics and involvement in terrorism
Group dynamics have attracted considerable attention from terrorism 
researchers.2 In recent years, this level of analysis has been described as 
of above-average explanatory potential when it comes to understanding 
involvement. Kleinmann, for instance, found that ‘[g]roup-level processes 
are the most signif icant mechanism for radicalization of both convert and 
non-convert homegrown Sunni militants in the United States’.3 In Leaderless 
Jihad, Marc Sageman argues that both micro and macro perspectives on 
terrorism are limited in their ability to offer an understanding of terrorism 
and that a middle-ground analysis is needed, one in which ample atten-
tion is paid to the relationships between terrorists, such as leader-follower 
interactions.4 A f irst step towards assessing whether group dynamics can 
also offer useful insights into how involvement in the Hofstadgroup came 
about, is inventorying relevant explanations at this level of analysis.
1 Nesser, ‘Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat’, 440, 450; Spaaij, ‘The Engima of 
Lone Wolf Terrorism’, 859.
2 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 307-16; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of 
Terrorist Groups’, 331-46.
3 Kleinmann, ‘Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants’, 288.
4 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 23-24.
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Several authors have conducted literature reviews of group-level fac-
tors relevant to terrorism.5 These provide useful overviews of the most 
prevalent hypotheses, but generally do not organize them according to 
a particular logic. There is no equivalent to Crenshaw’s division of the 
structural-level causes of terrorism into preconditions and precipitants 
that can be used to organize the discussion of the group level of analysis.6 
A solution is provided by Taylor and Horgan, who distinguish involvement 
decisions from event decisions, essentially arguing that the processes by 
which people become involved in terrorist groups are distinct from those 
that lead some group members to participate in actual attacks.7 Joining a 
terrorist group does not mean that the participant will also become involved 
in actual violence.
Following Taylor and Horgan’s argument, the group level of analysis 
has been divided into two. The f irst part deals with group processes that 
influence how and why people join and stay in extremist or terrorist groups. 
The second focuses on group dynamics that influence the commission of 
terrorist attacks. Because the literature on both of these subjects is exten-
sive, each is discussed in a separate chapter. The current one focuses on the 
contribution made by group-level factors to bringing about and sustaining 
involvement in terrorism. A review of the literature on terrorism revealed 
eight group-level explanations other researchers have thought relevant to 
this discussion (Table 7). Only one hypothesis could be dismissed out of 
hand. The literature indicates broad consensus that ‘brainwashing’, the 
idea that people can be coerced to adopt ideas, does not constitute a cred-
ible, empirically substantiated hypothesis.8 Despite being an explanation 
encountered with some frequency in journalistic accounts of involvement 
in terrorism, it is not given further consideration here.9
5 Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I’, 7-36; LaFree and Ackerman, ‘The Empirical 
Study of Terrorism’, 355-60; Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 39-51.
6 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 381.
7 Taylor and Horgan, ‘A Conceptual Framework’, 592; Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 
13, 142-46; Taylor, ‘Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?’, 125-26.
8 Dawson, ‘The Study of New Religious Movements’, 3; Hofmann and Dawson, ‘The Neglected 
Role’, 351, 60; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 124-25.
9 Derix, ‘Volgelingen Syriër “Opgefokt En Gehersenspoeld”’; Van der Veen, ‘Kijken: 10 Jaar Na 
De Aanslagen’.
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Table 7  Initiating and sustaining involvement in terrorist groups
terrorist group formation
social identity and the benefits of group membership
socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
the underground life
social learning theory
the influence of leaders
peer pressures
Brainwashing
6.2 Terrorist group formation
Terrorist group formation is generally seen as either a top-down or a bottom-
up process. The first revolves around premeditated attempts by recruiters to 
encourage or coax others into joining an established terrorist organization.10 
Blazak, for instance, has found that such activities are prevalent among 
American Nazi skinheads.11 Bottom-up group formation is a much more au-
tonomous process, whereby like-minded individuals come together without 
the intervention of recruiters linked to established terrorist organizations.12 
Autonomous group formation is not random, however. Research shows that 
participation in radical or extremist groups is often guided by preexisting 
social ties.13 People become involved in groups, terrorist or otherwise, to a 
large extent because family members, friends, or acquaintances are already 
participating who thus provide exposure and easy access to said groups.14
The lack of recruiters does not mean that bottom-up processes are neces-
sarily completely volitional. In the context of Italian left-wing extremism, 
Della Porta found that the desire to obtain the approval of companions 
already part of clandestine organizations inf luenced the involvement 
process of new members.15 This desire not to be seen remaining on the 
sidelines exerted a form of peer pressure that propelled non-committed 
friends towards participation. Similar sentiments, albeit much more 
10 Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘Psychological Factors’, 13.
11 Blazak, ‘White Boys to Terrorist Men’, 990-94.
12 Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 48-49.
13 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 309-10; Lofland and Stark, ‘Becoming a World-Saver’, 
862-75.
14 Munson, The Making Of, 48-54, 187-89; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist 
Groups’, 338.
15 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 310.
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strongly expressed, were found among members of Palestinian terrorist 
groups. As a participant of one such group stated, ‘[a]nyone who didn’t 
enlist during that period (intifada) would have been ostracized’.16 Even in 
the absence of conscious efforts at recruitment, terrorist groups can still 
exert a powerful pull on potential members.
Various studies indicate that the formation of homegrown jihadist groups, 
particularly in the f irst decade of the 21st century, is largely a bottom-up 
process.17 Most homegrown jihadists are ‘connected by blood, marriage, 
and close friendships’.18 Yet autonomous group formation should not be 
taken as an essential characteristic of European homegrown jihadism. 
Nesser’s research on jihadist groups active in Europe between 1995 and 2010 
shows a mixture of top-down and autonomous patterns of group forma-
tion.19 The rise of autonomously formed groups in the Hofstadgroup time 
period appears strongly related to intensif ied domestic and international 
counterterrorism efforts that seriously hampered the ability of groups like 
al-Qaeda to operate internationally and made it more diff icult for Western 
citizens to travel to Afghanistan and Iraq.20 The homegrown nature of 
entities like the Hofstadgroup may reflect geopolitical realities rather than 
a consciously chosen organizational format.
The Hofstadgroup was no exception to the autonomous group formation 
trend. One interviewee described it as a ‘circle of acquaintances’.21 Many 
participants had been long-time friends, had grown up together in the same 
neighborhood, attended the same schools, or visited the same mosques. Oth-
ers met each other in asylum seekers’ centers, were colleagues, or became 
acquainted through an Internet café they frequented.22 Those who did 
not have preexisting ties to other participants got to know them through 
16 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, ‘The Terrorists in Their Own Words’, 178.
17 Bakker, ‘Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists’, 142; Bartolo, ‘Decentralised Leadership 
in Contemporary Jihadism’, 52-54; Roy, ‘Al-Qaeda’, 22-23; Sageman, Understanding Terror 
Networks, 107-20; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 66, 109; Vidino, ‘Radicalization, Linkage, and 
Diversity’, ix, 3-4.
18 Harris-Hogan, ‘Australian Neo-Jihadist Terrorism’, 311.
19 Nesser, Jihad in Europe, 523-25.
20 Sageman, ‘Confronting Al-Qaeda’, 22-24.
21 ‘een vriendenkring’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
22 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19444, 19459, 19675, 19717, 19858-860, 19877, 
19916, 19980, 19994, 20079, 20112, 20115, 20174; GET: 18215, 18312-313, 18374-375, 18414, 20348; 01/17: 
4176; AHA03/20: 1227; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 11520; Van der Hulst, ‘Terroristische 
Netwerken’, 15; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3; Erkel, Samir, 78-79; 
Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 7, 17-18, 83; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 109-10, 119, 193.
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introductions by mutual acquaintances,23 online discussion forums,24 or by 
being brought along to a group meeting.25 As far as can be gleaned from the 
available data, peer pressure does not appear to have propelled involvement. 
Instead, group formation throughout the Hofstadgroup’s existence was 
driven almost entirely by individuals who came together, volitionally and 
by chance, through preexisting social networks.
The Hofstadgroup’s largely autonomous formation begs the question 
whether recruitment played any role at all. The October 2003 attempts 
by two participants to entice other young Muslims to travel to Pakistan 
or Afghanistan do not count, as this recruitment effort was not geared 
towards enlarging the Hofstadgroup itself or forming a separate terrorist 
cell in the Netherlands. Several group participants did, however, use the 
Internet to spread their views and engaged in online chat conversations 
with people in the hope of converting them to their point of view.26 On 
the whole, however, the evidence suggests that these online outreach 
activities were principally focused on conveying the ‘right’ religious 
views rather than deliberate attempts to form or enlarge an extremist 
organization. As such, they seem better described as a form of outreach 
or missionary zeal.
An anecdote that more clearly raises the possibility of recruitment 
involved one of the middle-aged Syrian men, detailed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5, who appeared on the group’s fringes. An interviewee recalled 
speaking with this individual at a mosque several times. During those 
talks, the Syrian man explained that the interviewee’s failure to get an 
internship was due to the ‘unbelievers’ not granting Muslims anything. 
Recognizing that he had struck a chord, the Syrian man later suggested 
that the interviewee meet with someone to discuss this topic further and 
gave him the phone number of a Hofstadgroup participant. Following this 
introduction, the interviewee soon found himself in the house of Van Gogh’s 
23 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4001, 4004, 4086-87; AHA05/22: 2566; Dienst 
Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 313-17, 3756; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal 
Interview 2’, 3; Erkel, Samir, 186, 257, 61; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 24-25, 123; De 
Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews and Friendship’, 385-86.
24 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, VERD: 18410; 01/17: 4001-4003, 4084, 4124; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 22.
25 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 7-8; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, VERD: 19459, 19465, 19475, 20217; 01/17: 4087, 4124, 4178-4179; Erkel, Samir, 37-38, 78-79, 
186.
26 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002-03, 4020, 4026-31, 4047-51, 4084-85, 
4128; GET: 18410; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 18-19, 32; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1-3.
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future killer and attending lectures given by Abu Khaled, an acquaintance, 
moreover, of the Syrian man who suggested the interviewee make contact 
with the group.27
While this series of events is suggestive of recruitment, two factors 
advocate caution in using this description. First of all, there is no evidence 
that the f irst of the two Syrian men mentioned above had a hand in re-
ferring other individuals towards the group. This raises the possibility 
that it was a chance encounter that provided the Syrian man with the 
opportunity to put like-minded individuals in touch with one another. 
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the Hofstadgroup’s religious 
instructor was himself making deliberate efforts to enlarge the group 
through recruitment. His role appears to have been limited to conveying 
a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.28 It is unlikely, therefore, that 
the two Syrian men were working together as part of a deliberate effort 
to enlarge the Hofstadgroup.
Recruitment may have played a role in 2005’s Piranha case. Two partici-
pants claimed in court that they were coerced into providing assistance.29 
However, the truthfulness of these assertions is questionable. Other 
participants have claimed that the couple, who became key witnesses for 
the prosecution, presented themselves as helpless victims only to avoid 
being sentenced.30 A judge labeled the couple’s testimony as ‘untrustworthy’ 
for similar reasons.31 In lieu of more convincing or concrete evidence to 
the contrary, the conclusion remains that the Hofstadgroup’s formation 
was an overwhelmingly autonomous process. Its participants were not 
vulnerable youngsters who were sought out by recruiters with the specif ic 
aim of turning them into Islamist extremists. Instead, group formation 
depended predominantly on preexisting social ties, with a lesser role for 
introductions through friends or acquaintances and the transmutation of 
virtual connections into ‘real-life’ ones.
27 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 2-5.
28 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 24; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3; 
‘Personal Interview 2’, 8-9; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 136-40; 01/17: 4002, 4026, 
4048-50, 4090-91, 4096, 4098, 4129, 4179, 4146, 4201; AHB02/26: 3796-803; Erkel, Samir.
29 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 209-14, 218-27.
30 ‘Getuige Piranha-Zaak Zelf Radicaal’; Kranenberg and Groen, ‘Kroongetuigen Vallen in 
Eigen Kuil’.
31 Kranenberg and Groen, ‘Kroongetuigen Vallen in Eigen Kuil’.
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6.3 Social identity and the benefits of group membership
People have a universal desire to attain a satisfactory self-image, and an 
important part of that image is shaped by the ‘social identity’ derived from 
group membership.32 Through a process of ‘social categorization’, individu-
als impose order on a complex social environment by subjectively divid-
ing it into a multitude of groups. These groups are not necessarily formal 
organizations but may also include ‘cognitive entities’ based, for example, 
on social class, ethnicity, or religion.33 People tend to identify themselves 
with numerous groups simultaneously, with contextual factors influencing 
when a certain group-based identity is activated. For instance, someone’s 
social identity as a supporter of a soccer team will be more prominent during 
match attendance than in a work environment. But some social identities 
can become so important that they are ‘chronically salient’, influencing 
all aspects of life.34
Terrorist groups provide chronically salient social identities through 
the demands placed on members. Participants are not only required to 
risk life and liberty but to reimagine themselves according to the group’s 
particular reality, be that as holy warriors, a revolutionary vanguard, or 
nationalist freedom f ighters.35 But with social categorization providing 
individuals with a veritable marketplace of groups to choose from in their 
pursuit of self-fulf illment, why would someone be drawn to those involved 
in political violence in the f irst place?36 As Dalgaard-Nielsen writes, the 
success of a movement depends on its ability to promote a worldview that 
resonates with potential recruits.37 What benef its can terrorist groups 
offer their members that outweigh the very real risks of imprisonment 
and death?
People may join a terrorist group because they value the cause it strives 
for, essentially engaging in terrorism for strategic reasons.38 The strategic 
rationale of terrorism is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. For now, 
it is suff icient to note that a considerable body of research indicates 
that such instrumental motives are certainly not the only, and perhaps 
32 Tajfel, ‘Social Identity’, 68-69.
33 Tajfel and Turner, ‘An Integrative Theory’, 40.
34 Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, ‘Self and Social Identity’, 164, 166.
35 Kruglanski, Chen, and Golec, ‘Individual Motivations’, 70-84; Hemmingsen, ‘The Attractions 
of Jihadism’.
36 Tajfel, ‘Social Identity’, 69.
37 Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicalization in Europe’, 802.
38 Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 14-15.
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not even the most important, benef its of membership. Participation in 
terrorism can also provide emotional satisfaction, such as the ability to 
violently avenge perceived wrongs, cognitive benef its, such as the idea 
that one is f ighting for a worthy cause, social assets like increased status 
and comradeship and, f inally, opportunities for personal gain simply by 
taking under threat of violence what would otherwise have remained 
beyond reach.39
These rewards of group membership can explain not only why people 
become involved in terrorism but also why they remain involved. The 
benefits outlined in the previous paragraph can become so important to 
participants that they perpetuate their involvement, make disengagement 
more diff icult, and stifle criticism of group norms or behavior.40 In extreme 
cases, individuals’ social identity can have such a powerful influence on 
their worldview and behavior that they subjugate themselves entirely to 
the aims and well-being of the group, even willingly sacrif icing their own 
lives.41 Can social identity and the benefits of group membership explain 
the attraction of the Hofstadgroup?
Part of the Hofstadgroup’s appeal was that participants could imagine 
themselves as one of the few righteous Muslims in a country f illed with 
unbelievers, sinners, and apostates. For many participants, the group 
was an alternative to a Dutch Islamic community ‘tainted’ by imams 
who refused to discuss jihad in order to appease the Dutch government 
and by fellow believers who failed to live and worship as ‘true’ Muslims.42 
The group’s religious nature was not just some superf icial gloss but its 
central appeal.43 This is aptly illustrated by an interviewee who adamantly 
dispelled the idea, put forward in Dutch media, that the group practiced 
a ‘cut-and-paste Islam’44, insisting that religious beliefs were not only 
taken extremely seriously but rigorously studied during gatherings.45 Such 
statements suggest that by enabling self-perception as a ‘true’ Muslim, 
39 McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 336; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the 
Terrorist’, 30; Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 75-82; Al Raff ie, ‘Social Identity Theory’, 67-68.
40 Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 349.
41 Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, ‘Self and Social Identity’, 163.
42 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4016, 4030, 4048-51, 4085-86, 4090-93, 4127, 
4131; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1-2, 5, 9; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 11-12, 18-21, 27; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 215.
43 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1-2.
44 Oostveen, ‘De Knip- En-Plak-Islam’.
45 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 12-13.
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the cognitive benef its of participation were an important part of the 
group’s appeal.
Participation in the Hofstadgroup also provided social and emotional 
benef its. Many participants valued simply being among friends; chat-
ting, playing some soccer, or sharing a meal.46 One interviewee recalled 
feeling a strong sense of belonging and friendship during his very f irst 
encounter with other participants, which motivated him to keep going 
back.47 Another participant, an illegal immigrant, supposedly said that he 
greatly missed his family in Morocco, but that his ‘brothers’ had become 
his new family and that he loved them very much.48 In jail after the murder 
of Van Gogh, one participant bragged about his Hofstadgroup ‘member-
ship’, indicating participation could also bring the benef its of status.49 An 
emotional benefit for participants was their ability to enter into short-term 
‘marriages’, off iciated by the groups’ religious authority f igures, which 
enabled them to have sex without breaking Islamic injunctions against 
casual relationships.50
An important f inding is thus that the cognitive, social, and emotional 
benefits sustained participation. However, there are no indications that they 
also initiated involvement. No one seems to have consciously sought out the 
Hofstadgroup because they wanted so share in the self-perception of being a 
‘true believer’ or because they were looking for comradeship. Partly this can 
be explained by the group’s lack of a clear organizational structure and the 
fact that it was largely anonymous and unknown until Van Gogh’s murder; 
few people were aware of its existence and outsiders had no clear point of 
contact to facilitate entry. Although the group became a household name 
after November 2004, it also became much more secretive during 2005’s 
Piranha case, again precluding easy access by potential newcomers. Instead, 
preexisting social networks brought like-minded individuals together, after 
which group-identity-related processes bound them together and worked 
to prolong their involvement.
46 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4158; VERD: 19475, 19477, 19479-80, 19866, 19935, 
19980, 20012, 20131, 20213, 20228, 20313, 20363, 20468, 20484; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, 
‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 13; ‘Personal Interview 3’, 3; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1, 9; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 112, 17.
47 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 6-9.
48 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4049.
49 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 105.
50 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4003, 4053, 4086-87, 4101, 4110-111, 4114-115, 
4145-147, 154; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 30-33; Chorus and Olgun, ‘Op De Thee’, 7.
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6.4 Socialization into a worldview conducive to terrorism
As Della Porta argues, ‘conversion to violence requires a specif ic redefini-
tion of reality’.51 In other words, an individual’s willingness to commit acts 
of terrorism is a process that is generally not completed by the mere act of 
joining a terrorist group. An important next step is formed by members’ 
internalization of worldviews and group norms conducive to the use of 
violence.52 Before the next paragraphs discuss the group-based mechanisms 
that led the Hofstadgroup’s participants to adopt such views, it is instructive 
to briefly revisit what those views were. How were they conducive to seeing 
terrorism as a legitimate form of behavior?
Chapter 3 concluded that it is problematic to speak of a single or com-
monly held ‘Hofstadgroup ideology’. Yet broadly shared ideological themes 
existed which could provide justif ications and even imperatives for the 
use of violence. The most important of these were a sense of crisis which 
mandated participation in violent jihad and a dichotomous worldview 
that made clear distinctions between a small rightly guided in-group and 
a much larger and threatening out-group. For instance, Van Gogh’s killer 
believed the Islamic world was beset by both external enemies (American 
imperialism, Western materialism, corrupt Middle-Eastern regimes) and 
foes within (apostates, Shiite heretics, ‘Westernized’ Muslims). Only an 
‘awakening’ to these realities and a willingness to f ight and sacrif ice in 
defense of ‘true’ Islam could stave off the religion’s imminent demise and 
the persecution of its adherents.53
Participants also placed considerable emphasis on their beliefs’ norma-
tive aspects. Only polities structured and run in accordance with a strict 
and dogmatic interpretation of Islamic law (‘Sharia’) were seen to suff ice.54 
The group could also be very inward-looking. De Koning aptly described 
participants as engaged in a ‘competition of piety’.55 Not only did they 
harshly judge Muslims outside of the group’s boundaries, their critical eye 
did not spare compatriots who failed to adhere to group norms, such as 
growing a beard, or who were deemed to have committed transgressions 
such as accepting the aid of a lawyer, thereby undermining Allah’s status 
51 Della Porta, Social Movements, 136.
52 Egerton, Jihad in the West, 151; Silke, ‘Holy Warriors’, 111.
53 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59.
54 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 63-64, 124-25, 127-31, 137, 140, 151, 163; AHA03/20: 
1171; AHA06/23: 2555; AHA07/24: 3226; 01/17: 4049-50, 4052, 4131; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En 
Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 2-12.
55 De Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews and Friendship’, 387.
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as the sole source of legal authority.56 Some went so far as to refuse to 
participate in a game of soccer as doing so would implicitly mean accepting 
the man-made and therefore tawhid-undermining rules of the Dutch soccer 
association.57
The normative aspects of the Hofstadgroup’s ideology also fed partici-
pants’ adversarial relationship with out-groups. Most notably in the case 
of takf ir, as excommunication carries with it the justif ication to murder 
the apostate.58 Extremist elements within the group also took their un-
derstanding of tawhid to mean that non-Islamic laws could and should 
be flaunted and that unbelievers’ property and, in some cases, even their 
lives were free for the taking.59 In short, while the Hofstadgroup lacked a 
clearly def ined and commonly held ideology, the group’s more extremist 
participants in particular held to and conveyed beliefs that could provide 
motivations and justif ications for the use of violence. These beliefs also 
provided normative standards by which Muslims both in and outside of 
the group were judged, creating behavioral and ideological rules to which 
participants were expected to adhere. The next sections discuss how these 
views were spread and upheld.
6.5 The underground life
A group’s ‘social reality value’ is its ability to def ine moral standards for its 
members and enforce their compliance.60 For example, groups with high 
social reality value are better able to influence their members’ thinking 
on such matters as what constitutes ‘good’ and who or what is ‘evil’.61 An 
important variable that determines a group’s social reality value is the 
degree of ‘competition’ it faces from other groups. As section 6.3 explained, 
people tend to have numerous social identities whose salience is often 
context dependent; a person’s professional attitudes and behavior will 
56 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19475; De Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews 
and Friendship’, 387-88; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 181; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 16-17; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3.
57 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 2.
58 Brooke, ‘Jihadist Strategic Debates’, 202; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4052.
59 ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 161-62; AHD08/37: 8713-14, 8765-66; AHD09/38: sessie 13; VERD: 19745; GET: 
4086, 4094.
60 McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 423-24.
61 Ibid., 423.
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tend to dominate in a work setting, aff iliation with a certain sports team 
during matches, etcetera. When numerous group memberships ‘compete’ 
for influence on a person’s values and behavior, it is unlikely that any one 
in particular will become predominant. However, when all but one group 
identity remains, its ability to exert such control increases markedly.62
The criminal nature of terrorism forces those who engage in it to lead a 
covert existence. As authorities deploy more means to apprehend or kill ter-
rorists, the latter’s need for secrecy increases. The necessity of maintaining 
operational security can force terrorist groups to ‘go underground’, that is to 
lead an entirely secret and withdrawn existence. Once underground, their 
members have only each other to rely on, leading to increased interdepend-
ence, the strengthening of interpersonal bonds, and a heightened desire 
to protect comrades and the larger group.63 ‘Having entered a world of 
conspiracy and danger, the [terrorists] are bound together before a common 
threat of exposure, imprisonment or death’.64 In such a setting, the group’s 
social reality value increases dramatically, as does its ability to influence 
members’ worldviews and behavior. Isolation can thus increase a terrorist 
group’s ability to fashion the worldviews of its adherents, facilitating their 
acceptance of political violence as necessary and legitimate.65
The Hofstadgroup’s participants gradually withdrew from society. 
Mosque attendance was largely supplanted by privately held discussions 
and prayers.66 The group became the focal point of social interactions, 
in some cases entirely supplanting old friends and family.67 A number of 
participants saw each other on an almost daily basis and several of them 
even lived together for varying periods of time.68 One of the travelers to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan quit a part-time job because he felt it clashed with 
his religious convictions. Some others abandoned school or jobs for similar 
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.; Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 350; Della Porta, Social Movements, 133-35, 
180; Egerton, Jihad in the West, 156-57; Veldhuis and Bakker, ‘Causale Factoren Van Radicalisering’, 
458-59.
64 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 107.
65 Egerton, Jihad in the West, 155.
66 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002, 4004, 4016, 4049, 4054, 4092, 4177-179, 
4199; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 11-12, 20; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 8-9.
67 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4049.
68 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 2; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, 01/13: 23-24, 92; AHA03/20: 860; VERD: 20212; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 
REL00: 51-53.
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reasons or were encouraged to do so.69 The numerous arrests, the knowledge 
that the group had attracted the AIVD’s attention, and the inability or 
unwillingness of imams to discuss jihad-related topics formed external 
pressures towards isolation.70 In the words of an interviewee: ‘[y]ou were 
at home or at [Van Gogh’s future killer’s] home. That was it really’.71 The 
latter even described a diminishing social circle as the abandonment of 
an old life f illed with unbelief and therefore as signifying a true believer.72
Yet the Hofstadgroup’s withdrawal from society fell short of what could 
be considered ‘going underground’. Many participants, including members 
of the extremist inner circle, continued to hold (part-time) jobs or attend 
school.73 Their participation in online discussion forums and their attempts 
at convincing other young Muslims of the validity of their views occasionally 
exposed them to dissenting opinions.74 Although the authorities’ interest 
in them sparked a degree of watchfulness bordering on the paranoid, with 
participants removing the batteries from cell phones during meetings, 
none of them went ‘off the grid’ until 2005’s Piranha case.75 Even then, 
only two individuals did so; the person who evaded arrest in November 
2004 and his Islamic wife.76 By contrast, the other ringleader of the Piranha 
case continued to live at home with his family until his apprehension in 
October 2005.
Because the Hofstadgroup as a whole never went underground, the degree 
to which isolation influenced its internal cohesion and social reality value 
was limited. Nevertheless, the trend towards increasing isolation, one that 
was particularly noticeable among the more extremist participants, had two 
important consequences. First of all, it made participants relatively more 
exposed to people with radical and extremist ideas while lessening their 
69 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA03/20: 1299; VERD: 20114; De Koning and Meijer, 
‘Going All the Way’, 231.
70 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 11; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, 01/13: 104; AHA05/22: 1811-13, 1837; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 5-6, 8-9.
71 ‘Je was thuis of bij Mohammed B. thuis. Dat was het eigenlijk’: Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 20.
72 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD02/31: 5793.
73 Ibid., AHA03/20: 860; AHA04/21: 1664; AHD04/33: 6716-19; AHF01/39: 9279, 9349, 9462, 
9535, 9620; AHF02/40: 10000, 10032; AHF03/41: 311; VERD: 9443, 9852, 9915, 9981, 20111, 20217, 
20463-464, 20518-519; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 38.
74 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD07/36: 8400-01, 8409-12; AHD09/38: 9173-75, 
9179-81, 9184-95, 9216-220; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 18-19, 30-31.
75 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5-6; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 25-26; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1.
76 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4062.
136 BEcoming a EuropEan HomEgrown JiHadist 
contacts with individuals who could have challenged their increasing ex-
tremism. Secondly, by cutting ties to former friends, the Hofstadgroup rose 
in importance as the center of participants’ social life. Isolation therefore 
sustained involvement by increasing the group’s importance as participants’ 
foremost sources of social ties. It also catalyzed participants’ adoption of 
views that saw the use of violence as justif ied and necessary.
6.6 Social learning theory
The application of social learning theory to the study of delinquency essen-
tially teaches that ‘criminal behavior is learned through interactions with 
others, especially in intimate, primary groups’.77 While specif ic attention 
is given to the role of primary groups such as family and close friends as 
the setting in which the mechanisms that constitute social learning theory 
are at their most influential, this form of learning is not exclusively reliant 
on face-to-face interactions. It can also take place through exposure to 
extremist materials encountered on social media or the emulation of at-
titudes or behavior seen on television.78 Social learning theory can be used 
to explain pro-social as well as criminal attitudes and actions.79 Whether 
social learning leads to one or the other depends on a range of factors.
Several circumstances make it is more likely that social learning will con-
tribute to violent behavior. The f irst is ‘differential association’ or relatively 
greater exposure to individuals or groups who commit violence or justify 
its use. When others are seen to engage in criminal or violent activities 
without suffering negative consequences, or even benefiting from it, the 
observer’s previously acquired inhibitions to delinquent behavior may be 
lowered. Second, violence is more likely when the ‘social learner’ is exposed 
to individuals who hold beliefs that portray such behavior in neutral or 
positive terms. Third, violence is more likely when its perceived benefits 
outweigh perceived costs, a calculation that can be influenced, for instance, 
through religious beliefs or political convictions that portray violence as 
necessary for the attainment or defense of a greater good. Finally, violent 
77 Sellers, Cochran, and Winfree, ‘Social Learning Theory’, 109.
78 Bandura, Social Learning Theory, 2-13; Pauwels and Schils, ‘Differential Online Exposure’, 
1-29.
79 Pauwels and Schils, ‘Differential Online Exposure’, 3.
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behavior becomes more likely when individuals have violent ‘role models’ 
they can observe directly or indirectly, such as through the Internet.80
The Hofstadgroup was a prime setting in which social learning could 
exert its influence for two reasons. First of all, the group was increasingly 
the main or even exclusive source of social contacts for many participants. 
Secondly, social gatherings were the group’s most frequent communal activ-
ity. Socializing with friends was an important aspect of these meetings, but 
they were also used for lectures and discussions on fundamentalist, radical, 
and extremist interpretations of Islam.81 These gatherings were not formal 
seminars dedicated to religious indoctrination, however. They appear to 
have been organized largely on an ad hoc basis, without mandatory attend-
ance and with little in the way of a syllabus to structure the discussions 
and lectures.82 While some participants showed up several times a week 
or even every day, others attended only once or twice a month.83
Social learning exerted a notable influence on Hofstadgroup participants 
in several ways. First of all, through direct association with individuals who 
supported the use of violence in principle and practice.84 Several witnesses 
and an interviewee mentioned or implied that the intensive contacts they 
had with other Hofstadgroup participants led them to adopt their points 
of view, even if only for a time.85 For instance, one witness explained that 
she may have become willing to use violence had the group’s influence 
not been restrained by the contacts she still maintained with ideologically 
non-radical individuals.86 Likewise, a former participant explained that 
his ultimate disavowal of extremist Islam only came about after he had 
physically distanced himself from the Hofstadgroup and was thus no longer 
80 Akers and Silverman, ‘Toward a Social Learning Model’, 20-24.
81 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 115; AHA02/19: 86-87, 100; AHA06/23: 2585-86, 
2600, 2693; AHA09/26: 3799-803; AHD01/30: 5499-503; 01/17: 4090-99, 4201; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 12-13; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2, 4-5, 9.
82 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 3’, 3; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 14-15; 
Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19476-77, 19479, 19918-919, 19944, 20080, 20228, 
20363, 20486; 01/17: 4099-4100; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3; 
Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
83 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19476, 19866, 19980, 20313, 20484.
84 For instance: Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 14.
85 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 133-34; 01/17: 4030-32, 4084-86, 4127-128; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 10; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, 
‘Personal Interview 1’, 1-2, 5.
86 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4028-32, 4050-51.
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exposed to the ideas and norms propagated by his erstwhile peers.87 Two 
interviewees’ recollection of the Van Gogh murder is especially striking. 
One admitted initially feeling a sense of awe for the murderer, while another 
explained that he was inspired to plan an attack of his own.88
Social learning also influenced Hofstadgroup participants by exposing 
them indirectly to ‘role models’ of violent behavior and radical or extremist 
interpretations of Islam. Police investigators found that participants shared 
(parts of) a large digital ‘library’ containing books and treatises by Salaf ist 
thinkers and theologians who justif ied violence, such as Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb.89 Furthermore, participants exchanged 
various digital media that included video and audio f iles in which jihadist 
militants or ideologues practiced and preached religiously justified violence. 
These included grisly videos of war crimes perpetrated by Chechen jihadists 
that were occasionally watched during group gatherings.90 Finally, there 
was the Internet which facilitated access to numerous jihadist role models; 
most notably men like Osama bin Laden, the 9/11 hijackers and Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006.91
Social learning also made a contribution to the adoption of militant 
beliefs and some participants’ willingness to use terrorism by helping instill 
the notion that the use of violence would be met with reward. The clearest 
example of this concerns the 2004 Madrid bombings. To the group’s more 
militant elements, the attack demonstrated that terrorism in Europe was 
feasible, legitimate, and effective, as the withdrawal of Spanish troops from 
Iraq was seen as a direct consequence of the attack.92 The attack helped shift 
the motivation of some of the most militant participants from joining jihad-
ist insurgents overseas to conducting terrorism in the Netherlands. Social 
learning again played a role in instilling the view that death in the service 
of Islam would be rewarded with martyrdom. This occurred partly through 
exposure to ideological materials and role models mentioned in previous 
87 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 11.
88 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 27-28; 
Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ’Personal Interview 1’, 10.
89 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 47; NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 
2; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 164.
90 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 47, 138-40; AHA07/24: 2865-66; GET: 4128, 4179, 
18231, 18410, 18452; VERD: 9477-9478, 20014, 20113; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 
43-44; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 13, 54, 82, 110-11, 126, 139, 154, 169, 176, 181, 196.
91 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 14; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Inter-
view 1’, 9.
92 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 22-23; De Koning and Meijer, 
‘Going All the Way’, 232; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 5.
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paragraphs, and partly in a far more direct fashion.93 One female participant 
was promised a ‘beautiful martyr’s death’ by a male group member who 
suggested they drive a car f illed with explosives into a shopping center.94
Social learning forms a key explanatory factor for how participants 
adopted extremist views and, in some cases, planned or perpetrated acts 
of terrorism. It shows that extremist views and behavior were in large part 
taught and copied. Direct interactions with individuals who justif ied ter-
rorism, including some who tried to join Islamist insurgents overseas and 
one who committed an actual terrorist attack, were key to the conveyance 
of attitudes favorable to the use of violence and provided role models of 
militancy to be emulated. Indirect exposure to jihadist role models, terrorist 
attacks, and extremist materials, principally via the Internet, further taught 
participants to see terrorism as justif ied, necessary, and effective. Through 
the notion of martyrdom, they were brought to believe that death in the 
service of Islam held distinct personal advantages that outweighed the costs 
of forfeiting life on earth. In short, social learning constituted a particularly 
important explanatory variable at the group-level of analysis.
6.7 The influence of leaders
Leaders are individuals with the ability to harness their followers’ energy 
‘in a concerted coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and 
objectives’.95 Within the specif ic context of terrorist groups, leaders’ influ-
ence allows them to do more than exert operational control and guidance. 
They can also play an important role in safeguarding the group’s cohesion 
and in socializing its members into an extremist worldview.96 Leaders’ 
ability to function as such depends on their credibility and authority, which 
can stem from several sources, such as ideological knowledge, operational 
expertise, or personal charisma.97 Keeping to the division of the group-level 
93 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 25-26, 28; 01/13: 81, 130-31, 134, 151, 163; AHB03/27: 
4040-41; AHD07/36: 8411, AHD08/37: 573-574, 594, 773-775; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze 
Ontwikkeling’, 14, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 38; 
NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
94 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 82.
95 Winston and Patterson, ‘An Integrative Def inition’, 7.
96 Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, 389; ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 390; 
Mandel, ‘The Role of Instigators’, 6; Milla, Faturochman, and Ancok, ‘The Impact of Leader-
Follower Interactions’, 96-97.
97 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 93; Hofmann and Dawson, ‘The Neglected Role’, 349; Milla, 
Faturochman, and Ancok, ‘The Impact of Leader-Follower Interactions’, 92.
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analysis over two chapters, the following paragraphs deal with leaders’ 
ability to shape terrorist groups organizationally and ideologically. The 
next chapter looks at their ability to instigate terrorist attacks.
Abu Khaled, the middle-aged Syrian man who provided religious in-
struction until he fled the country on the day of Van Gogh’s murder was 
the group’s most important ideological authority.98 There are, however, 
no indications that this man actively sought to create a common group 
ideology or harness its participants’ energy for particular ends, as the 
above-mentioned def inition of leadership requires.99 This may not have 
been possible even if he had wanted to; participants appear to have seen 
him as a good teacher, but not as a leader, as someone who had to be obeyed, 
or even as a particularly inspiring individual.100 His role is best described as 
an ‘epistemic authority’; an individual whose perceived knowledge enabled 
him to provide an authoritative interpretation of religious and political 
matters to the other participants.101
Van Gogh’s future murderer certainly gained the respect of other par-
ticipants for his knowledge of Islam.102 His writings and his teachings at 
group gatherings began to include clear incitement to violence from March 
2004 onward.103 But like Abu Khaled, Van Gogh’s murderer does not seem 
to have actively tried to force the group into a certain ideological mold or 
to shape it organizationally. Descriptions paint him as quiet, withdrawn, 
and as someone who was neither seen as a leader nor assumed such a role.104 
Essentially the same conclusion is reached with regard to other individuals 
whom the group held in high esteem, some of whom acquired status through 
their greater knowledge of Arabic or their outspoken militancy. While their 
higher status meant that they were relatively influential in the conveyance 
98 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 19; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 4.
99 NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Public Prosecutor 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 8.
100 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 4; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 33; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 48; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 
33, 83, 87, 112; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3.
101 Kruglanski, Chen, and Golec, ‘Individual Motivations’.
102 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19918, 19935, 20004-05, 20012-13, 20079, 
20227, 20236; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
103 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 150-59; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 81; 
Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 19.
104 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3-4; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 13; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19478, 
19868, 19868, 20212, 20227; Public Prosecutor 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
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of fundamentalist, radical, or extremist interpretations of Islam, none ap-
pear to have had the ability or inclination to consciously shape the group, 
whether ideologically or organizationally.105
At least as far as the ideological and organizational development of the 
group was concerned, the Hofstadgroup lacked clear leaders. While its 
social pecking order included individuals with more influence over mat-
ters of ideology than others, these persons are more accurately described 
as authority figures than as leaders. It could be argued that participants 
saw men like Bin Laden or al-Zarqawi as their leaders, but this does not 
change the group’s essentially leaderless nature. While such jihadist role 
models certainly had a major influence, it was indirectly and unconsciously 
exercised. There is no reason to believe that foreign jihadists knew of the 
Hofstadgroup’s existence, let alone tried to exercise control over its activities 
to accomplish a joint goal.
6.8 Peer pressure
Peer pressure plays an important role in upholding and inculcating group 
norms,106 which Pynchon and Borum define as the ‘implicit and explicit 
expectations for the conduct and opinions of individual members’.107 In 
Crenshaw’s words, ‘peer pressure can induce people to perform acts that 
they would ordinarily be prevented from doing by moral restraints’.108 
Peer pressure is of course not a mechanism unique to terrorist groups, 
but its influence in that particular setting is notable. For groups involved 
in illegal or violent activities, internal dissent can be dangerous, making 
them especially susceptible to producing strong internal pressures towards 
conformity.109 The following paragraphs discuss four forms of peer pres-
sure found in the literature and assess whether they played a role in the 
Hofstadgroup’s development.
105 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4; NCTV Employee 1, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 3; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4; Former Hofstadgroup 
Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 13-14; Dienst Nationale Recherche, 
‘RL8026’, AHA05/22: 2174-75; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 3.
106 Bartlett and Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence’, 16.
107 Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 350.
108 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 397.
109 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 106; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 125; McCauley 
and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 335.
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Extremity shift (also known as ‘risky shift’110 or ‘group polarization’111) is a 
process whereby a group’s ‘average’ opinion becomes increasingly extreme 
over time. The f irst reason for this is what McCauley and Segal label ‘vari-
ance decrease’; the tendency of groups to become more homogeneous as 
individuals with deviating views leave or are expelled.112 Secondly, ‘social 
comparison’ plays a role. Individuals may vie for their peers’ approval or 
pursue status by championing the group’s values. In the process, they create 
an incentive for their compatriots to do the same, as no one wants to be 
seen to be lagging behind in enthusiasm. This creates a process whereby 
individuals trigger each other to voice ever more extremist positions in 
order to stand out positively, thus steadily moving the group as a whole 
to more militant points of views. Finally, there is the ‘relevant arguments’ 
mechanism, whereby group discussions will be biased in favor of views that 
support group norms, thereby contributing to their acceptance.113
Another way in which peer pressure can exert its influence is through the 
‘majority effect’. Over the course of several experiments, Asch found that 
many individuals will adjust their opinions to correspond to the majority 
view expressed by the group in which they are participating, even if that 
view is clearly wrong.114 During one such experiment a research subject was 
asked to compare a line with several other lines of varying length and to 
judge which of those matched the f irst. When the other study participants, 
who were actually working together with the researcher, suddenly and 
unanimously started giving wrong answers to this simple task, more than 
a third of the research subjects felt compelled to go along with the majority. 
Those who did stick to their opinion experienced self-doubt, felt uneasy 
about their conspicuous deviance, and feared the group’s disapproval.115 
Asch’s research is a testament to both the power of the group in shaping the 
views of individuals and the diff iculties of maintaining a contrary opinion.
Two forms of peer pressure specif ic to terrorist groups are public com-
mitments to violence and what Crenshaw calls the ‘blood price’ of involve-
ment.116 Some terrorist organizations make their members publicly commit 
to carrying out an act of violence. Videotapes of would-be suicide bombers 
announcing their intentions and bidding farewell to friends and families 
110 Silke, ‘Holy Warriors’, 111.
111 Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 344.
112 McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 340-42.
113 Ibid., 341-42; Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 344.
114 Asch, ‘Studies of Independence and Conformity’, 1-70.
115 Asch, ‘Opinions and Social Pressure’, 31-35.
116 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 396.
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are an especially strong example of this practice.117 Although ostensibly 
framed as an inspirational message, the public distribution of such videos 
creates strong pressures on the would-be terrorist to follow through. Once 
such a statement of intention has been recorded and publicized, there can 
be no going back without considerable loss of face. Finally, there is the ‘blood 
price’ to be reckoned with; the death or capture of comrades may prompt 
remaining group members to strengthen their adherence to the norms the 
fallen represented as a coping mechanism for dealing with their loss.118
Peer pressure had a notable influence on Hofstadgroup participants’ 
adoption of fundamentalist, radical, and extremist views although not all 
participants were equally exposed to it.119 However, of the mechanisms iden-
tified above only evidence of the extremity shift and, to a smaller degree, the 
majority effect was found in the data. While one of the Piranha ringleaders 
did record a video that, in tone and content, strongly resembled a statement 
of intent to commit violence, there are no indications that he was pressured 
in any way to do so. Similarly, witnessing the arrest of group participants 
does not seem to have noticeably led the remainder to strengthen their ideo-
logical convictions. It could be argued that these arrests did contribute to 
group solidarity, however, as they prompted several instances of participants 
collectively donating money to their arrested friends’ wives.120
Variance decrease was the most notable aspect of extremity shift within 
the Hofstadgroup. Newcomers were questioned about their interpreta-
tion of tawhid to assess whether it corresponded with the group norm of 
denouncing democracy and its supporters.121 This provided a basic degree of 
homogeneity by keeping out individuals with markedly different opinions 
on the matter. For instance, an old friend of Van Gogh’s killer-to-be stopped 
visiting him because he did not agree with the increasingly extremist views 
being espoused at his friend’s house.122 It seems that extremity shift was 
also taking place via the relevant arguments mechanism. Hofstadgroup 
participants fanned each other’s radicalism by constantly talking about 
fundamentalist Islam and jihad and because there were few divergent 
opinions on these topics.123
117 Merari, ‘Social, Organizational, and Psychological Factors’, 79-80; Kruglanski and Fishman, 
‘Psychological Factors’, 23.
118 Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 396.
119 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3.
120 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 89-92.
121 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3.
122 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 132; GET: 18414-22.
123 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 10.
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Such like-mindedness was further established by the importance 
attached to takf ir. According to one interviewee, it was an almost daily 
practice for participants to ask each other whether they were willing to 
excommunicate a wide range of Muslims who failed to live up to the group’s 
extreme views.124 Given that acceptance of takfir was the majority opinion, 
this practice is reminiscent of the majority effect described above. As the 
‘correct’ answer was clearly to support a very broad application of takf ir, 
holding on to divergent opinions became more diff icult. This emphasis on 
an unbridled interpretation of takf ir also contributed to further variance 
decrease; in late 2004, several participants broke with the Hofstadgroup 
because they felt the use of takf ir had gone too far.125
On several occasions, pressure was deliberately exerted to engender 
acceptance of group norms and to maintain the group’s organizational 
integrity. A female participant was repeatedly shown videos of suicide 
bombers and told that she would one day commit a similar attack. She 
was also given a knife to hold and made to watch footage of people having 
their throats cut, while another participant told her she would learn how 
to slaughter too.126 In another example, a participant who questioned the 
group’s use of takf ir was met with verbal aggression; some of the other 
participants present went so far as to demand this individual retake the 
confession of faith.127
There were also less sinister but still notable instances of peer pressure. 
One male participant was questioned about his lackluster participation in 
prayer sessions and repeatedly lectured about his refusal to grow a long 
beard to the point that he no longer felt welcome.128 Another was told he 
was not allowed to talk with girls.129 Although attendance of Hofstadgroup 
gatherings was not mandatory, anyone who showed up infrequently was 
liable to get a call from other participants asking them to explain their 
absence. Those who persisted risked becoming the subject of malicious 
rumors that he or she had become an apostate.130 Several women, who 
disengaged from the group because they felt the use of takf ir went too far, 
124 Ibid., 2-3.
125 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002-03, 4018-20, 4030, 4048-58, 4085-86, 4092, 
4100, 4125-127, 4129, 4204; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 37, 93.
126 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 35, 134, 162; Groen and Kranenberg, Women 
Warriors, 81-82.
127 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3.
128 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19475.
129 Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 83.
130 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5.
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expressed fear of reprisals.131 Two of them were threatened for cooperating 
with the police.132
These examples show that peer pressure influenced the Hofstadgroup’s 
development in two ways. First, it played an important role in propagating 
and maintaining adherence to fundamentalist and extremist group norms 
(growing a beard, readiness to use takf ir, etc.). Second, peer pressure made 
it harder for individuals to cease participation by making such a decision 
costly in terms of reputation damage and personal threats. Like the trend 
towards isolation, peer pressure contributed to the Hofstadgroup’s cohesion 
and facilitated the spread of radical and extremist views.
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted that the Hofstadgroup’s formation was heavily 
reliant on preexisting ties of friendship, rather than conscious attempts at 
recruitment. Once initial participation had come about through these social 
networks, various group processes began to bind participants together, giv-
ing the Hofstadgroup a degree of organizational substance. The application 
of social identity theory revealed the key role that the social, cognitive, and 
emotional benefits of participation had in sustaining involvement. By and 
large, participants did not seek out the Hofstadgroup because they wanted 
to become extremists or terrorists. Instead, it appears that they found their 
way into this group and were then motivated to stay for reasons such as 
friendship and the sense of being among ‘true’ Muslims.
Social learning theory provided a key explanation for how fundamental-
ist and extremist ideas and models of behavior were transmitted among 
members of the group. This occurred both directly (e.g. during lectures) and 
indirectly (e.g. by watching jihadist videos that glorif ied violence) through 
exposure to justif ications for violence and to violent role models like Bin 
Laden and al-Zarqawi. Another important dynamic was the group’s volun-
tary isolation from Dutch society which increasingly cut its participants off 
from opinions and norms contrary to their own. Over time, this increased 
the Hofstadgroup’s social reality value, or the degree to which participants 
were influenced by commonly held views and norms, and strengthened its 
131 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4018-20, 4029, 4052, 4092; Groen and Kranen-
berg, Women Warriors, 91, 101.
132 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4122, 13; Groen and Kranenberg, Women War-
riors, 98-102.
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cohesion as participants’ social circle gradually excluded anyone outside 
of the group’s boundaries.
Some group-level factors influenced the Hofstadgroup through their 
absence. The Hofstadgroup lacked clear leaders who could or tried to shape 
the group ideologically or organizationally. While several authority f igures 
existed whose lectures and writings were important to the group’s adoption 
of fundamentalist, radical and extremist views, none appear to have had the 
ability or desire to purposefully mold the group. Ideological conformity and 
a degree of organizational integrity were safeguarded largely autonomously 
through various forms of peer pressure. Group extremity shift and the 
majority effect induced some individuals with contrary views to leave 
the group. The considerable importance placed on the themes of tawhid 
and takf ir compelled participants to adopt these views as their own. Peer 
pressure also threw up barriers to disengagement from the group and was 
on occasion exerted on specif ic individuals to gain their compliance with 
group norms.
These conclusions underwrite the importance of the group-level of 
analysis for achieving an understanding of how involvement in terrorist 
groups is initiated and sustained. What the preceding analysis has left 
unanswered, however, is whether group processes can shed light on the 
Hofstadgroup’s actual and intended use of violence. That discussion is the 
subject of the next chapter.
7 Group dynamics II: Involvement in 
acts of terrorist violence1
An individual’s participation in a terrorist group, the mere act of ‘joining’, 
does not necessarily lead to their involvement in terrorist attacks.2 As Taylor 
and Horgan argue, ‘involvement decisions’ are distinct from ‘event deci-
sions’.3 As such, any attempt to understand the commission of terrorist acts 
must go beyond explanations for why people join and remain in terrorist 
groups to look specif ically at how the decision to use violence came about. 
The previous chapter discussed the group-level factors that initiated and 
sustained involvement in the Hofstadgroup. The following pages complete 
the group-level analysis by analyzing whether it offers answers to why 
some participants became involved in actual terrorist violence or intended 
to do so.
7.1 Group-level explanations for terrorist violence
The literature reveals several group-level explanations for the use of terrorist 
violence, all of which will be discussed in the following paragraphs (Table 8). 
The most common assumption is that terrorism is strategic; a consciously 
chosen means to achieve certain (political) ends.4 A second and perhaps 
less widely acknowledged perspective states that terrorism can stem from 
organizational motives for violence such as the desire to avenge killed or 
captured comrades.5 The literature also reveals two other subjects relevant 
to a group’s ability and inclination to use such violence. The f irst is the 
relationship between a terrorist group’s organizational structure and its 
lethality.6 The second consists of various social-psychological factors that 
can lower individuals’ inhibitions towards harming or killing others. These 
are the diffusion of responsibility that can take place in group settings, the 
1 This chapter has been published in amended form as: Schuurman and Horgan, ‘Rationales 
for Terrorist Violence in Homegrown Jihadist Groups’.
2 Taylor and Horgan, ‘A Conceptual Framework’, 592; Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 
142-43.
3 Taylor, ‘Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?’, 125-26.
4 Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 371-82.
5 Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 13-31.
6 Asal and Rethemeyer, ‘The Nature of the Beast’, 437-49.
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closely related phenomenon of deindividuation, and the role of authority 
f igures in ordering or legitimizing violence.7
Table 8  Committing acts of terrorism
Organizational lethality Overcoming barriers to violence Rationales for terrorism
organizational lethality diffusion of responsibility strategic
deindividuation organizational
authorization of violence
7.2 Organizational structure and lethality
Research has found several organizational characteristics that increase 
a terrorist group’s lethality.8 The f irst is rallying around a religious or 
ethno-nationalist ideology, which is seen as leading to stronger ‘other-
ing’ of out-groups perceived to be inferior. The second characteristic is a 
positive correlation between group size and lethality, possibly due to larger 
groups having access to more human capital in the form of people with the 
skills required for organizing and executing terrorist attacks. Ties to other 
terrorist organizations and control of territory make up characteristics 
three and four, which are respectively explained as providing increased 
access to relevant information, means and expertise, and as conveying 
resources and shelter conducive to organizational growth and longevity.9 
Later research by Asal et al. also underscored terrorists’ technical expertise 
as a lethality-increasing factor.10
The Hofstadgroup could count on few of the above characteristics. It had 
no territorial control whatsoever. It did have international links to several 
individuals who may have been involved in terrorism. But as Chapter 5 
argued, these ties did not provide the Hofstadgroup with signif icant 
benefits in terms of increasing its ability to plan and execute a terrorist 
attack, beyond the possibility that two participants had undergone basic 
paramilitary training overseas. Neither did the Hofstadgroup’s fairly large 
size of approximately forty participants provide it with much in the way 
of terrorism-relevant human capital. None of the group’s participants were 
7 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 48-49.
8 Asal and Rethemeyer, ‘The Nature of the Beast’, 437-49.
9 Ibid., 437-41, 443-44, 446.
10 Asal et al., ‘Killing Range’, 401-27.
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experienced militants and the largely unsuccessful trips abroad did little to 
alter this fact. Neither did the group contain people knowledgeable about 
such terrorist essentials as the construction of explosives.
The one organizational characteristic conducive to increased lethality 
that the Hofstadgroup had, was a religious ideology based on an extrem-
ist interpretation of Islam. This allowed a dichotomous ‘us versus them’ 
worldview to take hold, especially among the more militant participants. 
This sharp distinction between a small in-group of the righteous and 
various out-group enemies, ranging from apostate Muslims to Western 
states engaged in a perceived ‘war against Islam’, lowered the threshold 
to seeing the use of violence as acceptable. On the whole, however, the 
Hofstadgroup’s organizational characteristics conferred upon it a relatively 
low level of inherent lethality. This is a potential explanation for why so 
few participants actually became involved in (preparations for) terrorism 
and why Van Gogh’s murder was the only attack to go beyond planning 
and preparatory stages.
7.3 Group influences that lower barriers to violent behavior
In his review of the relevant literature, Borum identif ies four group effects 
that can lower individuals’ thresholds to using violence.11 One of these, 
group norms that legitimize the use of violence, will not be repeated here 
as both the previous paragraph and the last chapter have aff irmed that 
such norms existed within the Hofstadgroup. Instead, the next paragraphs 
focus on the diffusion of individual responsibility, the related concept of 
deindividuation and, thirdly, obedience to authority.
7.3.1 Diffusion of responsibility and deindividuation
Soccer hooliganism and mass looting show that, under particular circum-
stances, crowds can bring out antisocial behavior in the individuals that 
constitute them.12 Given the propensity for large groups to behave violently, 
early social scientists described such collective behavior in terms of irration-
ality and anarchy.13 While recent research has shown such qualif ications 
11 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 48-49.
12 Russell, ‘Sport Riots’, 367-68.
13 Reicher, ‘Psychology of Crowd Dynamics’, 185-86.
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to be inaccurate,14 group participation can affect individuals’ behavior by 
‘diffusing’ their personal sense of responsibility to the collective.15 When 
everyone is responsible for what happens, no one person can be held ac-
countable.16 In such a setting, individuals’ internal barriers to otherwise 
prohibited behavior, including involvement in acts of violence, are lowered.17
The lowering of inhibitions to deviant behavior can also result from 
‘deindividuation’. Postmes and Spears def ine it as a ‘psychological state of 
decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing 
antinormative and disinhibitive behavior’.18 Put another way, people are 
more likely to act in otherwise prohibited ways when they lose the sense 
that they will or can be held accountable for their actions. Silke has argued 
that anonymity-induced deindividuation is particularly likely to lead to an 
increased likeliness of violent behavior.19 His research on interpersonal 
assaults in Northern Ireland shows that masked attackers were significantly 
more likely to display higher levels of aggression and punitive treatment of 
their victims than those whose identities were not similarly concealed.20
Hofstadgroup participants were involved in two acts of violence; the 
murder of Van Gogh and the throwing of a hand grenade at police off icers. 
As neither of the two perpetrators was disguised or in any other sense 
unrecognizable, anonymity-induced deindividuation is ruled out as an 
explanatory variable. Likewise, there is currently no data to suggest that 
either of these individuals experienced a diffusion of responsibility based 
on their participation in a larger group. Van Gogh’s killer acted alone and 
while the hand grenade thrower was accompanied by another Hofstadgroup 
participant at the time of the incident, there is no data to suggest the other 
person’s presence induced a diffusion of personal responsibility. A ‘group’ of 
two seems simply too small for its participants to experience such an effect.
7.3.2 Authorization of violence
Milgram’s famous 1963 study dramatically highlighted some humans’ 
willingness to use violence when ordered to do so.21 In the experiment, test 
14 Ibid., 182-208.
15 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 49.
16 Garnett, ‘The Causes of War’, 81.
17 Pynchon and Borum, ‘Assessing Threats’, 345-46.
18 Postmes and Spears, ‘Deindividuation’, 238.
19 Silke, ‘The Internet & Terrorist Radicalisation’, 33.
20 Silke, ‘Deindividuation, Anonymity, and Violence’, 493-94, 496.
21 Milgram, ‘Behavorial Study of Obedience’,” 371-78.
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subjects administered what they thought were increasingly strong electric 
shocks to other people on the instigation of a scientif ic authority f igure, 
despite being able to hear the screams and pleas of the ‘victim’ (who in 
actuality was an accomplice of the experimenter).22 The test subjects clearly 
believed that their actions were causing pain to another human being and 
displayed high levels of stress while following the instructions given to 
them. Nevertheless, a majority of test subjects continued to perform as 
ordered. Milgram’s study highlights a mechanism known as ‘displacement 
of authority’.23 Most test subjects continued to give ‘electric shocks’ because 
in their perception it was ultimately not they who were responsible, but the 
experimenter issuing commands. Can obedience to authority explain why 
some Hofstadgroup participants planned or executed acts of terrorism?
The most notable authority f igures were the middle-aged Syrian religious 
instructor Abu Khaled and Van Gogh’s future murderer. As the previous 
chapter noted, the Syrian was crucial to the conveyance of fundamentalist 
and radical convictions that contributed to the delegitimization of Dutch 
society and politics. It is certainly plausible that he was in some way involved 
with the murder of Van Gogh, especially as he left for Syria on the very day 
of the attack. Yet despite considerable speculation to this end,24 there is 
currently no concrete data to suggest that Abu Khaled directly legitimized 
or encouraged the use of violence.25 It could well be that future research 
will convincingly show this individual did have a role in the murder of Van 
Gogh or the other planned attacks. For now, however, there is no concrete 
empirical evidence to support this line of reasoning.
The writings of Van Gogh’s future murderer show that he began to develop 
extremist views from approximately March 2004 onward.26 One participant 
recalled that he preached that the ‘blood and money’ of unbelievers was fair 
game.27 As such Van Gogh’s future assailant certainly provided justifications 
for the use of violence, but he too never appears to have directly instigated 
other participants to commit such acts. Both Abu Khaled and Van Gogh’s 
assailant conferred ideas that, to different degrees, provided participants 
22 Ibid.
23 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 49-50.
24 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 4.
25 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 136-40; AHA04/21: 1632-35, 1646; 01/17: 4002, 
4026, 4048-4050, 4090-4091, 4096, 4098, 4129, 4179, 4146, 4201; AHB11/26: 3796-803; VERD: 19480, 
20131, 20213, 20363; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3; ‘Personal 
Interview 2’, 8-9; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 24; Erkel, Samir, 190-92.
26 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 150-59.
27 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 81.
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with legitimizations for the use of violence. However, they did not explicitly 
order its use.
In November 2004, just after Van Gogh’s murder, a listening device 
recorded one participant telling another to use a hand grenade should the 
police come to arrest them. ‘Because there will be a ring at the door before 
their arrival, what do you do? You make… you wait until they enter and then 
you throw one, yes?’28 In an earlier conversation, however, the ‘instructor’ 
uses ‘we’ to refer to how they would react to a police raid.29 Likewise, during 
the ‘siege’ of their apartment on 10 November, this individual spoke with 
‘we’ when phoning several friends to tell them they had thrown a grenade 
at the police.30 On that day he was also heard saying ‘[y]ou just need to 
get that thing and throw it outside’ to his compatriot.31 But none of the 
remaining three hand grenades were used. These conversations suggest that 
this individual either was not trying to or lacked the authority to command 
the use of violence, making it unlikely the authorization of violence was a 
factor in the use of the grenade.
Based on the above examples and the remainder of the empirical data, 
there is little to suggest that among the group’s participants were those with 
the authority, ability, and desire to order the execution of terrorist attacks.32 
But what about those authority f igures outside its borders? It has been noted 
several times that there is no concrete evidence that the Moroccan jihadist 
residing in Spain and the unnamed Afghan or Pakistani ‘emir’ authorized 
or instigated the use of violence by those participants they were in contact 
with.33 But they were not the only external authority f igures.
In chat conversations dated to September 2003, two participants describe 
their separate encounters with a Dutch convert to Islam who became a 
radical preacher. In these chats, both participants claim to have received 
confirmation from this preacher that it was religiously justified to steal from 
or kill representatives of the Dutch government.34 The preacher in ques-
tion has denied any involvement with the two Hofstadgroup participants 
28 ‘Want er wordt straks vóór hun aankomst gebeld, wat doe je? Jij maakt… jij wacht totdat zij 
binnenkomen en dan doe jij eentje gooien, ja?’:Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA07/24: 
3047.
29 Ibid., AHA07/24: 3034.
30 Ibid., AHA07/24: 3091.
31 ‘Je moet dat ding gewoon pakken en naar buiten gooien’: Ibid., AHA07/24: 3119; Vermaat, 
Nederlandse Jihad, 49.
32 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19479, 19876; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 14-15; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 586-87.
33 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 23-25.
34 Ibid., AHD08/37: 8713-14, 8765-66; NOVA, ‘Chatgesprekken Jason W.’
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and claims to have barely met them.35 While the Hofstadgroup men may 
have given a more militant interpretation to his words than the preacher 
intended, the latter’s radical convictions seem in little doubt. During a 
November 2004 television appearance, he said that he was pleased to hear 
of Van Gogh’s death and would not feel sorry if right-wing politician Geert 
Wilders contracted a deadly disease.36 These remarks lend credibility to 
the idea that the Hofstadgroup participants were able to construe from 
the preacher’s words a legitimization for violence, although it is unlikely 
he ever issued any kind of direct ‘order’ to that extent.
One of the imams of the Salafist as-Soennah mosque in The Hague gained 
notoriety for a sermon he delivered shortly before the murder of Van Gogh. 
The imam provided various examples of the punishment reserved for those 
who mock the Prophet Muhammad and beseeched his god to give Van 
Gogh and Hirsi Ali deadly, incurable diseases. He was, however, careful to 
not openly incite to violence.37 Although Van Gogh’s killer does not appear 
to have attended this particular sermon, he and other participants in the 
Hofstadgroup were known to have frequented the imam’s mosque.38 The 
imam has claimed that his sermon was intended to channel his listen-
ers’ anger and frustration over the activities of Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali 
as a means of creating a buffer against violence.39 Even if this surprising 
interpretation of his words is true, the incident suggests that participants 
had access to authority f igures whose words could easily be interpreted as 
justif ications for violence.
Extremist imams, ideologues, and militants that influenced the Hof-
stadgroup through books, television, and the Internet, provided the clearest 
justif ications for and calls to violence. Yet their influence was indirect. 
Men like Osama bin Laden or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi never specif ically 
instructed or authorized the Hofstadgroup to carry out an attack. Van 
Gogh’s killer found a particularly compelling justif ication to murder blas-
phemers in the work of the fourteenth-century Salaf ist scholar Ahmad ibn 
Taymiyya. Crucially, however, interpreting this work as a personal duty for 
the individual believer to act as judge, jury, and executioner was something 
that the killer had to do himself.40
35 Alberts and Derix, ‘Balkenende in 2003’.
36 ‘“U Wilt Misschien”’. 
37 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 233-40.
38 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19562, 19853, 20004, 20114-115; Groen and 
Kranenberg, Women Warriors.
39 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 236-45.
40 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 156.
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To the previous chapter’s conclusion that the Hofstadgroup lacked leaders 
who shaped the group ideologically or organizationally, this section adds 
the f inding that it also lacked what could be termed operational leaders.41 
Authority f igures both in and outside of the group, as well as jihadist ‘role 
models’ provided plentiful (implied) justif ications for the use of terrorism. 
But none actively moved participants from the conviction that violence 
was permissible to actual participation in violent behavior. The lack of 
direct personal contacts with people authorizing or ordering the use of 
terrorism was signif icant. It meant that the degree to which Hofstadgroup 
participants could displace responsibility for any harm they inflicted on 
others was limited, leaving a signif icant obstacle to the use of violence 
intact. It also supports a previous f inding that the impetus for acts of ter-
rorism was left to the initiative of individual participants. Planning or 
perpetrating acts of terrorism remained a predominantly personal rather 
than group-based undertaking.
7.4 The rationality of terrorism
The remainder of this chapter addresses whether strategic or organizational 
rationales for terrorism can explain the Hofstadgroup’s planned and per-
petrated attacks. This discussion, however, builds on the assumption that 
terrorism can be seen as the end-result of an essentially rational decision-
making process. In other words, that terrorism is not (solely) the domain of 
the irrational fanatic or the mentally disturbed psychopath. The following 
paragraphs briefly outline this argument in order to support the analysis 
of the strategic and organizational rationales that follows.
All rationality is ‘bounded’ in the sense that people seldom have perfect 
information on which to base their decisions or may simply not be able 
to accurately foresee all possible consequences of the courses of action 
available to them.42 Thus, the decision to engage in high-risk behavior such 
as terrorism does not necessarily imply irrationality; it may simply have 
seemed the best option available at the time. Secondly, although rational 
choice theory has at times advocated that decision making is motivated 
solely by the maximization of narrowly def ined self-interest,43 in reality 
41 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19479, 19876; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 14-15; Vidino, ‘The Hofstad Group’, 586-87.
42 Simon, ‘Rationality in Political Behavior’, 46-47.
43 Caplan, ‘Terrorism’, 94-95.
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many people engage in collective action at considerable personal risk, such 
as strikes or rebellions.44 This indicates that self-interest can extend to the 
pursuit of altruistic or collectively held goals.45 Even suicide terrorism, 
seemingly the ultimate negation of self-interest, can be construed as rational 
behavior provided that the perpetrator believes death in pursuit of his or 
her cause will guarantee the bestowment of status, benefits to family, or 
rewards in an afterlife that warrant the loss of life.46
A substantial body of empirical research lends further credence to the 
notion of that terrorists are essentially rational actors. Terrorists have been 
shown to adapt their behavior in response to the obstacles and opportuni-
ties provided by prevailing physical, social, and political circumstances.47 
For instance by adjusting operational methods or switching to different 
targets in response to heightened security measures,48 reserving suicide 
attacks for targets against which ‘conventional’ modes of attack are less 
likely to be successful,49 and considering beforehand how the use of suicide 
attacks will affect their popular standing.50 Terrorist organizations have 
also been found to time their attacks in an attempt to maximize both their 
long-term and immediate effects.51
It has been noted that terrorism is seldom effective in the long run,52 and 
that the stated goals of contemporary religious terrorists are so utopian as to 
defy rational expectations of achievability.53 However, there are examples 
of terrorism proving strategically effective,54 and its short-term benefits, 
such as limited concessions or simple recognition, may obscure its poor 
long-term chances of success.55 The literature also cautions against taking 
44 Scott, ‘Rational Choice Theory’, 132-33.
45 Shughart, ‘Terrorism in Rational Choice Perspective’, 126.
46 Hafez, ‘Rationality, Culture, and Structure’, 180-81; Kacou, ‘Five Arguments’, 539-47; Tosini, 
‘Calculated, Passionate, Pious Extremism’, 394-415.
47 Shapiro, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 9-13.
48 Berrebi, ‘Evidence About the Link between Education’, 172-73; Clauset et al., ‘The Strategic 
Calculus of Terrorism’, 6-33; Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero, ‘Testing a Rational Choice Model of 
Airline Hijackings’, 356-57; Sandler and Enders, ‘An Economic Perspective’, 311-13.
49 Berman and Laitin, ‘Hard Targets’, 30-31.
50 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 78.
51 Kliot and Charney, ‘ Geography of Suicide Terrorism’, 353.
52 Abrahms, ‘The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism’, 366-93; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 
211-12, 215-17.
53 Nalbandov, ‘Irrational Rationality’, 92-96, 102.
54 Hoffman, ‘The Rationality of Terrorism’, 258-72; Kydd and Walter, ‘The Strategies of Terror-
ism’, 49.
55 Gould and Klor, ‘Does Terrorism Work?’, 1459-510; Krause, ‘The Political Effectiveness of 
Non-State Violence’, 259-94; Marsden, ‘Succesful Terrorism’, 134-50.
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terrorists’ utopian rhetoric at face value. While terrorist groups may claim 
to be driven by religious motives and otherworldly rewards, their behavior 
often belies realism and a focus on the here and now. For instance, the fact 
that Hamas videotapes would-be suicide bombers’ last wills to reinforce 
their resolve, indicates that even these ideological extremists realize that 
when put to the test, their operatives may not hold to professed beliefs as 
closely as they claimed.56 In short, existing research makes a strong case 
for analyzing terrorism as a rational form of behavior.
7.5 Terrorism as the result of strategic considerations
The academic literature widely considers terrorism to be a strategy; a means 
consciously chosen to achieve certain (political) ends.57 Despite projecting 
an image of irrational fanaticism, suicide terrorism is no exception in this 
regard, especially when viewed from the perspective of the organizations 
deploying such attacks.58 As Pape states, it is not simple fanaticism that 
explains organizations’ use of suicide terrorism, but a belief in the eff icacy 
of this mode of attack.59 From the strategic perspective, terrorism is just 
one particular form of political violence whose adoption is dictated by 
circumstances.60 The strategic rationale brings to light that terrorism is a 
form of behavior rather than an inherent quality of certain types of people; 
it is something individuals can opt to do, not an expression of what they are.
Any group may opt to utilize terrorist violence as a strategy for a variety 
of reasons.61 Some employ it as a form of psychological warfare, extracting 
concessions from opponents through the (threatened) use of indiscriminate 
violence.62 Groups might also utilize terrorist violence to demonstrate a gov-
ernment’s impotence,63 to advertise their goals and grievances to a (global) 
audience, to establish revolutionary conditions, or to entice government 
56 Miller, ‘Terrorist Decision Making,’ 138.
57 Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 371-82; LaFree et al., ‘Spatial and Temporal Patterns’, 
7-29; Lake, ‘Rational Extremism’, 15-29; Neumann and Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism; Shapiro, 
‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 5-20.
58 Hoffman and McCormick, ‘Terrorism, Signaling’, 243-81; Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic’, 1-19; 
Pape, Dying to Win; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
59 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic’, 1-19.
60 Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, 213-51.
61 Jackson, ‘Organizational Decisionmaking’, 221-28; Kydd and Walter, ‘The Strategies of 
Terrorism’, 59.
62 Schmid, ‘Terrorism as Psychological Warfare’, 137-46.
63 Neumann and Smith, ‘Strategic Terrorism’, 571-95.
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over-reaction as a means of delegitimizing the authorities.64 Furthermore, 
terrorist attacks can be intended to alter the behavior of the groups with 
which the perpetrators identify, for instance by gaining popular support 
or new recruits, or by convincing their supporters that armed resistance 
is feasible.65
Scenarios in which a cost-benefit analysis could swing in favor of terror-
ism include the exhaustion of non-violent options or seeing other groups 
successfully utilize this form of political violence. Alternatively, the narrow 
popular appeal of extremist groups’ goals or strong government repression 
may rule out political attempts at achieving change, making terrorism more 
attractive from the outset. There may also be a sudden opportunity that 
makes terrorism seem an appealing option, such as repressive government 
measures that (temporarily) provide popular legitimacy for striking at the 
authorities. Finally, terrorism can become attractive when a group is forced 
onto the defensive, turning it into a means of showing continued strength 
and ability to act despite state success or increased repression.66
Van Gogh’s attacker left behind numerous writings that provide an 
interesting perspective on his views. In some of these texts, he threatened 
perceived enemies or called upon Muslims to rise up and f ight in defense 
of their faith.67 But to what end? Beyond advocacy of religious dogmatism 
and general calls to militancy and resistance, concrete strategic goals are 
absent. While Van Gogh’s murderer does at one point declare that it is ‘but 
a matter of time’ before the Dutch government will fall to Islamist forces, 
there is no indication that he worked to hasten this ultimate victory or had 
any practical ideas on how to bring it about.68
The lack of strategic motives is also apparent in the f inal statement that 
Van Gogh’s murderer gave in court on 9 August 2005. ‘I acted out of faith. 
And I have even declared that had it been my father or my brother, I would 
have done exactly the same’.69 Neither is there a clear indication that he 
killed for political motives in any of the seven ‘open letters’ he wrote prior 
to carrying out his attack. The letters threaten the Dutch people as a whole 
with further acts of terrorism and single out several politicians known for 
64 Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 371, 377-79.
65 Lustick, ‘Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, 514-52.
66 Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 373-76.
67 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschre-
ven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 12-56.
68 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 158-59.
69 ‘Ik heb gehandeld uit geloof. En ik heb zelfs aangegeven dat als het mijn vader was geweest 
of broertje had ik precies hetzelfde gedaan’: NOS, ‘Verklaring Mohammed B. In Tekst’, 2.
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their critical stance on Islam. The letters also admonish the (global) Muslim 
community for standing by in the face of oppression and encourage young 
Dutch Muslims to follow the ‘true’ path of (extremist) Islam.70 They suggest 
that the murderer was motivated by a strongly held belief that it was his 
personal duty to kill blasphemers, as a well as a desire to avenge perceived 
injustices, rather than an ambition to attain political goals more specif ic 
than rallying potential supporters to his worldview.
In 2005, another member of the group’s extremist inner circle made a 
videotape in which he threatens the Dutch government and its citizens for 
their participation in the Iraq war. He also calls upon his fellow believers 
to ‘attack or be attacked’ in defense of oppressed Muslims worldwide.71 
But other than a call for the Dutch to ‘keep your hands off of the Muslims 
everywhere in the world’, he does not formulate clear political goals.72 A 
concrete strategic rationale was also absent from this individual’s 2003 
attempt to reach Chechnya and, prior to that, his ambition to go to the 
Palestinian territories. Instead, both the videotaped message and his 
unf inished autobiography reveal an idealistic desire to help oppressed 
Muslims, the need to f ind a release for feelings of anger and revenge, a 
sense of personal religious duty, and the emulation of jihadist role models. 
In a telling reference to his desire to go to the Palestinian territories, he 
writes ‘I did not think at all, about where I would go, what I would do, about 
nothing’.73 The need to ‘do something’ was all-important.
The motives of other Hofstadgroup participants with violent intentions 
follow a similar pattern. The letter a third inner-circle member left his 
mother before embarking for Pakistan or Afghanistan makes clear that he 
left to ‘drive out the unbelievers’ and ‘establish the Islamic state’.74 Although 
these are clear goals on paper they hardly appear outside of this one letter. 
When he mentions his travels in chat conversations during the fall of 2003, 
the emphasis is always on the action itself, rather than its signif icance as a 
means towards certain ends. Rather than stressing the need for an Islamic 
state in Afghanistan, for instance, this individual seemed almost singu-
larly interested in discussing the specif ic weapons he used, the training 
70 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 156-57.
71 NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
72 ‘Houden jullie handen af van de moslims overal in de wereld’: Ibid.
73 ‘Ik dacht helemaal niet na, over waar ik daar naar toe zou gaan, wat ik daar zou kunnen 
doen, over niets’: A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4.
74 ‘om er de ongelovigen te verdrijven, en te helpen om de Islamitische staat op te richten’: 
Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 163.
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he allegedly underwent, the hardships he faced, and the people he met.75 
Adventure and action trumped strategic considerations.
Political-strategic considerations were not entirely absent from the 
motives of those Hofstadgroup participants who actually carried out or 
planned to carry out a terrorist attack. There are also some indications that 
the group’s most militant participants discussed – and disagreed – about 
how the use of violence could best suit their aims; some wanted to focus on 
attacks in the Netherlands while others wished to join Islamist insurgents 
overseas.76 But as the various examples given above have shown, strategic 
rationales were never clearly expressed. Instead, such ambitions to com-
mit acts of terrorism as emerged from the group hinted at strongly held 
convictions and violent emotions as motivational forces. The next section 
considers whether organizational rationales for violence can shed light on 
their origins.
7.6 Terrorism as the result of organizational dynamics
Semi-clandestine and ideologically oriented organizations such as terrorist 
groups face considerable constraints on decision-making processes. Their 
social isolation or, in some cases, even completely underground existence 
makes them inherently inward-looking. Among the effects of such an 
existence are increased cohesion among militants and a heightened desire 
to strike out at those who threaten the group.77 But studies reveal that 
by making the group the sole source and f ilter for information about the 
outside world, increased solidarity can also skew the analysis of the likely 
consequences of attacks as well as the cost benefit calculation that led to 
the adoption of terrorism in the f irst place.78
Furthermore, highly cohesive in-groups that need to make decisions in 
times of crisis and in conditions of considerable stress are vulnerable to 
‘groupthink’. This refers to a setting in which loyalty to group norms and 
social pressures towards conformity override critical thinking and the 
voicing of doubts.79 Groupthink further deteriorates the ability of (terrorist) 
75 Ibid., 01/01: 123-26; AHA05/22: 2176; AHD07/36: 8401-02; AHD08/37: 569-571, 595-597, 618-619, 
635-637, 715-717, 767-769, 773-775, 880, 919-931; AHD09/38: 9049, 9054-56.
76 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3-4.
77 McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 421-24.
78 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 310; Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 372; Della 
Porta, Social Movements, 114, 186, 204.
79 Janis, ‘Groupthink’, 84-85.
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groups to objectively interpret reality, can lead them to overestimate their 
own capabilities, to dismiss information or criticisms that do not f it their 
preconceptions, and to hold stereotypical views of the enemy that prohibit a 
realistic assessment of their opponents’ capabilities and likely responses.80
The effects of group psychology surpass merely placing constraints on 
the rationality of decision-making processes. Some authors propose that 
group dynamics override strategic considerations in contributing to the 
decision to use terrorist violence.81 Although terrorist groups often present 
themselves as ideologically driven organizations that use violence to achieve 
political aims, such strategic rationales are not necessarily the primary 
incentive guiding members’ participation. Instead, personnel may be drawn 
by a host of non-political considerations such as social solidarity, status, or 
the personal gratif ication found in adherence to the group’s worldview.82 
Through its ability to deliver these benefits, the group’s importance can 
become so great that its wellbeing becomes its members’ greatest priority.83 
Over time, ‘proximate’ objectives such as group survival can supersede 
‘ultimate’ political purpose, leading terrorist groups to persevere even in 
the face of outright failure and making terrorism a goal in itself.84
The literature review revealed six group-based motives for terrorist 
violence. The f irst is the incentive of redemption, whereby membership of 
violent groups that adhere to strict moral or religious codes offers individual 
participants a road to salvation.85 In such a setting, the ‘motivation for 
terrorism may be to transcend reality as much as to transform it’.86 The 
second is the action imperative. Impatient for results and disillusioned 
with or otherwise dismissive of the path of non-violence, terrorist groups 
frequently develop strong internal pressures towards carrying out a violent 
act. Such a need to ‘do something’ is not necessarily tied to instrumental 
reasoning.87 Thirdly, there is the emulation of other terrorists held in high 
esteem by the group. Their modus operandi, their justif ications for violence, 
80 Ibid., 85-88; McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 488-89; Crenshaw, Explaining Ter-
rorism, 107.
81 Ozer, ‘The Impact of Group Dynamics’, 63-75.
82 Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want’, 101-03.
83 Della Porta, Social Movements, 134, 177-78, 183.
84 Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 19-22; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terror-
ist Groups’, 336-37; McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 489-90; McAllister and Schmid, 
‘Theories of Terrorism’, 227; Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic’, 38.
85 Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 20.
86 Ibid.
87 McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 487; Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 20; Sage-
man, ‘The Next Generation of Terror’, 40-41.
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and even the manner in which these role models issue communiqués can 
become templates and incentives for admirers’ own actions.88
The fourth group-driven motivation for terrorism found in the literature 
sees such violence occur as a response to counterterrorism measures taken 
by the authorities.89 Attacking the state is of course most readily associated 
with strategic rationales for terrorism. But as the state reacts to terrorist at-
tacks and terrorist groups lose comrades to f irefights or arrests, what began 
as a politically strategic use of force has a tendency to devolve into a highly 
personal struggle in which the desire for vengeance can override strategic 
considerations and instigate further violence.90 Such a spiral of revenge is 
documented, for instance, by Della Porta in her research on the Italian and 
German left-wing terrorist groups that were active between 1960 and 1990.91
The f ifth and sixth organizational rationales for terrorism are competi-
tion with other extremist groups and intragroup conflict. When different 
terrorist groups emerge that share the same goals, appeal to the same 
ideology, and (claim to) represent the same segment of a population, the 
likeliness of competition increases. In the struggle for such resources as 
media attention, recruits, and popular legitimacy, terrorist groups may 
begin to use violence against their competitors as well as their primary 
out-group enemy.92 Intragroup conflicts and disagreements, f inally, have 
been hypothesized to lead to violence when they become so extreme that 
the projection of this disaffection onto external enemies is the only way of 
keeping the terrorist group from falling apart.93
The empirical data on the Hofstadgroup appears to match four of the 
six organizational rationales for violence outlined above. These are the 
‘redemption’, ‘emulation’, ‘reactions to state countermeasures’, and ‘competi-
tion with other extremist groups’ hypotheses.
7.6.1 The group as a vehicle for redemptive violence
Van Gogh’s murderer was clearly motivated by the incentive of religious 
salvation. His declaration in court and the farewell letter he left his family 
88 McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 488; Crone, ‘Religion and Violence’, 291-307.
89 Lia and Skjølberg, ‘Causes of Terrorism’, 17.
90 McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 425.
91 Della Porta, Social Movements, 155, 183.
92 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 78-79, 94-97; Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism’, 24; McCauley and 
Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 424; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology 
of Terrorist Groups’, 335; Ross, ‘Structural Causes’, 323; Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, 76.
93 McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 335.
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revealed a man driven by the desire to act in accordance with his religious 
convictions and the hope that he would gain a favored place in an afterlife.94 
Although these themes are less prominent in the case of the individual who 
videotaped a threat to the Dutch public, his message similarly stresses that 
waging defensive jihad is a religious duty. He also told his parents that he 
acted out of fear for disobeying his god’s commandments and his message 
appears to glorify self-sacrif ice in name of Islam.95 A desire for martyrdom 
and its associated awards is also a commonly recurring theme in a third 
participant’s chat conversations about his motives for traveling to Pakistan 
or Afghanistan.96
It is clear that group processes contributed to the adoption of such radi-
cal and extremist convictions. However, there is little to indicate that the 
aforementioned individuals’ desire to engage in religiously inspired violence 
resulted directly from their participation in the Hofstadgroup. Neither is 
there cause to assume that they sought out the Hofstadgroup because they 
hoped it would enable them to engage in such violence. Instead, as the next 
chapter will detail, the available evidence points to the influential role of 
largely idiosyncratic personal factors. In the case of Van Gogh’s murderer 
these were the loss of his mother and his discovery of religious texts mandat-
ing the murder of blasphemers.97 For the videotaped individual, a desire 
to assist oppressed Muslims worldwide mixed with personal animosity 
towards the Dutch state. These f indings hint at motives for terrorism that 
were primarily personal rather than group-based.
7.6.2 The influence of role models on the use of violence
Emulation of role models certainly formed an incentive for violence among 
some Hofstadgroup participants. Van Gogh’s murderer followed precepts 
mandating the murder of blasphemers set out in a centuries-old work by a 
leading Salaf ist scholar.98 The videotaped message discussed earlier bore a 
close stylistic resemblance to similar communiqués published by jihadists 
like Osama Bin Laden; studded with Quranic recitation and a firearm clearly 
displayed.99 However, in both examples the sources being emulated lay 
94 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4033-41; NOS, ‘Verklaring Mohammed B. 
In Tekst’.
95 NOVA, “Videotestament Samir A.’.
96 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8573-74, 8594, 8773.
97 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59.
98 Ibid., 155-56.
99 NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
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outside of the Hofstadgroup itself, meaning they cannot be earmarked as 
reflecting organizational rationales for violence.
There is only one notable example where emulation of a Hofstadgroup 
participant contributed to another’s motivation for violence. One inter-
viewee explained that he and his comrades saw the murder of Van Gogh 
as setting an example that they too needed to follow.100 Thus, Van Gogh’s 
murder inspired the interviewee to start considering an attack of his 
own. Fortunately, the individual in question was arrested before he was 
able to act on his intentions. Although only one example, it points to the 
potentially signif icant inf luence of copycat behavior in bringing about 
further acts of terrorism.
7.6.3 Interaction with the Dutch authorities
The organizational dynamic that most clearly contributed to some 
participants’ desire to use violence was the Hofstadgroup’s increasing 
antagonism towards the Dutch state. First of all, the experience of being 
arrested and imprisoned clearly increased the hatred felt by some of those 
in and around the group towards the state and its representatives.101 For 
instance, one participant claimed that his arrest following an altercation 
with a police off icer in 2002 strengthened his conviction that Muslims 
were being persecuted by unbelievers.102 The female participants inter-
viewed by Groen and Kranenberg were furious about the rough manner 
in which they had been apprehended and the authors noted the radical-
izing effects of these experiences.103 Similarly, one interviewee mentioned 
that, initially, his incarceration only strengthened his convictions and 
his hatred.104
Most importantly, the counterterrorism activities of the Dutch state 
seem to have engendered within some participants a desire to strike back. 
In chat messages dated to October 2003 an inner-circle member expressed 
anger at the drafting of new laws which, he claimed, would land him and his 
compatriots in jail.105 Although he does not specify them, he was probably 
referring to the legislative proposals that would result in the 2004 Crimes of 
100 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 27.
101 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 5-6; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 215.
102 Erkel, Samir, 35-40.
103 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 147, 183.
104 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
105 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8600.
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Terrorism Act.106 The sources also make clear that this person felt a strong 
antipathy towards the AIVD.107 Furthermore, in a letter likely written by 
this same individual, he responds to the then Deputy Prime Minister’s 
‘declaration of war’ against terrorism that was issued in the wake of Van 
Gogh’s murder. With those words, the letter warns, the ‘gates of hell’ have 
been opened and a total war begun that can only end in the victory of either 
the forces of unbelief or those of Islam.108
No one was more strongly affected by the Hofstadgroup’s increasingly 
antagonistic relations with the Dutch state than the participant who in 
2005 would record a threatening video message. This person appears to 
have developed a particular hatred for the Dutch justice system and the 
AIVD.109 After his release from custody in early 2005, police intelligence 
revealed that he was driven to rectify the ‘1-0’ the Dutch state had scored 
against him, indicating that he was at least partly motivated by a desire 
for revenge.110 While the participants’ antagonistic interactions with the 
Dutch authorities were arguably the single most important organizational 
rationale for violence, the examples given in this paragraph once again hint 
that this rationale may have been as much personal as it was group-based 
in origin.
7.6.4 Competition with other extremist groups
Rivalry with other extremist groups did not occur because of an absence 
of potential competitors with whom to vie for recruits, resources, or 
standing. The Hofstadgroup was not one of many similar entities but, at 
the time, a relatively unique phenomenon in the Netherlands. However, 
if this line of reasoning is broadened slightly to encompass disagreements 
between an extremist group and the wider (non-violent) social movement 
to which it relates, then a new perspective comes to the fore centered on 
the Hofstadgroup’s discontent with the wider Dutch Salaf ist community 
and moderate Muslims in general.
106 Van der Woude, Wetgeving in Een Veiligheidscultuur, 206-07; Van der Laan, ‘Donners 
Rigoureuze Maatregelen’.
107 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA05/22: 2169; AHD08/37: 8552, 8607-608.
108 ‘de poorten van de hel opengezet’: Ibid., 01/13: 151; ‘Kabinet Bindt Strijd Aan Met 
Moslimterreur’.
109 Erkel, Samir, 35-40, 199-200, 206-08, 218-19, 227-28, 240-41; Calis, ‘Iedereen Wil Martelaar 
Zijn’, 3; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8552.
110 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 151, INL05: 8327.
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De Koning and Meijer attribute particular importance to this relation-
ship. They argue that the progressively harsher tone of the public debate 
on Islam in the Netherlands, coupled with the increased public scrutiny of 
Salaf ist mosques after two young Dutch Salaf ists were killed in Kashmir in 
2002, pressured representatives of mainstream Salaf ism to become more 
moderate. This accommodating attitude left the Hofstadgroup’s young 
radicals disappointed with mainstream Salaf ism, which contributed both 
to the group’s formation as well as to the conviction of its more extremist 
participants that jihad was the only legitimate way forward.111
The available empirical data partly supports this line of reasoning. Vari-
ous sources reveal that Dutch Salaf ist imams’ unwillingness or inability to 
discuss jihad-related topics led to considerable frustration and resentment 
among the Hofstadgroup’s participants. This was exacerbated by the 2003 
decision of influential Saudi-Arabian Salafist religious authorities to follow 
their government’s line in condemning jihadists such as Bin Laden and Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi. To at least several members of the Hofstadgroup, the 
Dutch Salafist mosques’ decision to adopt a similar stance epitomized their 
betrayal of ‘true Islam’ and its champions. Both of these developments led 
to a reorientation on other, more extremist, sources of information and to 
a stronger focus on the group as a venue for discussing and learning about 
Islam rather than the mosque, leading to the elimination of the latter’s 
potentially moderating influence.112
However, this falling out with the Salaf ist movement does not appear 
to have formed a direct motive for violence. While the group felt a strong 
disdain for Salaf ists, moderate Muslims and organizations claiming to 
represent the interests of Muslims in the Netherlands, clear indications that 
this sparked a strong desire to use violence against them are lacking. With 
the exception of an October 2003 chat message in which one participant 
expressed his desire to slaughter ‘fake Muslims’, and which reads more like 
bragging than an actual intention to use violence, the sources predomi-
nantly convey a sense of disappointment and disgust. For instance, one of 
the letters left behind by Van Gogh’s murderer shows his disappointment 
with Muslim scholars and religious leaders for concealing the ‘truth’ of their 
111 De Koning and Meijer, ‘Going All the Way’, 225, 231, 233-34, 236.
112 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7-8; Former Hofstadgroup Par-
ticipant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7; ‘Personal Interview 2’, 16; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3-5; Peters, ‘De 
Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald 
door Mohammed B., 42-45; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD02/31: 5791; AHB01/25: 
3303; AHA05/22: 2168, 2172, 2179; AHD07/36: 8412; AHD08/37: 614, 638-642; De Koning, ‘Changing 
Worldviews and Friendship’, 374, 385-88.
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religion from their followers. By contrast, the message to Dutch citizens and 
politicians is not one of disappointment, but of death threats.113
In conclusion, the empirical data reveals several motives for terrorism 
that resemble a number of the organizational rationales for terrorism identi-
f ied in the literature. However, the most important conclusion to be drawn 
here is that the extent to which these motives truly had their basis in group 
dynamics is in most cases limited. Mirroring the conclusion reached with 
regard to strategic rationales, it seems that the motives for violence found 
among Hofstadgroup participants are more accurately explained as the 
result of factors at the individual level of analysis.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter assessed whether group-level explanations for terrorist vio-
lence could account for the Hofstadgroup’s planned and perpetrated attacks. 
The discussion began with an examination of the ways in which a terrorist 
group’s organizational structure can influence its lethality. Except for ad-
herence to an extremist interpretation of Islam that portrayed violence as 
necessary and justified, the Hofstadgroup lacked the characteristics thought 
to correspond with a higher degree of deadliness, such as skilled operatives.
Next, the analysis turned to group effects that can lower individual 
participants’ thresholds to engaging in violent behavior; diffusion of 
responsibility, deindividuation, and displacement or responsibility to 
authority f igures. Only the last of these factors was found to have exerted 
an influence, albeit in a very limited capacity. While the group had access to 
authority f igures ranging from its Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled to 
jihadist role models like Bin Laden who provided (implicit) justif ications for 
the use of violence, none directly authorized or ordered the use of terrorism. 
This meant that participants were limited in the degree to which they could 
displace responsibility for harming and killing others, leaving a signif icant 
obstacle to the use of violence in place and making the development of 
terrorist plots dependent on their own initiative.
The remainder of the chapter dealt with strategic and organizational 
rationales for terrorism. On the whole, neither rationale could provide a 
convincing explanation for the terrorist acts planned or perpetrated by 
Hofstadgroup participants. There is little to indicate that the group’s most 
113 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschre-
ven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 32-56.
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militant participants did more than pay lip service to strategic motives 
such as establishing theocratic rule in the Netherlands or inspiring po-
tential followers to copy their violent examples. Organizational dynamics 
had a more noticeable, if still minor, inf luence. The most salient being 
the Hofstadgroup’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with the Dutch 
state, which may have engendered the desire to commit attacks as a form 
of revenge within at least one participant and the ‘example’ set by the 
murder of Van Gogh, which inspired at least one other participant to plan 
an attack of his own.
In a sense, this chapter’s most important contribution to understanding 
the factors that governed processes of involvement in the Hofstadgroup has 
been to highlight where group-level accounts for terrorism fall short. The 
Hofstadgroup’s planned and executed terrorist attacks cannot convincingly 
be explained as the result of either strategic or organizational rationales. 
Instead, they appear to have originated from these individuals’ personal 
backgrounds, experiences and convictions. Gaining a clearer understand-
ing of why some participants (planned to) engage in terrorism therefore 
requires turning to that level of analysis next.

8 Individual-level analysis I: Cognitive 
explanations
In this f irst of two chapters on the individual level of analysis, the emphasis 
is on cognitive explanations for participation in terrorism. How can ways 
of thinking, a person’s idiosyncratic perception of events and people, con-
tribute to their becoming involved in an extremist or terrorist group? After 
a brief explication of the individual level of analysis, the chapter opens by 
discussing ‘radicalization’, the most influential cognitive explanation for 
terrorism to have emerged since the 9/11 attacks. It then moves on to the 
related concept of fanaticism before turning to how ‘cognitive openings’ 
can trigger processes leading to involvement in terrorism. The chapter 
closes with an appraisal of the roles that cognitive dissonance and moral 
disengagement can play in bringing about participation. The next chapter 
completes the individual-level analysis by utilizing various explanations 
centered on the idea of distinct psychological traits as contributing to the 
likeliness of involvement in terrorism.
8.1 Structuring the individual-level of analysis
As Crenshaw commented in 1998, ‘terrorism is not the direct result of social 
conditions but of individual perceptions of those conditions’.1 Similarly, 
Borum emphasizes that most violence is intentional; a wide variety of fac-
tors play a role in bringing it about, but at the end of the day it is still about 
individuals consciously engaging in this form of behavior.2 The structural 
and group-level factors discussed in previous chapters form an integral 
part of the puzzle of how and why people become involved in homegrown 
jihadist entities like the Hofstadgroup. But any assessment of this question 
that does not take the individual-level perspective into account, will remain 
incomplete.
There is a large body of work that studies terrorism from the perspective 
of the individual perpetrator.3 This book utilizes two broad lines of inquiry 
1 Crenshaw, ‘Questions to Be Answered’, 250.
2 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 11.
3 Ibid.; Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism II’, 37-62; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the 
Terrorist’, 3-42.
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found in this literature to structure the individual-level discussion. Whereas 
the next chapter utilizes approaches that see terrorists as psychologically 
distinctive, for instance in terms of higher incidences of mental illness, the 
present one focuses on cognitive explanations.
The study of cognition is ‘concerned with the internal processes involved 
in making sense of the environment and deciding what action might be 
appropriate’.4 Victoroff highlights the distinction between cognitive 
capacity and cognitive style. The f irst ‘refers to mental functions, such as 
memory, attention, concentration, language, and the so-called “executive” 
functions, including the capacity to learn and follow rules, to anticipate 
outcomes, to make sensible inferences, and to perform accurate risk-benefit 
calculations’.5 Cognitive style ‘refers to ways of thinking – that is, biases, 
prejudices, or tendencies to over- or underemphasize factors in decision 
making’.6 Reflecting the literature on terrorism’s focus on this latter aspect 
of cognitive psychology, this chapter assesses how ways of thinking can 
contribute to involvement in terrorism (Table 9).
A qualif ication that needs to be made before proceeding to the analysis 
proper, is that it is not possible to provide a detailed look at every single 
Hofstadgroup participant. The sources currently available are simply not 
expansive enough to allow an in-depth reconstruction of the life history, 
motivations for involvement, psychological state, and other relevant per-
sonal factors for each and every participant. The available information 
is also skewed in that relatively more is known about the group’s most 
extremist participants due to the police’s greater interest in those individu-
als. While the two chapters that form the individual-level of analysis draw 
upon as much data as is available in an attempt to provide insights relevant 
to the group as a whole, these limitations cannot be entirely overcome.
Table 9  Individual-level analysis I: Cognitive explanations
radicalization
Fanaticism
cognitive openings and ‘unfreezing’
cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
4 Eysenck and Keane, Cognitive Psychology, 1.
5 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 26.
6 Ibid.
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8.2 Radicalization
For well over a decade, academics, policy makers, journalists and the 
general public have been debating involvement in terrorism as a process 
characterized by ‘radicalization’.7 The concept’s obverse, ‘deradicalization’, 
has similarly become central to more recent questions about if and how 
former terrorists can be re-integrated into society.8 But despite its ubiquitous 
use, radicalization has also attracted considerable criticism.9
A f irst issue is the lack of consensus on what radicalization encompasses. 
Some scholars10 and government agencies11 use it in a rather broad sense to 
designate the processes leading up to involvement in terrorism. For Horgan, 
‘violent radicalisation […] encompasses the phases of a) becoming involved 
with a terrorist group and b) remaining involved and engaging in terrorist 
activity’.12 Similarly, Kruglanski and colleagues see radicalization as ‘a move-
ment in the direction of supporting or enacting radical behavior’.13 McCauley 
and Moskalenko view it as ‘increased preparation for and commitment to 
intergroup conflict’.14 Several relatively complex models for involvement in 
terrorism, such as Moghaddam’s ‘staircase’ and McCauley and Moskalenko’s 
‘pyramid’ models can also be subsumed under this behaviorally-oriented 
approach to radicalization.15
A second perspective sees radicalization as a process of cognitive change 
which results in the internalization of radical or extremist beliefs.16 Neu-
mann, for instance, argues that ‘at the most basic level, radicalization can 
be def ined as the process whereby people become extremists’.17 Similarly, 
Slootman and Tillie, as well as Buijs and Demant, see radicalization as a 
7 Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited’, 587.
8 Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization.
9 Horgan, ‘Psychology of Terrorism’, 200.
10 Davis and Cragin, Social Science for Counterterrorism, xxiv; Dawson, ‘The Study of New 
Religious Movements’, 4; Della Porta and LaFree, ‘Guest Editorial’, 5; King and Taylor, ‘The 
Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists’, 603.
11 See Danish, Dutch, and Swedish government def initions in: Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-
Radicalisation’, 12.
12 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 152.
13 Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 70.
14 McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 416.
15 Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism II’, 38-43; King and Taylor, ‘The Radi-
calization of Homegrown Jihadists’, 605; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political 
Radicalization’, 416-28; Moghaddam, ‘The Staircase to Terrorism’, 161-69.
16 Borum, ‘Understanding the Terrorist Mindset’, 7-10; Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, 
‘Radicalization or Rehabilitation’, 2.
17 Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, 874.
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process centered on the ‘delegitimization’ of the established societal and 
political order, leading to a desire for radical change that in its most extreme 
form could include the use of violence.18 Horgan contrasts ‘violent radicaliza-
tion’ with ‘radicalization’, the latter signifying the ‘social and psychological 
process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political 
or religious ideology’.19
A third set of definitions of radicalization explicitly link beliefs to behav-
ior.20 Silber and Bhatt have argued that radicalization is the ‘progression 
of searching, f inding, adopting, nurturing, and developing [an] extreme 
belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act’.21 
Dalgaard-Nielsen sees ‘violent radicalization’ as a ‘process in which radical 
ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly 
support or engage in violent acts’.22 Neumann writes of ‘the process (or pro-
cesses) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) 
participate in the use of violence for political aims’.23 Other authors make 
a more implicit connection between extremist beliefs and involvement in 
terrorism.24 The key point is that radicalization is frequently interpreted 
as a process in which the adoption of radical ideas precedes or even leads to 
involvement in radical behavior. This implied or explicitly stated connection 
is radicalization’s biggest f law.
To be clear, none of the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph 
argue that beliefs alone are suff icient to explain involvement in terrorism. 
Yet the centrality of this link, explicitly stated or not, in many ‘radicali-
zation’-based explanations is diff icult to overlook. Indeed, the very term 
‘radicalization’ implies that radical (or as is more often the case ‘extremist’) 
ideas are key to understanding terrorism. It is clear the beliefs can play 
a crucial role in motivating and legitimizing terrorism.25 Yet by raising 
beliefs as the key element to understanding terrorism, ‘radicalization’ often 
18 Slootman and Tillie, ‘Processen Van Radicalisering’, 24; Buijs and Demant, ‘Extremisme En 
Radicalisering’, 173; Demant et al., ‘Decline and Disengagement’, 12-13.
19 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 152.
20 See also: Genkin and Gutfraind, ‘How Do Terrorist Cells Self-Assemble’, 2; Vidino and 
Brandon, ‘Countering Radicalization’, 9.
21 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West,” 16.
22 Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicalization in Europe’, 798.
23 Neumann, ‘Prisons and Terrorism’, 12.
24 For instance: Gielen, Radicalisering En Identiteit, 14; Ongering, ‘Home-Grown Terrorism 
and Radicalisation in the Netherlands’, 3; Porter and Kebbell, ‘Radicalization in Australia’, 213; 
Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass, ‘Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization’, 736. 
25 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 45-47; Kruglanski, ‘Inside the Terrorist Mind’, 274-75; 
Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 76-78.
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overstates the explanatory potential of this variable while leaving others 
underemphasized.26
As Kundnani aptly summarizes the problem, ‘the radicalization litera-
ture fails to offer a convincing demonstration of any causal relationship 
between theology and violence’.27 Essentially, the vast majority of people 
with extremist beliefs never act on them.28 Strikingly, research has also 
shown that not all those who do become terrorists are (primarily) motivated 
by extremist ideologies.29 For instance, a study on American Muslims 
found radical Islamic beliefs to be unrelated to support for terrorism or 
the conviction that the U.S. was waging a war on Islam.30 Even Palestin-
ian suicide terrorists appear to be motivated by more than just extremist 
beliefs.31 In short, most radicals do not become terrorists and not all ter-
rorists are (primarily) ideologically driven. Another reason for skepticism 
about the degree to which beliefs motivate behavior is that terrorists’ may 
have learned to describe their motivations in ideological terms during 
their socialization into the group.32 Such justif ications may obscure other 
motivating factors of equal or greater signif icance.
The overstated link between beliefs and behavior still found in a sig-
nif icant portion of the literature on radicalization is the concept’s primary 
shortcoming. Yet there are more reasons why radicalization is a problematic 
framework through which to study involvement in terrorism. Some of 
the more detailed models of involvement in terrorism tend to be quite 
linear; suggesting a sequential progression through distinct stages that 
seems an overly neat categorization of a complex reality.33 As scholars and 
practitioners have remarked, it is inaccurate to view radicalization as ‘a 
“conveyor belt” that starts with grievances and ends with violence, with 
26 Aly and Striegher, ‘Examining the Role of Religion’, 850, 860; Bartlett and Miller, ‘The Edge 
of Violence’, 2; Knefel, ‘Everything You’ve Been Told About Radicalization Is Wrong’; Kühle 
and Lindekilde, Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus, 134-35. See also comments by 
Horgan in: Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, 878.
27 Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’, 21.
28 Borum, ‘Rethinking Radicalization’, 1-2; ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I’, 8; Khalil, 
‘Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions’, 198-211; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 219-21; Taylor, 
‘Conflict Resolution’, 1.
29 Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want’, 98-99; Taylor and Quayle, Terrorist Lives, 37-38.
30 McCauley, ‘Testing Theories of Radicalization’, 309. For a critique of this very point, see: 
Mullins, ‘Radical Attitudes and Jihad’, 313-14.
31 Merari, ‘Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism’, 106; Merari et al., ‘Making Palestinian 
“Martyrdom Operations”’, 109-10.
32 Horgan, ‘From Prof iles to Pathways’, 81, 86-87.
33 King and Taylor, ‘The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists’, 605.
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easily discernible signposts along the way’.34 Moreover, empirical data 
to support these models is still frequently lacking.35 Finally, the utility of 
radicalization as a concept is hampered by the inherently subjective nature 
of how to def ine what views and behaviors are ‘radical’.36
For all of these reasons, this book has neither adopted radicalization as 
an overarching explanatory framework, nor as shorthand for the process 
leading up to terrorism. Still, its centrality in the debate on terrorism means 
that it cannot be sidestepped entirely. Previous chapters discussed the 
contents of Hofstadgroup participants’ ideological convictions and the 
manner in which group processes contributed to the adoption of these 
views. Shared ideological convictions were the group’s most important 
def ining characteristic and formed an important part of the ‘glue’ that 
held its participants together. What needs to be elucidated here is whether 
radicalization can explain involvement in the group and, most importantly, 
why some individuals planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism.
Cognitive-leading-to-behavioral radicalization appears well suited to 
explaining the behavior of Van Gogh’s murderer-to-be. This individual was 
set on a quest for answers by the death of his mother in 2001 and quickly 
came to adopt a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.37 Contacts with 
like-minded individuals and the middle-aged Syrian religious instructor 
Abu Khaled strengthened his new identity as a ‘true’ Muslim and cata-
lyzed a process whereby he adopted ever more radical views.38 Van Gogh’s 
future assailant kept on radicalizing until he embraced clearly extremist 
convictions and concluded that violence against those who insulted Islam 
and its prophet was not only justif ied, but a personal duty.39 By actually 
murdering Van Gogh for blasphemy, the attacker represents a clear case 
of someone whose extremist convictions both motivated and justif ied his 
use of violence.40
At f irst glance, the same appears to hold true for the individual who 
recorded a threatening video message in 2005. He too adopted extremist 
views after a negative experience, namely his perception that Muslims were 
34 Patel, “Rethinking Radicalization,” 9; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 218-19.
35 King and Taylor, ‘The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists’, 615-16; Borum, ‘Radicalization 
into Violent Extremism I’, 15.
36 Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, 876-77.
37 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4040.
38 Ibid., AHA03/20: 861; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 8.
39 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwik-
keling’, 1-87.
40 NOS, ‘Verklaring Mohammed B. In Tekst’; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 155-56.
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persecuted the world over, and his growing extremism was also mediated 
by his involvement with like-minded individuals and authority f igures like 
the Hofstadgroup’s Syrian religious instructor Abu Khaled.41 But in contrast 
to the experience of Van Gogh’s murderer, this individual’s internalization 
of an extremist worldview and his involvement in the Hofstadgroup did not 
immediately lead to the intention to commit acts of terrorism. Instead, he 
initially wanted to join Islamist insurgencies in Palestine or Chechnya.42 
Only after attempts to reach those regions had failed did this person begin 
to show an interest in what appear to have been plans to commit terrorist 
attacks in the Netherlands.43
A more important difference is that, while Van Gogh’s killer appeared 
to be strongly and singularly motivated by his convictions, this second 
individual’s desire to commit acts of terrorism was at least party driven by a 
personal desire for revenge. What is known of this person indicates that he 
felt a very strong antipathy towards the Dutch justice system and the secret 
service AIVD.44 In early 2005, just after his release from custody, police 
intelligence information indicated he wanted to rectify the ‘1-0’ that the 
authorities had scored against him.45 Undoubtedly, extremist convictions 
played a role in this individual’s violent intentions. But the strong hints of a 
more personal motive already diminish the degree to which ‘radicalization’ 
can provide a full explanation for his (intended) behavior. His is a case 
where it is diff icult to assess the degree which extremist religious views 
motivated his intended violence vis-à-vis justified acts he felt compelled to 
undertake on more personal grounds.
Studying the wider group’s involvement through the ‘radicalization’ lens 
underlines the problematic link between beliefs and behavior. Despite the 
fact that most Hofstadgroup participants held a Salaf i-Jihadist worldview, 
the overwhelming majority of them never committed an act of terrorism, 
nor were they involved in preparations for one. As one of the group’s extrem-
ist participants recalled, most of his erstwhile compatriots turned out to 
be ‘wannabes’.46 The single attack to materialize was the murder of Van 
Gogh and, as previous chapters have detailed, even the intention to commit 
violence was limited to a handful of the group’s almost forty participants. 
41 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3-10; ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 32.
42 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 10-11; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 258-59.
43 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 25-26.
44 Erkel, Samir, 35-40, 199-200, 206-08, 218-19, 227-28, 240-41; Calis, ‘Iedereen Wil Martelaar 
Zijn’, 3; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8552.
45 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 151, INL05: 8327.
46 ‘wannabes’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
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Among this minority was one of the interviewees, who recounted that he 
only began to develop an interest in actually ‘doing something’ after the 
murder of Van Gogh made him and his friends feel it was now their turn to 
prove themselves.47 While Van Gogh’s murderer was guided largely by his 
extremist convictions, other participants’ motives for violence included a 
signif icant amount of non-ideological factors as well.
What about the notion, implied within various interpretations of 
radicalization, that the adoption of radical beliefs precedes involvement 
in radical or extremist groups? This sequence of events did hold true for 
a number of individuals, including Van Gogh’s murderer and the person 
who in 2003 tried to reach Chechnya.48 But in a signif icant number of 
cases, increased interest in radical and extremist Islam followed from 
involvement.49 The experiences of one interviewee were exemplary in 
this regard, as his initial attraction to the group was not the worldview 
he encountered there or his own ideological preoccupations, but rather 
the simple fact that he enjoyed the others’ company and friendship. Only 
gradually did he begin to adopt the worldview espoused by people like Van 
Gogh’s future assailant.50
Finally, what of some radicalization theories’ implied determinism, 
whereby those who radicalize will adopt ever more extremist convictions 
over time? Again, it appears only partly applicable to the Hofstadgroup. 
Some participants ‘stopped’ at a certain level of ‘radicalness’, for instance by 
adopting a Salafist interpretation of Islam that did not see the use of violence 
as legitimate.51 Three participants appeared to have little or no interest in 
radical or fundamentalist beliefs altogether.52 A small number of people 
also disengaged from the group because they came to disagree with the 
emphasis on takfir, even though they had previously supported it.53 For the 
47 ‘iets doen’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 27.
48 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3-11; ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 30-32; Alberts et al., De Wereld Van Mo-
hammed B.’; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4002; Groen and Kranenberg, Women 
Warriors, 20-25; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 150-51; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 
3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7-9; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 1-3.
49 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 169, 81; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 18125, 18157; 
VERD: 9917, 9935, 20012, 20131, 20225.
50 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 5-7.
51 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4018-20, 4129, 4132, 4146, 4148, 4159; VERD: 
20083, 20567; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 98-99.
52 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 19477-78, 19480, 19597, 19654, 20522, 20535, 
20566.
53 Ibid., 01/17: 4002-03, 4018-20, 4030, 4062, 4048-58, 4085-86, 4092, 4100, 4125-127, 4129, 4204; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 36-37, 93.
individual-lEvEl analysis i : cognitivE Explanations 177
Hofstadgroup’s participants, ‘radicalization’ was neither predetermined to 
end at the adoption of extremist views or participation in acts of terrorism, 
nor an irreversible process.
In short, radicalization is of limited value when it comes to understand-
ing involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Contrary to this concept’s central 
assumption, the vast majority of participants did not act upon the views 
they held. Conversely, at least two individuals with apparent intentions 
to commit acts of terrorism were motivated by more than ideology alone. 
Secondly, the idea that an initial adoption of radical convictions precedes 
involvement in an extremist group does not match the experiences of all 
Hofstadgroup participants. Finally, the deterministic nature of some radi-
calization approaches cannot account for the minority of participants who 
retained ‘merely’ radical or fundamentalist worldviews, or even abandoned 
previously held extremist beliefs. Radicalization’s biggest contribution 
as an analytical lens is that it underscores the heterogeneous and non-
deterministic nature of involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
8.3 Fanaticism
Although radicalization is a problematic explanation for involvement in 
terrorism for a variety of reasons, this does not mean that the role that 
beliefs play in these processes should be dismissed. What is needed is an 
explanation that allows for a more nuanced understanding of the role 
between beliefs and behavior. An explanation that meets this criterion is 
Taylor’s concept of fanaticism, which the British psychologist developed 
in the early 1990s.
Taylor is careful to stress that fanaticism and ‘normal’ behavior are differ-
ent points on the same continuum; the fanatic is not intrinsically different.54 
Neither is fanaticism as static state; no one is born into fanaticism, it is a 
state of mind that can be adopted and abandoned over time. Fanaticism 
is understood as behavior that displays ‘excessive enthusiasm’ for certain 
religious or political beliefs.55 According to Taylor, ideologies can influence 
behavior because they essentially prescribe a variety of rules that link an 
individual’s current action to distant outcomes.56 For instance, religious 
belief can motivate specif ic behavior by connecting distant outcomes, such 
54 Taylor, The Fanatics, 14.
55 Ibid., 34.
56 Ibid., 112-13, 269; Taylor and Horgan, ‘The Psychological and Behavioural Bases’, 53-56, 58.
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as salvation in an afterlife, to daily behavior such as prayer. For the vast 
majority of people, religious or political beliefs are not the only influence 
on their behavior. But for the fanatic, ‘the influence of ideology is such that 
it excludes or attenuates other social, political or personal forces that might 
be expected to control and influence behaviour’.57
Taylor stipulates ten qualities of fanaticism that can be useful in gauging 
the degree to which radical or extremist beliefs can influence behavior. 
These are 1) an excessive focusing on issues of concern to the fanatic; 2) a 
world view that is solely based on ideological convictions; 3) an insensitivity 
to others and to ‘normal’ social pressures; 4) a loss of critical judgment in 
that the fanatic is apt to pursue ends and utilize means that seem to run 
contrary to his or her personal interest; and 5) a surprising tolerance for 
inconsistency and incompatibility in the beliefs held. In addition, Taylor 
describes fanatical behavior as apt to display: 6) great certainty in the ap-
propriateness of the actions taken; 7) a simplif ied view of the world; 8) high 
resistance to facts or interpretations that undermine the convictions held; 
9) disdain for the victims of the fanatic’s behavior; and 10) the construction 
of a social environment that makes it easier to sustain fanatical views.58
In addition, Taylor stresses three contextual elements that make it more 
likely that fanatically held ideological beliefs will lead to violence.59 The 
f irst is millenarianism, or the belief that the world is facing an impending 
and apocalyptic disaster or change. The very imminence of millenarian 
beliefs can strengthen their ideological control over individual behavior, 
as the consequences of the believer’s actions are no longer relegated to a 
distant future. Additionally, some ideologies advocate violent action as a 
way of hastening the advent of a new world order.60 The second factor is 
the totality of ideological control; when there is little to no ‘public space’ in 
which the ideology and its alternatives can be freely debated, the ideology’s 
influence over every aspect of its adherents’ lives will increase.61 The third 
factor is the militancy of the ideological belief itself.62
Fanaticism stresses that there is a conditional link between extremist 
beliefs and extremist behavior. Moreover, the concept goes at least some 
way towards illuminating the circumstances under which the likeliness of 
such a relationship occurring may increase. It does so by highlighting the 
57 Taylor, The Fanatics, 33.
58 Ibid., 38-55.
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contextual factors that can enable beliefs to exert stronger control over 
behavior, as well as the ten aspects of fanaticism itself that, when present, 
may further increase the likeliness of radical and extremist views actually 
influencing someone’s actions. For these reasons, fanaticism should be con-
sidered as an alternative, or perhaps an addition, to current radicalization-
based concepts that by and large lack precisely this conditional element.
Taylor’s concept of fanaticism is intended as an explanation for individual 
engagement in political violence. It therefore makes sense to limit this 
analysis to those persons in the Hofstadgroup who committed, or most 
clearly intended to do so, an act of terrorism.
Van Gogh’s murderer harnessed at least eight of the ten ‘qualities of the 
fanatic’ that Taylor describes.63 From 2003 onward, his life began to revolve 
entirely around his Salaf i-Jihadist based convictions, which became the 
sole f ilter through which he interpreted the world. A world that he viewed 
in dichotomous terms; consisting of ‘true’ Muslims and their enemies.64 
His abandonment of work and education imply an insensitivity to ‘normal’ 
societal pressures and his decision to murder Van Gogh and then claim 
complete responsibility for it in court appear contrary to his own best 
interests.65 The fashion in which he murdered Van Gogh and his statement 
in court that he would have done the same had family members been the 
blasphemers, indicate both a high degree of certainty in the justness of 
his actions and a dismissive attitude towards his victims.66 Finally, by 
limiting his social circle to like-minded individuals, Van Gogh’s assailant 
constructed a ‘fanatical world’ that reinforced and sustained his views.67
The individual who, among other things, tried to reach Chechnya 
and played a central role in 2005’s Piranha case, also displayed signs of 
fanaticism. These included black-or-white reasoning, a preoccupation 
with ideological concerns and a worldview shaped by his Salaf i-Jihadist 
beliefs.68 Given these similarities, why did only Van Gogh’s assailant act 
on his convictions? Perhaps this second person was simply apprehended 
before he could strike. However, the available evidence suggests a different 
explanation. First of all, this person appears to have been less fanatical in 
63 Ibid., 38-55.
64 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59; Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy, Strijders Van Eigen 
Bodem, 43-49.
65 ‘Laatste Woord Mohammed B.’
66 Ibid.
67 Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’, 6.
68 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3-11; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; Van San, Sieckelinck, and De 
Winter, Idealen Op Drift, 46-47.
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the sense that his beliefs were not the alpha and omega of his existence. 
Instead, he was primarily motivated by a desire to aid and avenge what 
he saw as the Muslim victims of Western aggression. His beliefs certainly 
played a role in that quest, but as mentioned in a previous paragraph, their 
role may have been to justify violence as much as motivate it.
Two other explanations for this difference can be gained by consider-
ing the three factors that Taylor identif ies as making it more likely that 
fanatically held beliefs will actually lead to violent behavior.69 As the 
Salaf i-Jihadist views that both men held were clearly militant in content, 
this factor offers few answers.70 It is with regard to millenarianism that an 
important f irst distinction presents itself. Both men believed a global war 
against Islam was taking place.71 Yet it is only in the writings of Van Gogh’s 
killer that this struggle takes on an apocalyptic f lavor and is presented 
as the violent apogee of an age-old struggle between the forces of Satan 
and those of Truth that demands immediate action on the part of ‘true 
believers’.72 By contrast, in the videotaped threat to the Dutch government 
and people, arguably the most militant expression of the other individual’s 
views, millenarian motifs are absent.73
Taylor’s third factor that can lead fanatics to violence centers on the 
totality of ideological control, which is more likely in societies with limited 
‘public space’.74 As Chapter 6 noted, most participants, including extremists 
like the Piranha group’s ringleader discussed here, retained at least some 
connections to the world outside the group through old friends, school, 
work, or the simple fact that they lived with their parents. Not so in the case 
of Van Gogh’s murderer-to-be. He had lived on his own since 2000, quit his 
part-time job and his studies following the death of his mother in December 
2001, and stopped his volunteer work for an Amsterdam community center 
in July 2003.75 Gradually, he cut off contacts with his old friends and limited 
his social circle to fellow Hofstadgroup participants.76 He was ‘always at 
home reading and translating’.77 Within these self-imposed confines, the 
69 Taylor, The Fanatics, 113-14.
70 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaf i Movement’, 207-39.
71 NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; Van San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, Idealen Op Drift, 
48; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145, 152-54.
72 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 3-6; Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islam-
ism’, 146-48.
73 NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
74 Taylor, The Fanatics, 114, 160-67.
75 Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’, 1; Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 53-58.
76 Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’, 6.
77 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 9.
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convictions of Van Gogh’s future assailant could become all-encompassing 
and ever-present, exerting behavioral control to a degree not found among 
his compatriots.
Fanaticism makes an important contribution to the present analysis by 
explaining, at least partially, why of the numerous ideological extremists in 
the Hofstadgroup’s inner circle, only Van Gogh’s killer turned convictions 
into violent action. Van Gogh’s killer acted on his beliefs because he was 
the most fanatical of the group’s participants, because his views had a 
notable apocalyptical edge and, most saliently, because they were adopted 
and nurtured in a social setting characterized by a lack of countervailing 
opinions not experienced to the same degree by his compatriots. Fanaticism 
therefore affords an understanding of how beliefs can lead to violence that 
is instrumental to explaining the murder of Van Gogh.
8.4 Cognitive openings and unfreezing
Wiktorowicz describes a ‘cognitive opening’ as a questioning of previously 
held beliefs, brought on by a sudden sense of crisis that can be economic, 
social, political, or personal in nature.78 Cognitive openings, or ‘trigger 
events’ more broadly, are seen by several authors as factors that can kick-
start the process by which people come to adopt extremist beliefs and 
participate in political violence.79 Once open to new ideas, an individual 
can become attracted to radical or extremist groups provided there is a 
sense of ‘frame alignment’, in which the group’s representation of reality 
matches the individual’s experience and preconceptions.80 The crises which 
can produce cognitive openings need not be personally experienced. People 
may empathize with the suffering of others, for instance through televised 
reporting on war and conflict, and experience ‘vicarious deprivation’ that 
can prompt them to reevaluate their convictions or take action.81
In a similar argument, McCauley and Moskalenko posit that there is a 
higher chance that people will become involved in terrorism when they are 
78 Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam’, 1, 7-8.
79 Ellis et al., ‘Trauma and Openness’, 857-83; Ilardi, ‘Interviews with Canadian Radicals’, 
726-27; Porter and Kebbell, ‘Radicalization in Australia’, 227; Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause: 
Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam’, 1; Wilner and Dubouloz, ‘Transformative Radicalization’, 
423.
80 Wiktorowicz, ‘Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam’, 5.
81 Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 26; Silke, Terrorism, 66-67; Sageman, Leaderless 
Jihad, 72-75; Sageman, ‘The Next Generation of Terror’, 40-41.
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suddenly detached from their everyday commitments and acquaintances. 
Individuals undergoing such ‘unfreezing’ become more open to meeting 
new people and entertaining new ideas. For instance, moving to a new city 
may prompt people to make new friends or, more dramatically, government 
collapse might necessitate looking for other means or organizations to 
ensure personal safety.82 The unfreezing hypothesis is, in turn, reminiscent 
of what Munson refers to as ‘biographical availability’; his study indicated 
that a majority of people who became involved in pro-life activism were in 
a period of personal transition at the moment of contact with the pro-life 
movement, whereas those who remained uncommitted had stable life situ-
ations.83 Cognitive openings, unfreezing, and biographical availability all 
suggest that a sudden change or a period of personal transition can make 
individuals more amenable to becoming involved in activism, radical or 
extremist groups, and even terrorism.
Cognitive openings and the trigger events that led to them played an 
important role in bringing about participation in the Hofstadgroup. For 
several individuals, these trigger events were political in nature. As a 
teenager, the individual who tried to reach Chechnya in 2003 was gripped 
by news footage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Balkan war. 
The start of the Second Intifada (2000) led to a burgeoning perception that 
Muslims were being specif ically persecuted the world over.84 Then he saw 
the dramatic footage of the Palestinian boy Muhammad al-Durrah and his 
father being killed after getting caught in a cross f ire between Israeli and 
Palestinian forces.85 This particular incident triggered a belief that ‘Muslims 
were being wronged’ and led him to question whether he should go and help 
the Palestinian people, ‘if necessary by f ighting’.86
The most influential trigger events of all were undoubtedly the 11 Septem-
ber 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. They prompted a number of 
future participants to search for answers about the attackers’ motives and 
Islam’s stance on such violence, searches that brought them into contact 
with political Islam and Salaf i-Jihadist justif ications for violence.87 As one 
future participant described this period; ‘I was on the Internet so often 
82 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 75-88.
83 Munson, The Making Of, 37.
84 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4.
85 Ibid., 4-6.
86 ‘dat de moslims onrecht word aangedaan’, ‘desnoods met vechten’: Ibid., 4.
87 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 18-19; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal 
Interview 2’, 10-11; De Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 249.
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and so long that I began to lose weight’.88 In addition, the attacks and the 
U.S.-led military response they evoked brought about a burgeoning political 
consciousness. One female participant described being shocked by what she 
saw as U.S. president George W. Bush’s declaration of war against Muslims. 
This compelled her to choose sides for ‘the Muslims’ and fueled her interest 
in Islam.89
Trigger events could also be distinctly personal. Van Gogh’s murderer’s 
adoption of a fundamentalist and extremist interpretation of Islam was 
initiated by two events. The f irst was his imprisonment from July to August 
2001 for assaulting two police off icers with a knife. It seems that his im-
prisonment engendered a desire to make a fresh start and it was in prison 
that he began studying the Quran in earnest.90 The more important trigger 
event was the death of his mother in December 2001. Van Gogh’s future 
assailant would later write about the influence her death had on him in a 
farewell letter he left his family: ‘[i]t has not eluded you that I have changed 
since the death of my mother. In the wake of her death I have undertaken a 
search to uncover the truth’.91 These triggers awakened the ‘need for a new 
spiritual orientation’, setting him on a signif icance quest that, through the 
mediation of group influences such as the teachings of Abu Khaled, would 
lead him to religious fanaticism and terrorist violence.92
Other future participants were also set on a path towards involvement 
by similarly eye-opening personal experiences. One man told police that he 
reoriented himself on his faith two years earlier after coming to believe he 
was fatally ill.93 A female participant who was raised a Muslim realized she 
knew very little about her faith after meeting a Dutch convert. ‘The convert 
laughed in my face, but then invited me to join her to go to the mosque one 
time. It took a while before I went, but that woman got stuck in my head: 
she is Dutch and knows everything about Islam, while I am Muslim and know 
nothing. From then on, I went every Friday. I would put on a headscarf and 
it felt great! I was so proud!’94 This young woman’s renewed interest in her 
88 ‘Ik zat zo vaak en zo lang achter het Internet dat ik begon af te vallen’: A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 9.
89 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 19.
90 Chorus and Olgun, In Godsnaam, 51-53.
91 ‘Het is jullie niet ontgaan dat ik sinds het overlijden van mijn moeder veranderd ben. 
Ik heb sinds het overlijden van mijn moeder een zoektocht ondernomen om de waarheid te 
achterhalen’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4040-41; Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld 
Van Mohammed B.’
92 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’.
93 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 20242.
94 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 24 (Italics added).
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faith led her to make the acquaintance of Hofstadgroup participants and 
from there to become involved in the group herself.95
Asked why he considered using violence, an interviewee listed several 
factors. One of them was his experience of watching a propaganda video:
And what really actually triggered me, was when I saw a Palestinian 
woman be mistreated by Israeli soldiers. So that was for me something, 
and and, and when you also heard that, you know with Islamic songs in 
the background, and and, and yes, that was very emotional. Because I, 
I saw actually my mother there in front of me. […] Yes, that was… Look, 
when you a, a Palestinian woman, with headscarf, you know, then you 
see, then she is already something recognizable you know and then you 
saw her fall on the ground and when she wanted to get up she got a… […] 
So that you can, you can see again in the f ilm. And that was emotional. 
And, and uhh, that was then something that made me think ‘Fucking 
Jews’, you know.96
With regard to ‘unfreezing’, there were at least two participants who expe-
rienced a marked change in their everyday life prior to becoming involved 
or turning to (fundamentalist) Islam. One was a young man who could not 
f ind the internship he needed to f inish his education and suddenly had a 
lot of time on his hands, some of which he spent at a mosque. There he met 
a Syrian man who told him that his failure to get an internship was due to 
unbelievers’ hatred for Muslims. This conversation was the starting point 
of his search for information about (extremist) Islam and led to him being 
introduced to the Hofstadgroup by the same Syrian man.97 The second 
individual was an illegal immigrant from Morocco; it appears that the group 
took the place of the friends and family he dearly missed.98
Cognitive openings and unfreezing constitute essential pieces of the 
Hofstadgroup puzzle as they can explain how the initial steps towards 
95 Ibid., 24-25.
96 ‘En wat mij eigenlijk vooral de trigger was, was toen ik een Palestijnse vrouw zag mishandeld 
worden door Israëlische militairen. Dus dat was voor mij iets, en en, en als je ook dat hoorde, 
weet je met Islamitische liederen op de achtergrond, en en, en ja, dat was heel emotioneel. Omdat 
ik, ik zag eigenlijk mijn moeder daar voor me. […] Ja, dat was… Kijk, als jij een, een Palestijnse 
vrouw, met hoofddoek, weet je, dan zie je, dan is ze al iets herkenbaars weet je en die zag je dan 
op de grond laten vallen en als ze wilde opstaan dan krijgt ze een…[…] Dus dat kun je, kun je 
terugzien in de f ilm. En dat was emotioneel. En, enne, dat was toch wel iets waarvan ik dacht 
van “Kutjoden”weet je.’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 10.
97 Ibid., 2-6.
98 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/17: 4049; Chorus and Olgun, Broeders, 36-37.
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involvement came about. For a signif icant number of individuals, partici-
pation resulted from a sudden period of uncertainty in which they were 
prompted to question their own beliefs and understanding of the world. 
A process that made them open to making new friends and interested in 
exploring new ideas. Furthermore, the examples of unfreezing illuminate 
the role that chance plays in bringing about involvement. Had the individual 
who could not f ind an internship been successful in his search, it is quite 
possible that he would never have become involved in the Hofstadgroup. 
Similarly, would the Moroccan illegal immigrant have become involved 
in the Hofstadgroup if he had made friends with people who were not 
interested in radical and extremist interpretations of Islam? Chance may 
not be a particularly satisfying explanatory variable, but these examples 
suggest it cannot be overlooked.
8.5 Cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement
People’s opinions are continuously challenged by new information or 
contrarian views. For instance, a creationist who learns of the theory of 
evolution may be shocked to see his or her idea that the world was created 
in a number of days challenged by a completely different explanation. Such 
experiences can lead to ‘cognitive dissonance’; a psychological tension 
between beliefs and information or views that challenge them. Cognitive 
dissonance can also result from a disparity between beliefs and behavior; 
someone who smokes while knowing it poses a health risk or, closer to the 
topic at hand, willfully harming or killing others while being aware of the 
legal and moral prohibitions against such behavior.99
The unpleasant psychological tension gets stronger as dissonance 
increases.100 People who engage in terrorism and other forms of violent 
behavior are therefore especially likely to suffer its effects. Without ways 
in which to rationalize or ameliorate the tension that follows from the 
breach of legal and moral codes that the commission of terrorist acts entails, 
such behavior could well remain taboo or unsustainable for any prolonged 
period of time. As Maikovich argues, it might be the ability to overcome 
such cognitive dissonance that separates those who do become involved in 
terrorism from those who remain militant in thoughts only.101 The following 
99 Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1-31.
100 Ibid., 16.
101 Maikovich, ‘A New Understanding of Terrorism’, 377.
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paragraphs look at several strategies for coping with cognitive dissonance 
and pay particular attention to the mechanism of moral disengagement.
One way of dealing with the cognitive dissonance that may result 
from participation in terrorism is to justify present actions based on past 
behavior. If it was right to do something the f irst time, it cannot be wrong 
to do it again. If it was justif iable to lend logistical support to a terrorist 
attack in the past, why should it be wrong to become more closely involved 
in the execution of the next one? Isn’t the person supplying the bomb just 
as responsible as the one pressing the button? As past actions form the 
foundations for subsequent ones, this mechanism of dealing with cognitive 
dissonance through self-justif ication sets people on a ‘slippery slope’ that 
leads to ever greater involvement in terrorist activities. Self-justif icatory 
arguments can also form an obstacle to disengagement, as ceasing this 
involvement means questioning the moral permissibility of past behavior.102
Involvement in terrorism comes at a signif icant price. Terrorists must 
deal with the death or capture of their comrades, abandon alternate career 
paths, and live under the continuous threat of being arrested or killed. Over 
time, the price of involvement can add up to form a ‘sunk cost’ that is so 
high that continued participation is the only way to justify it. As long as the 
struggle is not abandoned, past sacrif ices can still be justif ied as having 
been necessary contributions to the achievement of future goals worthy 
of the sacrif ice. Abandoning the cause or group before those goals have 
been realized would mean accepting that such costs have been incurred 
for nothing.103 Thus, when faced with failure or the realization that past 
sacrif ices have been futile, renewed commitment to the terrorist group 
and its cause can be a (temporarily) effective way of avoiding this very 
unpleasant form of cognitive dissonance.
A particularly powerful way of rationalizing the use of violence and 
overcoming the inhibitions to harming and killing others found in the vast 
majority of people, is through moral disengagement. Bandura posits moral 
disengagement as a way of bypassing or selectively deactivating internally 
held moral standards that prevent inhumane behavior, thereby avoiding 
the self-condemnation that would otherwise follow when those standards 
of behavior are breached.104 Moral disengagement is itself made possible 
102 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 129; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist 
Groups’, 342-43; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization’, 419-21; 
Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 22.
103 Della Porta, Social Movements, 181; Taylor, The Fanatics, 75-77; Crenshaw, Explaining Ter-
rorism, 127.
104 Bandura, ‘Mechanisms’, 161-65.
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by several factors highlighted in Bandura’s work as well as the broader 
literature on terrorism. These include the availability of moral justif ications 
for violence, the displacement or diffusion of personal responsibility, dis-
regarding or distorting the consequences of violence, blaming the victims, 
and dehumanizing opponents.105
Several factors affecting moral disengagement have already been dis-
cussed in previous chapters and will not be dealt with in detail here. For 
instance, it was established that the Salaf i-Jihadism-based worldview to 
which the Hofstadgroup’s extremist participants adhered, allowed them to 
see violence as morally justified and necessary. Chapter seven noted that the 
group had recourse to authority f igures that provided them with (implicit) 
justif ications for violence, but none that allowed for a displacement of 
personal responsibility to occur by ordering attacks to be carried out. Those 
participants who carried out acts of violence were therefore hard put to 
obscure their personal agency as a means of overcoming moral obstacles 
to the use of violence. What remains to be assessed is whether disregard for 
the consequences of violence, blaming the victims, and dehumanization 
had a hand in bringing about participants’ (intended) acts of terrorism.
Disregard for the consequences of violence is a way of avoiding or minimiz-
ing personal responsibility for the harm inflicted on others by ignoring or 
downplaying the damage wrought. It is easier to use violence, for instance, 
when the results are not directly witnessed such as through the use of 
remote-controlled weapons or when a chain of command distances the 
individual who orders an attack from those actually carrying it out.106 By 
portraying their violence as defensive, in response to provocation, or as 
rightful retribution, terrorists legitimize their acts by blaming their victims; 
essentially arguing that they brought it on themselves.107 With regard to 
dehumanization, Bandura argues that when a deliberate effort is made to 
present the other as something reprehensible, dangerous, and less than 
human, natural feelings of empathy wane and personal inhibitions against 
using violence are more easily overcome.108
McCauley and Moskalenko view dehumanization as the result of ‘es-
sentialist thinking’ which often takes hold among groups or individuals 
that are in conflict with one another. The f irst indicator of this way of 
105 Ibid., 161.
106 Ibid., 177-78.
107 Ibid., 184-85; Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 51.
108 Bandura, ‘Mechanisms’, 180-82. For an example of how dehumanization can contribute to 
violence, see: Lankford, ‘Promoting Aggression and Violence’, 394.
188 BEcoming a EuropEan HomEgrown JiHadist 
thinking is over-generalization; for instance, by seeing the violent behavior 
of individuals as reflecting the ‘evil nature’ of the entire group, nation or 
culture they represent. The second telltale sign is fear that the in-group will 
somehow be contaminated by contact with out-group members. Third is 
the use of derogatory designations for out-group members that essentializes 
them as inherently evil and frequently denies them even their humanity; for 
example, by referring to enemies as ‘roaches’ or ‘pigs’.109 By contrast, when 
terrorists refer to themselves they tend to use words that convey legitimacy 
and heroism, such as ‘soldier’, ‘revolutionary’, or ‘mujahid’ (warrior for the 
faith).110
For most of the Hofstadgroup’s participants, ‘involvement’ was limited to 
attending group gatherings, discussing radical and extremist interpretations 
of Islam, and perhaps spreading such views online. In lieu of involvement 
in clearly illegal or morally questionable behavior, such as preparations for 
an actual attack, the likeliness that these participants suffered signif icant 
cognitive dissonance was small. Their limited degree of involvement also 
came at relatively low personal cost; commitments outside of the group, 
such as study or work, did not necessarily have to be abandoned. Although 
many participants ultimately paid for their involvement with arrest and 
imprisonment, these costs were arguably not apparent during their involve-
ment and thus did not trigger self-justif icatory mechanisms that could lead 
to prolonged or intensif ied commitment to the group.
Those participants most likely to experience major cognitive dissonance 
were those who actually planned or perpetrated acts of terrorism. Most no-
tably, Van Gogh’s assailant and the individual who tried to reach Chechnya 
in 2003 and who appeared interested in committing a terrorist attack in 
the Netherlands in 2004 and 2005. Both men rapidly embraced ever-more 
extremist views and eventually became involved in (plans for) acts of ter-
rorism. They also incurred costs for their involvement in militancy; Van 
Gogh’s murderer gave up work, study, and old friends to focus entirely on 
his religious convictions and his new-found circle of acquaintances. The 
second individual was arrested multiple times in the period from 2003 to 
2005 and spent time in prison. Yet despite these outward signs reminiscent 
of the slippery-slope and sunk-cost mechanisms, there were no indications 
that either of them utilized such rationalizations. What they did do, was 
rely on various forms of moral disengagement.
109 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 161-67.
110 Bandura, ‘Mechanisms’, 170; Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 398; Loza, 
‘The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism’, 149; Della Porta, Social Movements, 174-76.
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Both of these participants availed themselves of ideological justif ications 
for violence. For instance, both referred to Quranic verses extolling the 
necessity and justness of violent jihad.111 They also displaced their indi-
vidual responsibility for violence by portraying their (intended) actions as 
religiously mandated.112 Van Gogh’s murderer explained his decision to his 
family by writing that he had ‘chosen to fulf ill [his] duty towards Allah’.113 
Likewise, the second individual addressed the following words to his family:
know that this is the right path and know that I commit this deed out of 
fear for the punishment of Allah, the almighty, for he says […] ‘If you do 
not sally forth, He shall punish you with a painful punishment’, and out of 
obedience to Allah, who says: ‘For you it is mandated to f ight, irrespective 
of how much you dislike it.’114
In other words, there was no place for personal feelings about the use of 
violence; it simply had to be done.
Neither of these individuals appears to have disregarded the (potential) 
consequences of their actions. They did, however, consistently blame their 
victims. Consider this phrase from the videotaped warning message one 
of them recorded in 2005:
Sheikh Osama bin Laden […] sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri […] [a]nd our 
beloved sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi […] have warned you. But you 
have only committed more injustices, you crusaders. You supported Bush 
when he uttered his famous word: ‘Let the crusades begin.’ I tell you that 
between us and you only the language of the sword shall apply until you 
leave the Muslims alone and choose the path of peace.115
111 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschre-
ven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 27-28, 32-45, 50-56; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
112 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4040-41; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; 
Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven 
of vertaald door Mohammed B., 18, 27-28, 32-33; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 9.
113 ‘Ik heb ervoor gekozen om mijn plicht tegenover Allah te vervullen’: Alberts and Derix, 
‘Mohammed B. Schreef’.
114 ‘weet dat dit het juiste pad is en weet dat ik deze daad verricht uit vrees voor de straf van 
Allah, de Verhevene, omdat Hij zegt: […] “Als jullie niet uitrukken, zal Hij jullie straffen met een 
pijnlijke bestraff ing”, en uit gehoorzaamheid aan Allah, die zegt: “Aan jullie is voorgeschreven 
te strijden, hoezeer het jullie ook tegenstaat”’: NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
115 ‘Sheikh Osama bin Laden […] sjeikh Ayman al-Zawahiri […] [e]n onze geliefde sheikh Abou 
Moesaab Al-Zarqawi […] heeft jullie wel eens gewaarschuwd. Maar jullie hebben alleen maar 
meer onrecht gepleegd, jullie kruisvaarders. Jullie steunden Bush toen hij zijn bekende woord 
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Van Gogh’s assailant uses the same reasoning in his ‘Open Letter to the 
Dutch People’:
Millions and millions of Muslims have been raped and slaughtered like 
animals and there seems to be no end in sight. You, as unbelieving Dutch 
citizens, must know that your government is partly to blame for this. […] 
Because the policy of your government is supported by your ballot and 
they govern on your behalf, your blood and possessions have become 
halal [permitted] for the Islamic Ummah.116
Both men dehumanized their opponents through the persistent use of 
derogatory religious signif iers. Consider what Van Gogh’s murderer told 
Van Gogh’s mother in court: ‘I don’t feel your pain. […] Partly because I can’t 
sympathize with you because you are an unbeliever’.117 Such dehumaniza-
tion was widespread within the group. Non-Muslims were called ‘kuffar’ 
or simply ‘unbelievers’, underscoring their fundamental otherness.118 The 
words ‘zindiq’119 or ‘mortad’120 (both mean apostate), ‘munafiq’121 (hypocrite/
Muslim without true faith), and ‘mushrik’122 (polytheist/one who recognizes 
other authorities than god alone, e.g. democratic governance) were similarly 
heeft uitgesproken: “Laat de kruistochten beginnen.” Ik zeg jullie dat er tussen ons en jullie 
alleen de taal van het zwaard zal gelden tot jullie de moslims met rust laten en de weg van de 
vrede kiezen’: Ibid.
116 ‘Miljoenen en miljoenen Moslims zijn als beesten verkracht en afgeslacht en hier lijkt geen 
einde aan te komen. U, als ongelovige Nederlander, moet weten dat uw regering hier mede aan 
schuldig is. […] Omdat het beleid van uw regering door uw stembiljet wordt ondersteund en zij 
namens u regeren is uw bloed en bezittingen voor de Islamitische Ummah halaal geworden’: 
Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven 
of vertaald door Mohammed B., 33.
117 ‘Ik voel uw pijn niet. […] Deels kan ik niet met u meevoelen omdat u een ongelovige bent’: 
‘Laatste Woord Mohammed B.’
118 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 123; GET: 4048, 4052, 4092; AHA03/20: 1171, 
1176-77, 1179; AHB03/27: 4035-36, 4041; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 
appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 27-28, 40, 50; NOVA, 
‘Chatgesprekken Jason W.’; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 38.
119 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 16, appendix: Overzicht teksten 
geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 40.
120 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA04/21: 1324-25.
121 Ibid., GET: 4052, 4085; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 27, appendix: 
Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 22, 40, 50; Groen and Kranenberg, 
Women Warriors, 37.
122 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4048; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze 
Ontwikkeling’, 31, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 18, 
22-23; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 66; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
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used against ‘false’ and ‘deviant’ Muslims.123 Given that the group saw death 
as the penalty for apostasy, many of these terms carried a very clear con-
notation; these people deserve to be killed.124 Another important example 
of derogatory language is the recurring use of ‘taghut’ (idolater/idolatry) to 
refer to leaders, political systems, or state institutions that claim authority 
based on anything other than Sharia law, as an attempt to paint their claims 
to power as illegitimate.125
All of these mechanisms worked to lower psychological inhibitions to the 
use of violence and were especially important for the group’s most militant 
participants. The available evidence illustrates that moral disengagement 
was a key individual-level enabler of terrorist violence. It forms an important 
factor in the explanation for the group’s planned and perpetrated acts of 
violence by making it easier to consider the use of violence without seeing 
it as morally reprehensible.
8.6 Conclusion
Although radicalization has become the predominant explanation for 
involvement in terrorism in the post-9/11 period, this chapter’s f indings 
problematize its explanatory potential in several ways. Certainly, Van 
Gogh’s murderer appeared to be a text-book case of radicalization as he 
was ultimately motivated by his convictions to commit a terrorist attack. 
The problem is that radicalization cannot explain why the vast majority of 
the other participants who also held extremist views did not act on them. 
Moreover, some participants only adopted radical views after becoming 
involved; disabusing the notion that radicalization precedes such participa-
tion. Finally, the f indings belied the idea that radicalization is linear or 
deterministic; some participants held radical views but never developed 
extremist ones and a small number even turned away from previously held 
extremist points of view. Radicalization, in short, could not convincingly 
explain involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
123 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
124 Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 16; Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the 
Salaf i Movement’, 228.
125 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA03/20: 1171, 1177; AHA09/26: 3801-02; GET: 4002, 
4026, 4128; Peters, ‘De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 28-29, appendix: Overzicht 
teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammed B., 10-11, 23-24, 34, 40; NOVA, ‘Videotestament 
Samir A.’.
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Fanaticism provided a more nuanced understanding of the link between 
beliefs and actions. Unlike radicalization, it is specif ic enough to explain 
why not all of those who hold radical or extremist beliefs will act on them 
by making violent behavior contingent on several contextual factors. 
Although the Hofstadgroup’s extremists shared a militant belief system, 
only Van Gogh’s murderer infused them with a millenarian f lavor that 
mandated action on the part of ‘true believers’ to stave off a disastrous and 
f inal defeat. More importantly, Van Gogh’s killer led the relatively most 
isolated existence of the Hofstadgroup’s participants. Virtually unchal-
lenged by different opinions encountered at work, school, or in family life, 
the future murderer’s beliefs could exert a markedly greater influence on 
his behavior. It was this context that allowed his fanatical convictions to 
lead to fanatical behavior.
This chapter also discussed the important role that ‘cognitive openings’ 
and the related concept of ‘unfreezing’ played in bringing about involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup. Triggered by events ranging from the 9/11 attacks to 
personal loss, many future participants went through a period in which 
they questioned previously held beliefs, or were suddenly open to new 
ideas and acquaintances. These experiences were critical in making 
them interested in radical and extremist interpretations of Islam and the 
company of like-minded individuals and thus formed a key element in the 
Hofstadgroup’s formation. Unfreezing also drew attention to the role of 
chance in bringing about involvement in extremist or terrorist groups. Had 
some of the Hofstadgroup’s participants not run into individuals interested 
in extremist interpretations of Islam, it is quite possible they would never 
have become involved in the group.
A discussion of cognitive dissonance and the various ways in which it 
can be managed, rounded off this f irst part of the individual-level analysis. 
Through such mechanisms as attributing the blame for their own violent 
intentions to the actions of their victims, emphasizing religious precepts 
that mandated the use of violence, and the dehumanization of opponents, 
the Hofstadgroup’s most militant participants were able to prevent debili-
tating psychological discomfort that could otherwise result from the use 
of violence. Moral disengagement therefore played an important role in 
making possible the acts of terrorism planned and perpetrated by some of 
the group’s participants.
These f indings have made an important contribution towards un-
derstanding involvement in the Hofstadgroup from an individual-level 
perspective. But they represent only a part of the various explanations 
that this level of analysis has to offer. The next chapter completes the 
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individual-level analysis by addressing whether explanations based on 
mental illness, psychoanalysis, personality characteristics, and emotional 
states can yield explanations for involvement in homegrown jihadist groups.

9 Individual-level analysis II: Terrorists 
as psychologically distinctive
This chapter completes the two-part examination of the individual-level of 
analysis. The explanations discussed in the following pages share a focus 
on explaining involvement in terrorism as resulting from the distinct psy-
chological features of individual perpetrators. The f irst three paragraphs 
in particular embody the assumption that terrorists are somehow different 
from ‘normal’ individuals. They assess mental illness, psychological trauma, 
and personality characteristics as factors that can increase the likeliness of 
involvement in terrorism. The chapter’s second half departs from the focus 
on psychological abnormality to look at the role of emotions in bringing 
about involvement in terrorist groups and terrorist attacks. In particular, 
frustration-induced anger and fear of death are discussed as potentially 
relevant explanatory variables.
Two recurrent trends in research on terrorism have been the search for 
a distinctive terrorist personality or prof ile and the idea that terrorism 
can be explained as the result of mental illness or psychological damage 
incurred during childhood. In particular, the argument that terrorists are 
psychopaths has attracted considerable attention and criticism. Numer-
ous authors have lamented the empirically poorly substantiated nature of 
such claims.1 The diff iculty of accessing terrorists for research purposes, 
let alone carrying out clinical studies on them, means that explanations 
which hold that involvement in terrorism stems from distinct psychological 
qualities must be treated with care.2 On the basis of a literature review, the 
author identif ied f ive themes in this literature that form the main points 
of discussion (Table 10).
Table 10  Individual-level analysis II: Terrorists as psychologically distinctive
psychopathology
psychoanalysis, significance loss and identity-related alienation
terrorist personality or profile
anger and frustration
mortality salience
1 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 3; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 31; Silke, 
‘Cheshire-Cat Logic’, 52-53.
2 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 3-4.
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9.1 Terrorists as psychopaths
Perhaps because it is comforting to see terrorist violence as the work of 
mentally disturbed individuals, terrorists are frequently seen as psycho-
pathic individuals, particularly in the popular perception.3 Research on 
the subject has reached far more cautious conclusions, however. Numerous 
scholars have cautioned that there is insuff icient empirical evidence to 
support the notion that terrorists are psychopaths.4 Psychopaths would 
also make highly unreliable and dangerous operatives, making it likely that 
they would be shunned by terrorist groups.5 Neither is it convincing to argue 
that terrorism’s severe ‘occupational hazards’ would only be acceptable to 
the mentally unstable. There is a wide range of people who hold dangerous 
jobs, such as police off icers and soldiers, who are not considered mentally 
disturbed.6 For these reasons, psychopathy ranks among the most criticized 
explanations for involvement in terrorism.
Psychopathy, however, is a specif ic personality disorder. While it is no 
longer seen as a viable explanation for involvement in terrorism by most 
scholars, research on the broader spectrum of mental health problems 
paints a far more nuanced picture. For instance, a study by Kleinmann cites 
evidence that terrorists are more likely to suffer from mental health issues 
such as schizophrenia than the general population.7 Lankford addresses 
this topic in greater detail and reports that a signif icant percentage of 
suicide attackers suffered from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and ‘other mental health problems’.8 In an explorative study based on 
access to police f iles, Weenink writes that just under 50% of his sample of 
Dutch jihadists displayed ‘problem behavior’ and that 6% had diagnosed 
mental health problems.9
3 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 31; Silke, ‘Cheshire-Cat Logic’, 56-57.
4 Corrado, ‘A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective’, 295-304; Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology 
of Political Terrorism’, 385; Hudson, ‘The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism’, 60; Kruglanski 
and Fishman, ‘What Makes Terrorism Tick?’, 140-41; McCauley, ‘Psychological Issues in Under-
standing Terrorism’, 5-6; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 333; Merari, 
‘Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism’, 107; Ruby, ‘Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?’, 22; 
Silke, ‘Cheshire-Cat Logic’, 53, 60-62; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 12-14.
5 Alderdice, ‘The Individual, the Group’, 201; Beck, ‘Prisoners of Hate’, 210; Borum, Psychology of 
Terrorism, 32; Frost, ‘Terrorist Psychology’, 42-43; Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation’, 21.
6 Ruby, ‘Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?’, 21.
7 Kleinmann, ‘Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants’, 287-88.
8 Lankford, ‘Précis of the Myth of Martyrdom’, 354-55.
9 Weenink, ‘Behavioral Problems’, 24-27.
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Corner and Gill found that some 42%of lone actors experienced mental 
health problems, compared with some 28% for the general population and 
approximately 3% for group-based terrorists.10 When accounting for the 
potential influence of mental health problems, it is therefore important 
to distinguish between various forms of terrorism. It is also crucial to not 
blindly equate the diagnosis of a mental health issue with an explanation 
for how that person became involved in terrorism. Mental health problems 
encompass a broad spectrum of ailments, including many relatively benign 
ones. With the exception of serious disorders such as psychopathy, which 
can be directly linked to lowered barriers towards the use of violence, it is 
often not immediately clear if and how a particular mental health disorder 
contributed to the involvement process. For example, many people will 
suffer some form of depression during their lives yet the vast majority of 
these individuals will not become involved in any kind of violent behavior.
Studies like Weenink’s and Corner and Gill’s lend considerable credibility 
to the notion that behavioral issues and mental health problems other than 
psychopathology can play a role in bringing about involvement in terror-
ism. They also illustrate that the mental health question cannot be seen 
dichotomously. Terrorists are not either psychopathic or mentally healthy 
individuals, but, like the population in general, may suffer from a range 
of issues whose potential to influence their behavior is often far from im-
mediately clear.11 Given the history of poorly supported claims of terrorists’ 
abnormality, caution remains in order when looking at terrorism from this 
perspective. Perhaps the most signif icant issue here has been the ongoing 
diff iculty of carrying out clinical diagnoses on actual terrorists.12 Hopefully, 
future studies will be able to gather more evidence and further advance a 
debate that has been at the core of the study of terrorism for decades.
The only two participants subjected to extensive psychological and 
psychiatric assessments were Van Gogh’s killer and the individual who 
videotaped threats to the Dutch public in 2005.13 Van Gogh’s assailant 
steadfastly refused to cooperate with specialists at the psychiatric obser-
vation clinic Pieter Baan Center (PBC) in Utrecht. Nevertheless, in the 
report presented during his trial, PBC experts concluded that there was no 
indication that he had refused cooperation on pathological grounds and 
that the little data they had gathered was insuff icient to warrant the view 
10 Corner, Gill, and Mason, ‘Mental Health Disorders’, 562.
11 Gill and Corner, ‘There and Back Again’, 239.
12 Merari, ‘Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism’, 104.
13 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 3-4.
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that Van Gogh’s killer suffered from some kind of disorder.14 Initially, the 
participant who videotaped threats also refused to cooperate.15 But by early 
2005, a psychological report was submitted to the court that concluded he 
too did not suffer from a personality disorder.16
Within the broader Hofstadgroup, reliable indications of mental illness 
are virtually absent. The one clear case concerns a young man on the fringes 
of 2005’s Piranha group. In October 2007, he escaped from a psychiatric hos-
pital and stabbed two police off icers, one of whom then shot the assailant 
dead.17 While this individual clearly suffered from mental health problems, 
at present there are simply no indications that these issues contributed to 
his (peripheral) participation in the group. There is therefore little cause 
to amend the overall conclusion that mental health problems do not offer 
an explanation for involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
9.2 Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis was pioneered by Sigmund Freud in the late nineteenth 
century. In explaining human behavior, it affords a key role to the influence 
of repressed or unconsciously held desires.18 The origins of these desires are at-
tributed to various phases of childhood mental development, with particular 
emphasis on ‘unresolved intrapsychic conflict’ that occurred during this peri-
od.19 In the second half of the twentieth century, psychoanalytical approaches 
began to be used to explain involvement in terrorism. Narcissism-aggression 
theory, for instance, holds that ego-damage suffered during childhood or 
adolescence can lead individuals to terrorism as a way of projecting inner 
pain on external targets.20 Another approach posits that the inability to live 
up to societal expectations and norms can prompt the adoption of ‘negative 
identities’, whereby the damaged individual embraces precisely those values 
that society abhors and becomes somebody by embodying the ‘nobody’.21
14 Amsterdam District Court, ‘LJN AU0025’, 8-9.
15 ‘Psychisch Onderzoek Naar Samir A. Levert Niets Op’.
16 ‘Rechter Wil Meer Getuigen’.
17 Groen, Kranenberg, and Schenk, ‘Bilal B. Was Bekende Van Hofstadgroep’.
18 Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity, 3-4; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 57.
19 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 22.
20 Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic’, 27; Ross, ‘A Model of the Psychological Causes’, 134; Victoroff, 
‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 23-24.
21 Hudson, ‘The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism’, 20; Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of 
Political Terrorism’, 393.
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Psychoanalytical approaches have lost ground in contemporary psycho-
logical and psychiatric research.22 One problematic aspect of these theories 
is their lack of strong empirical support.23 Another issue is their embodi-
ment of the ‘fundamental attribution error’. That is the human tendency to 
ascribe the behavior of others to innate qualities and to downplay the role of 
circumstances. Essentially, psychoanalytical approaches ‘overestimate the 
internal causes of terrorist behavior’.24 Finally, psychoanalytical explana-
tions are hard to falsify; how can the assertion of an unconsciously held 
desire be refuted?25
While Post acknowledges the absence of ‘major psychopathology’, he 
holds to the psychoanalytical approach essentially as a way of continuing 
the argument that terrorists are intrinsically different.26 Likewise, Merari 
and colleagues assert in one publication that the suicide terrorists they 
studied showed no evidence of psychopathic tendencies, but argue in 
another that 40% of the same sample did display subclinical (i.e. not 
def initely observed) suicidal tendencies that, moreover, the subjects 
themselves may have held without being aware of them.27 As Silke and 
Horgan point out, psychoanalytical approaches essentially provide a way 
of promulgating the questionable argument that terrorism results from 
some form of mental illness.28
Given their empirical and theoretical deficiencies, ‘classic’ psychoanalyti-
cal approaches such as narcissism-aggression theory will not be used to 
study involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Instead, the discussion continues 
with two more recently coined explanations that depart from the psy-
choanalytical tradition of subconsciously held desires and psychological 
damage incurred during childhood and adolescence, yet also resemble it 
in their emphasis on (perceived) shortcomings in an individual’s sense of 
self as motivating behavior. These lines of inquiry focus on ‘signif icance 
quests’ and identity-related alienation.
22 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 57; Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 26.
23 Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity, 24-25; Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 11; Corrado, 
‘A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective’, 298-304; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 57; 
Rogers, ‘Psychology of Violent Radicalization’, 36; Silke, ‘Cheshire-Cat Logic’, 52-67; Victoroff, 
‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 22.
24 Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity, 4.
25 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 26.
26 Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic’, 25-27. 
27 Merari et al., ‘Personality Characteristics’, 95-96; Merari et al., ‘Making Palestinian “Mar-
tyrdom Operations”’, 118.
28 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 61; Silke, ‘Cheshire-Cat Logic’, 64-67.
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9.3 Significance quests and identity-related alienation
Psychological research has identif ied the wish to attain and maintain a 
sense of personal signif icance as a key human need.29 Kruglanski et al. 
present this ‘fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, to have respect’ 
as terrorists’ overarching motivation.30 Such a yearning may be triggered by 
real, perceived, or potential signif icance loss, which itself may be brought 
about by, for instance, existential anxiety, social isolation, (group-based) 
humiliation, or deprivation.31 Signif icance quests are not envisioned as 
purely defensive reactions to (potential) significance loss, however. Involve-
ment in terrorism may also come about as the result of an opportunity for 
marked ‘signif icance gain’, such as the chance to acquire social standing 
by committing a ‘martyrdom’ (suicide) attack.32
Research has provided empirical support for the notion that the desire 
to (re)gain a sense of personal signif icance can contribute to processes of 
involvement in terrorism.33 However, it should be noted that a desire for 
signif icance is of course not unique to terrorists. The likeliness that such 
quests will increase the probability of involvement in terrorism appears de-
pendent on contextual factors. These are the perception of unjust personal 
or group-based deprivation, the ability to point to a hostile responsible party 
and the availability of justif ications for violence.34
Identity-related alienation essentially holds that children of Muslim 
immigrants to Western countries can come to feel that they neither belong 
to the country and culture of their parents, nor to the country and culture 
of their birth. Too modern to f it into the f irst and too different in appear-
ance and upbringing to f it seamlessly into the latter, these second- and 
third-generation immigrants may come to lack a clear sense of identity. 
Experiences with discrimination or exclusion can exacerbate this feeling of 
alienation and add a keen sense of frustration and anger towards their fellow 
citizens. In such a setting, radical and extremist interpretations of Islam can 
become especially attractive through their ability to offer straightforward 
explanations (‘you didn’t get the job because unbelievers hate Muslims’), 
29 Kruglanski and Orehek, ‘The Role of the Quest’, 154.
30 Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 73.
31 Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘What Makes Terrorism Tick?’, 142-45; Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychol-
ogy of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 74-76; Kruglanski et al., ‘Fully Committed’, 331-57.
32 Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 75-76.
33 Ilardi, ‘Interviews with Canadian Radicals’, 717-18.
34 Kruglanski and Orehek, ‘The Role of the Quest’, 163.
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provide a clear sense of identity (‘you’re not Dutch or Moroccan, but a 
Muslim’) and a militant purpose (‘you must defend your religion’).35
The clearest and most consequential signif icance quest among Hof-
stadgroup participants was the one that Van Gogh’s future murderer 
underwent. The killer himself made this very clear in a farewell letter he 
wrote to his family: ‘It has not eluded you that I have changed since the 
death of my mother. In the wake of her death I have undertaken a search 
to uncover the truth. […] I have chosen to fulf ill my duty to Allah and to 
trade my soul for paradise’.36 The death of his mother triggered a cognitive 
opening that set Van Gogh’s killer on a quest for answers that led him, in 
rapid succession, to embrace fundamentalist, radical, and extremist inter-
pretations of Islam.37 Ultimately, his desire to be a ‘true’ Muslim resulted 
in the belief that blasphemers should be killed and that it was his personal 
duty to carry out the punishment, thus restoring some of the signif icance 
lost by the Prophet Muhammad at the hands of Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali.
The partial autobiography written by the individual who tried to reach 
Chechnya in 2003 and who videotaped a threat to the Dutch public in 
2005 reveals that he too experienced a signif icance quest. In a revealing 
passage, he states:
[o]n the Internet, I went looking for answers about Islam, I looked at 
websites belonging to Hamas and later I discovered al-Qaeda. I no longer 
watched gruesome images [of Muslim suffering], I had seen enough. 
Now I went looking for answers; ‘how should a Muslim react to all this 
injustice?’38
35 Cottee, ‘Jihadism as a Subcultural Response’, 731, 738; Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Violent Radicaliza-
tion in Europe’, 800; Loza, ‘The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism’, 150; McCauley and 
Moskalenko, Friction, 85-88; Mullins, ‘Iraq Versus Lack of Integration’, 119; Roy, ‘Euro-Islam’, 
28-30, 36-38.
36 ‘Het is jullie niet ontgaan dat ik sinds het overlijden van mijn moeder veranderd ben. Ik heb 
sinds haar overlijden een zoektocht ondernomen om de waarheid te achterhalen. […] Ik heb 
ervoor gekozen om mijn plicht tegenover Allah te vervullen en mijn ziel in te ruilen voor het 
Paradijs.’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4040-41; Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld 
Van Mohammed B.’
37 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 145-59.
38 ‘Op het Internet, ging ik op zoek naar antwoorden over de Islam, ik keek op websites van 
Hamas en later ontdekte ik die van Al-Qaida. Ik keek niet meer naar gruwelijke beelden, ik had 
genoeg gezien. Nu ging ik op zoek naar antwoorden; “hoe dient een moslim te reageren op al 
deze onrechtvaardigheid?”’: A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 11.
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The desire for vengeance, according to Kruglanski et al., focuses on re-
storing an individual or group’s loss of signif icance.39 The quest to restore 
signif icance to Muslims affected by armed conflict, and to attain status 
as a ‘true’ Muslim in the process, would play a key role in this individual’s 
behavior throughout the 2002-2005 existence of the group.
With regard to the broader group, signif icance quests drew participants 
to the group and motivated their continued presence. Numerous individuals 
were searching for the ‘true’ or ‘right’ interpretation of Islam and were able 
to address such questions within the group.40 Groen and Kranenberg’s 
interviews with female Hofstadgroup participants show that at least some of 
these young women were drawn to radical Islam by a search for identity and 
that, more generally, they were exploring what roles women were allowed 
or expected to fulf ill in jihad.41 Lastly, the various recent converts in the 
group’s ranks are also considered to have undergone signif icance quests 
around the time of their involvement, as conversion to a religion suggests a 
search for meaning and answers to the larger questions of life and death.42 
Indeed, one convert described how the desire to become a ‘perfect Muslim’ 
brought about the adoption of jihadist beliefs, which this individual saw as 
representing ‘true’ Islam.43
Many Hofstadgroup participants wanted to deepen their understanding 
of their faith and to ascertain what it meant to be a Muslim in a time when 
across the globe large numbers of co-religionists were affected by armed 
conflict. The sense of injustice, the perception that Western nations and 
‘apostate’ Muslims were responsible for this state of affairs, and the avail-
ability of ideological justif ications for violence, both online and within the 
group, created a context in which signif icance quests led to an increased 
likeliness of involvement in extremism and even terrorism. For the group’s 
most militant participants, the significance quest concept suggests that the 
(intended) use of terrorism stemmed in part from their desire to become 
‘true’ Muslims and to restore some of the signif icance they perceived their 
co-religionists and the faith as a whole had lost at the hands of Western 
military interventions in Muslim countries and the actions of blasphemers 
like Van Gogh.
39 Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization’, 73-74.
40 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA04/21: 1593-94, 1604-605, 1612-613; VERD: 19849, 
19917-918, 19935, 19945, 20004, 20012-13, 20225, 20242; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 208; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 1.
41 Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 18, 65.
42 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4084, 4145, 177; VERD: 20461, 20518-519.
43 ‘perfecte moslim’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2.
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These f indings complement the conclusion of Chapter 7 that strategic 
and organizational rationales for the group’s planned and perpetrated acts 
of terrorism were largely absent. The signif icance quest concept suggests 
that these acts are better understood as distinctly personal in origin. They 
resembled what McCormick labels the ‘expressionist’ tradition of terrorism; 
rooted in a nineteenth-century philosophy of revolutionary violence, it sees 
the use of violence as a means of personal expression and redemption, rather 
than as a means for achieving political objectives.44 The Hofstadgroup’s 
most militant participants were looking to restore significance lost by them-
selves and their co-religionists, and in the process solidify their own sense 
of identity and purpose, rather than aiming to achieve strategic goals.45
Several publications on the Hofstadgroup raise identity-related alienation 
as a possible explanation for the adoption of radical and extremist views by 
the group’s participants.46 It also features prominently in the autobiography 
of a young Dutch Muslim who was arrested on terrorism-related charges in 
September 2004.47 Although not part of the Hofstadgroup, his background 
and convictions were similar to those who were, suggesting that identity-
related alienation could have played a role in the Hofstadgroup. The available 
empirical evidence, however, paints a different picture. It is clear that some 
participants strongly identif ied with an imagined worldwide community 
of believers, an association that superseded their national identities.48 But 
there is simply insuff icient evidence to suppose that this self-perception 
as a member of the global ummah stemmed from identity-related issues.
Only one explicit reference to identity-related alienation was encoun-
tered. It stems from a chat session in which one of the men who traveled to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan in 2003 reprimanded a chat-partner for indicat-
ing she struggled with reconciling her Moroccan heritage and her Dutch 
upbringing. Such problems were irrelevant, according to the traveler, as 
she should not see herself as Moroccan or Dutch but as Muslim.49 While 
it may be argued that his reply signif ied his own struggles with a lack of 
44 McCormick, ‘Terrorist Decision Making’, 477.
45 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
46 Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy, Strijders Van Eigen Bodem, 61-62, 218-28, 247; Buruma, Murder 
in Amsterdam, 121-22; Spruyt, ‘Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam’, 320-21; Transnational 
Terrorism Security & the Rule of Law Project, ‘The “Hofstadgroep”’, 12.
47 Kaddouri, Lach Met De Duivel, 24, 28, 35.
48 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 99, 163; 01/17: 4128, 18410; AHA05/22: 2228; Van 
San, Sieckelinck, and De Winter, Idealen Op Drift, 46-48; Erkel, Samir, 48; Peters, ‘De Ideologische 
En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, 4, 6, 16. 
49 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHD08/37: 8519.
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belonging, there is no actual evidence to support this possibility. In lieu of 
clear evidence to the contrary, identity-related alienation does not appear 
to offer an explanation for involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
9.4 The terrorist personality or profile
Another line of inquiry at the individual-level of analysis questions whether 
there is a particular ‘terrorist personality’. This immediately raises objec-
tions on a conceptual level, as ‘terrorist’ is not a singular or clearly def ined 
typology. Terrorists fulf ill a variety of roles, adhere to different ideological 
convictions, and come together in numerous organizational structures, 
ranging from strict hierarchies to loosely constituted networks.50 It is 
therefore likely that, as Victoroff writes, ‘any effort to uncover the “terrorist 
mind” will more likely result in uncovering a spectrum of terrorist minds’.51 
In light of these considerations it comes as little surprise that attempts to 
compose a distinct terrorist personality profile have floundered.52 Personal-
ity factors alone simply do not offer a credible explanation for why some 
people become involved in terrorist groups and political violence.
Neither does an examination of terrorists’ backgrounds reveal a 
distinctive prof ile; socioeconomic, demographic, or otherwise.53 Writ-
ing of terrorists in the 1980s, McCauley and Segal characterized them as 
mostly male, mostly young, predominantly from middle-class families, 
and usually in possession of at least some university education.54 These 
characteristics are too generic to offer explanations for involvement in 
terrorism. Similar research on 21st-century jihadists has likewise failed 
to produce a prof ile specif ic enough to have much explanatory value.55 
In his study of 336 European jihadists, Bakker concludes that ‘there is 
50 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 35-36; Horgan, ‘From Prof iles to Pathways’, 84, 86; Horgan, 
‘Understanding Terrorist Motivation’, 110; Ligon et al., ‘Putting the “O” in VEOs’, 110-17; Victoroff, 
‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 5-7.
51 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 7.
52 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 35-36; Horgan, ‘Understanding Terrorist Motivation’, 110; 
Horgan, Divided We Stand, 79; Hudson, ‘The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism’, 9, 60; Merari 
et al., ‘Personality Characteristics’, 96-97.
53 Nevertheless, the appeal of prof iles is such that their use in a law enforcement setting has 
continued. See, for instance: Eijkman, ‘Has the Genie Been Let out of the Bottle?’, 1-21.
54 McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 332.
55 Silber and Bhatt, ‘Radicalization in the West’, 23, 57; Porter and Kebbell, ‘Radicalization in 
Australia’, 226-27; Merari et al., ‘Personality Characteristics’, 90-91.
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no standard jihadi terrorist’.56 The individuals in his sample were mostly 
single males who were not particularly young, often hailed from the lower 
socioeconomic strata, and often had a criminal record.57 In similar work, 
Sageman found that the jihadists he studied mostly led middle-class exist-
ences, a contrast with Bakker’s work that adds further diversity to the 
prof ile of the ‘average’ jihadist.58
Recognizing the heterogeneity of terrorists’ backgrounds, several efforts 
have been made to differentiate between ‘typical’ members of jihadist 
groups based on their motivations for involvement instead.59 Nesser dis-
tinguishes between idealistic and militant ‘entrepreneurs’, their equally 
ideologically motivated and loyal ‘protégés’ who occupy junior leadership 
positions, the ‘misf its’ who are motivated more by personal problems 
than ideological commitment, and ‘drifters’ who become involved more 
or less through chance.60 More recent empirical work on the Provisional 
IRA has disaggregated data on terrorists’ backgrounds based on the roles 
or functions they performed within that organization.61 One such study 
found that younger members were more likely to be involved in violent 
front-line activities.62 While these important efforts draw attention to the 
various roles that exist within terrorist organizations, they are not specif ic 
enough to provide an explanation for involvement based on particular 
personality characteristics.
Some researchers have looked at personality characteristics as predispos-
ing risk factors for involvement in terrorism.63 Aggressiveness, for instance, 
has been linked to an increased likelihood of involvement in criminal vio-
lence.64 Della Porta found prior experience with using violence for political 
means to be one of the most important factors in the backgrounds of Italian 
terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s.65 Several authors argue that terrorism 
56 Bakker, ‘Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists’, 143.
57 Ibid., 140-42.
58 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 73-74.
59 Nesser, ‘Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe’, 87-114; Venhaus, ‘Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda’, 
8-11.
60 Nesser, ‘Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe’, 92-94.
61 Bloom, Gill, and Horgan, ‘Tiocfaid Ár Mná’, 67-70; Gill and Horgan, ‘Who Were the Volun-
teers?’, 451-53.
62 Gill and Horgan, ‘Who Were the Volunteers?’, 451-52.
63 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 15-16, 36; Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 100; Horgan, 
‘From Prof iles to Pathways’, 84-85; Hudson, ‘The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism’, 60; 
Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic’, 27.
64 Silke, Terrorism, 67-68; Taylor, ‘Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?’, 125.
65 Della Porta, ‘Recruitment Processes’, 313.
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might be especially attractive to highly authoritarian individuals.66 People 
for whom honor is an important value are more likely to favor an aggressive 
response to perceived external threats.67 Alternatively, individuals with 
a higher preference for social inequality (social-dominance orientation) 
and hierarchical social relations are more likely to hold negative attitudes 
towards out-groups which, in turn, might signify a lower threshold to using 
violence or seeing its use as legitimate.68
Other characteristics that could potentially heighten the likeliness of 
involvement in terrorism are prejudice,69 youth and immaturity,70 a desire 
for action, glory, adventure or the thrill of war and violence,71 the lack of a 
clear sense of purpose,72 impatience with words or a dissatisfaction with the 
eff icacy of political activities,73 and a desire for status.74 Horgan also notes 
anger or alienation, identif ication with victims of injustice, and the belief 
that violence is not inherently immoral.75 Doosje et al. add that personal 
uncertainty with regard to self and worldviews, and perceived intergroup 
threat can contribute to support for a radical belief system.76 Some scholars 
argue that altruism should also be counted among these characteristics, 
as terrorists are liable to view their own actions as the selfless promotion 
of a common good.77 Finally, Pedahzur et al. f ind that suicide terrorism is 
partly motivated by fatalism.78
The literature indicates that there is no such thing as a terrorist personal-
ity or prof ile. These f indings once again underline the fallacy of seeing 
66 Taylor, The Fanatics, 70-71; Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, ‘Terrorism’, 544; McCauley 
and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups’, 333.
67 Barnes et al., ‘My Country, My Self ’, 2-4, 19.
68 Levin et al., ‘Social Dominance and Social Identity in Lebanon’, 253-55; Pratto et al., ‘Social 
Dominance Orientation’, 741-58.
69 Taylor, The Fanatics, 68-69.
70 Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 100-01; Locicero and Sinclair, ‘Terrorism and Terrorist 
Leaders’, 236, 242.
71 Bartlett and Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence’, 14-15; Cottee and Hayward, ‘Terrorist (E)Mo-
tives’, 966-69; Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Political Terrorism’, 385-88; Ilardi, ‘Interviews with 
Canadian Radicals’, 719-20; Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic’, 27.
72 Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman, ‘Terrorism’, 544-45.
73 Horgan, ‘From Prof iles to Pathways’, 85; McCauley and Segal, ‘Social Psychology of Terrorist 
Groups’, 333.
74 Bartlett and Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence’, 15; McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 62-64.
75 Horgan, ‘From Prof iles to Pathways’, 84-85.
76 Doosje, Loseman, and Van den Bos, ‘Determinants of Radicalization of Islamic Youth’, 587, 
589-91.
77 Silke, Terrorism, 68-70; Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg, ‘Altruism and Fatalism’, 408-09.
78 Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg, ‘Altruism and Fatalism’, 409.
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terrorists as people who are somehow distinct in terms of psychology, 
mental illness, or character. However, the potential relevance of personality 
characteristics for understanding involvement in terrorism should not be 
ruled out altogether. There may be predisposing risk factors that increase 
the likeliness, however slightly, of certain individuals becoming involved 
in terrorism.
Several f indings stand out which suggest that personality character-
istics had a role to play in inf luencing the behavior of several leading 
Hofstadgroup participants. The clearest and most important of these is Van 
Gogh’s murderer’s history of violent behavior. In June 2000, this individual 
was detained after having been involved in a bar f ight. A year later, he 
displayed threatening behavior to off icers who visited his parental home 
on a matter related to his sister. In July 2001, he stabbed a policeman in 
an Amsterdam park and then threw the knife at another off icer. These of-
fenses resulted in a sentence of twelve weeks’ imprisonment. In May 2004, 
another incident involving Van Gogh’s future assailant was registered; 
this time he had threatened to kill a social services employee. Finally, on 
24 September of the same year, he was arrested for aggressive behavior 
towards police off icers after having been caught using public transport 
without a valid ticket.79
None of these observations form a clinical diagnosis of an aggressive 
predisposition. Yet it is striking that this person is the only Hofstadgroup 
participant who had such an extensive history of violent behavior and the 
only one to have committed an act of premeditated aggression.80 Although 
it is hard to evaluate their accuracy, there are also several descriptions 
of Van Gogh’s murderer by former colleagues, friends, and other group 
participants that paint him as someone who could be short-tempered 
and who was prone to (verbally) aggressive outbursts.81 Furthermore, the 
professionals who sought to examine him at the PBC speculated that he may 
have suffered from an aggression disorder.82 At the very least, his history 
of violent behavior showed him to be an individual who could match the 
79 Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, ‘Toezichtsrap-
port Met Betrekking Tot Mohammed B.’, 12-14; Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’
80 Although he was not the only participant to have previously engaged in violent behavior: 
Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 109.
81 Alberts et al., ‘De Wereld Van Mohammed B.’; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 
18415-16; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 2, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2; Chorus and Olgun, 
Broeders, 19-20; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 141; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal 
Interview 1’, 5.
82 ‘Mohammed Bleef Gesloten Boek in Observatiekliniek’.
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intention to use violence with a proven capability to do so. It is likely that 
this disposition contributed to his ability to commit murder.
One of the men who traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan was clearly 
influenced by a longing for adventure, excitement, and a boyish fascina-
tion with weapons. The descriptions of his experiences that he gave to 
others frequently revolved around his self-described expertise with various 
weapons, the interesting people he met, and the hardships he had to endure; 
from vigorous physical training to diets that allegedly included eating tree 
bark.83 Based on the degree of self-aggrandizement in his chat conversa-
tions with others, it also seems clear that this person sought and enjoyed the 
status of being (seen as) a warrior for his faith.84 Likewise, an interviewee 
described a longing for adventure and romantic notions of what it meant 
to participate in jihad as partly motivating his attraction to Salaf i-Jihadism 
and his involvement in the group. He also reflected that he had been driven 
by ‘youthful naiveté’.85
While not so much a personality characteristic as an element of some-
one’s personal background, data suggests that being a recent convert made 
at least some participants more susceptible to adopting extremist views. 
As newcomers to Islam, converts’ lack of knowledge about their religion 
appears to have made them more likely to see the group’s ‘born Muslims’ as 
sources of religious authority, especially when they had (some) command of 
Arabic.86 Two f inal ‘predisposing risk factors’ found among a larger number 
of Hofstadgroup participants, were identif ication with the victims of 
perceived injustice, and the belief that violence is not inherently immoral.87
None of the personality characteristics described in the previous 
paragraphs preordained these individuals’ future participation in the 
Hofstadgroup. Still, personality characteristics appear to have played a 
secondary, supportive role in bringing about involvement. That contribution 
was to make those who had these characteristics more likely to become 
83 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHA05/22: 2166, 2175-76; AHD08/37: 8595-97, 8618-619, 
8635-636, 8768-769, 8774-775, 8880, 8919, 8929-931; AHD09/38: 9056.
84 Ibid., AHA05/22: 2166; AHD08/37: 8571, 8593-95, 8635, 8716, 8767-768, 8773, 8880, 8919, 8928; 
AHD09/38: 9048-49, 9054-56.
85 ‘jeugdige naïviteit’: Former Hofstadgroup Participant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 9-10.
86 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 5, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 2-3.
87 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 3, 5-8; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 6; De 
Graaf, Gevaarlijke Vrouwen, 258; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 131; AHA04/21: 1666; 
01/13: 163; AHB01/25: 3166-68; GET: 4128, 18116; De Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews and Friendship’, 
385; Erkel, Samir, 65-67; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 18-21, 68-70, 169-70; Peters, ‘De 
Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling’, appendix: Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald 
door Mohammed B., 33; Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 216, 227.
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interested in radical or extremist interpretations of Islam, the company of 
like-minded individuals and, in some cases, involvement in acts of terrorism.
9.5 The role of emotions: anger
Emotions, in particular anger, have played a background role in many of 
the explanations discussed over the past several chapters. The f inal two 
sections of this chapter delve deeper into how they can influence involve-
ment in terrorism. It does so by highlighting two emotional states that the 
literature earmarks as being especially relevant; frustration-induced anger 
and fear of death.
Aggressive behavior can be instrumental or emotional. In the f irst case, 
aggression is consciously chosen as the means to achieve certain ends; in 
the latter, aggression is brought on by anger which in turn is a response 
to insult, physical pain, or frustration.88 Anger is frequently encountered 
as a (contributing) factor in explanations for involvement in terrorism, 
particularly in the shape of a personal grievance and a desire for revenge.89 
Of the triggers of anger, it is the link between frustration and aggression 
in particular that has become a frequently encountered explanation for 
terrorism and political violence. In its original incarnation, frustration-
aggression theory held that frustration occurs when an individual’s expec-
tancy of reward is thwarted, prompting aggression towards the source of 
that thwarting. However, if, for instance, fear of punishment makes such a 
course of action ill-advised, the intended aggression may also be displaced 
onto substitutes.90
Frustration-aggression theory has found its way into numerous explana-
tions for political violence, such as Gurr’s thesis that deprivation can lead to 
rebellion through the activation of the frustration-aggression mechanism.91 
Despite its popularity, the theory has also attracted considerable criticism, 
most notably based on the straightforward observation that virtually eve-
ryone experience frustrations but only very few people engage in violence 
because of it.92 This has led Berkowitz to propose a modif ication of the 
88 McCauley, ‘Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism’, 7-8, 16; Taylor, The Fanatics, 
4-6.
89 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 13-18; Merari, ‘Psychological Aspects of Suicide Ter-
rorism’, 107.
90 Berkowitz, ‘Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis’, 60-61.
91 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 9.
92 Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’, 19; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 54-56.
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original theory which stresses the importance of situational and personal 
factors in bringing about an actual aggressive response to frustration, no-
tably the degree to which the frustrating event is perceived as unpleasant, 
deliberate, and personal.93 As it is largely subjective whether frustration 
leads to aggression, the presence of relative deprivation as an explanatory 
variable can be diff icult to ascertain objectively.
Anger forms a key explanatory variable when accounting for the be-
havior of the group’s most militant participants. Consider the vicariously 
experienced insult and pain in one future participant’s reaction to what 
he saw as the injustices being perpetrated against Muslims in places like 
Chechnya and Palestine:
[W]hy is a Muslim casualty worth less than a non-Muslim casualty? […] 
Why do [the U.S. and Europe] only attack the Muslim world? […] [E]ach 
time on television when they called the perpetrators of the attacks of 
11 September terrorists, I always shouted at the television: ‘You are the 
terrorists!’ […] [T]he oppression, that gripped me, many videos were 
available, from babies with a hole of 10 cm in their stomach because a 
bullet came out there, to children who were taken from under the rubble, 
horrible things that were done with women, it was never warriors that I 
saw, the innocent were the target, they were hit.94
The desire to address these injustices by meting out vengeance to those he 
held responsible remained this person’s predominant motivation through-
out his involvement with the Hofstadgroup.95 But his aggression was also 
fed by what appears to have been a personal vendetta against the state 
institutions that had monitored, arrested, and imprisoned him, frequently 
in what he experienced as a hard-handed and humiliating fashion.96 This 
may explain why this individual appeared to be conducting reconnaissance 
93 Berkowitz, ‘Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis’, 60, 62, 71.
94 ‘waarom is een moslim dode minder waard dan een niet-moslim dode?’, ‘waarom vallen ze 
alleen de islamitische wereld aan?’, ‘elke keer als ze op de televisie de plegers van de aanslagen 
van 11 september terroristen noemde, schreeuwde ik altijd naar de televisie: “Jullie zijn ter-
roristen” […] de onderdrukking, dat greep mij aan, veel video’s waren er te zien, van baby’s 
die een gat van 10 cm in hun buik hebben omdat daar een kogel uit is gekomen, kinderen die 
vanonder de puin werden gehaald, verschrikkelijke dingen die met vrouwen werden gedaan, 
het waren nooit strijders die ik zag, de onschuldige waren het doelwit, zij werden getroffen’: 
A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4-5, 8-9.
95 Ibid., 11-12; Erkel, Samir, 227; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
96 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 29; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie Uit 
Strafdossier’; Erkel, Samir, 199-200, 206-08, 218-19, 227-28, 240-41.
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of the AIVD headquarters in 2004 and why he appeared interested in plan-
ning attacks against the same organization in 2005.97 It also f its with a 
police intelligence report earmarked as ‘reliable’ which indicated that upon 
his release in early 2005 this participant was driven to rectify the ‘1-0’ in 
the unbelievers favor.98 Essentially, his aggression appears to have been 
motivated by a desire to avenge both the injustices suffered by Muslims 
worldwide and the affronts he had suffered personally.
Aggression brought on by insult-induced anger appears the most likely 
explanation for what triggered the murder of Van Gogh. The assailant’s 
discovery of religious injunctions that mandated him to kill blasphemers 
occurred in the summer of 2004.99 The Van Gogh production of Hirsi Ali’s 
movie Submission, part 1 aired on 29 August and was met with revulsion 
and anger by people in and around the Hofstadgroup, precisely because it 
was considered blasphemous.100 As one participant reflected on the murder 
during questioning; ‘I think that […] Van Gogh apparently hurt [the killer] so 
much that this happened. This speaks of revenge’.101 It seems likely that Van 
Gogh was killed not just because he had violated the murderer’s religious 
beliefs, but deeply insulted him in the process.
Within the broader Hofstadgroup there were a number of people for 
whom anger factored into bringing about their initial involvement. For 
some, this anger was a response to the perceived persecution of Muslims 
similar to the example given above, triggering a search for answers which 
ultimately led to the adoption of extremist ideas and to making the ac-
quaintance of like-minded individuals.102 Others were angered by Dutch 
imams’ unwillingness to address questions related to the legitimacy of 
violent jihad or to discuss the wars taking place in Muslim countries. 
Frustrated by what they saw as cowardice, these individuals looked for 
alternative sources of religious authority, f inding it online and within the 
Hofstadgroup.103 Anger also contributed to sharper in-group/out-group 
97 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/01: 43-45; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, 
REL00: 46-56; NOVA, ‘Informatie AIVD En Politie Uit Strafdossier’.
98 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘Piranha’, REL00: 29.
99 Peters, ‘Dutch Extremist Islamism’, 155-56.
100 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 23-24; Dienst Nationale Re-
cherche, ‘RL8026’, 01/13: 74, 161; AHA04/21: 1324-30; Erkel, Samir, 223.
101 ‘Ik denk dat […] van Gogh hem blijkbaar zoveel pijn heeft gedaan dat dit is gebeurd. Hier 
spreekt wraak uit.’: Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, VERD: 20231.
102 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 163.
103 De Koning, ‘Changing Worldviews and Friendship’, 385, 387; Former Hofstadgroup Partici-
pant 3, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 7-9; A[.], ‘Deurwaarders’, 4-6; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 1, 
‘Personal Interview 2’, 11-12; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4018.
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distinctions; the aforementioned individuals came to feel a strong disdain 
for ‘mainstream’ Salaf ism and several individuals came to hate the Dutch 
authorities after being arrested and imprisoned.104
Anger played an important role in bringing about involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup and contributed to (planned) acts of terrorism. As an explana-
tory factor, anger also underlines the need to qualify the role that beliefs 
play in these processes. The individual who wanted to go to Chechnya was 
guided by a sense of idealism; a desire to help what he saw as the victims 
of oppression. Although his adoption of Salaf i-Jihadist beliefs gave him 
a religious vocabulary in which to express and justify that desire, it was 
his anger at perceived mistreatment that initially sparked his interest in 
militancy and it remained a factor of influence throughout his involve-
ment in the group. While data pertaining to the role of anger is limited 
to a relatively small number of participants, its inf luence among those 
individuals was considerable.
9.6 Mortality salience
Terror Management Theory holds that thinking about the f inality of life 
(‘mortality salience’) can give rise to considerable existential anxiety (‘ter-
ror’), and motivate people to look for ways of relieving these fears by imbuing 
their existence with meaning.105 Religion and its promise of life-after-death 
is one way in which people can alleviate such stress. But worldly ideologies 
or straightforward membership of a group can also fulf ill this function 
by making individuals part of something larger than themselves or by 
providing them with an opportunity to obtain a degree of immortality by 
contributing to something that will outlast their death. Terrorist groups’ 
trumpeting of clear ideological goals and a righteous cause, as well as 
their ability to offer members a chance to live on in communal memory 
as martyrs and the promise of a place in heaven, can make them powerful 
beacons to those looking for existential meaning.106
104 Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad, 215; Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 147, 183; Former 
Hofstadgroup Participant 1, ‘Personal Interview 1’, 4.
105 Dechesne et al., ‘Literal and Symbolic Immortality’, 722-34; Pyszczynski, Motyl, and Abdol-
lahi, ‘Righteous Violence’, 14.
106 McBride, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 561-65; Cottee and Hayward, ‘Terrorist (E)Motives’, 965-66, 
973-74; Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘What Makes Terrorism Tick?’, 143-44.
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Mortality salience has been shown to lead to heightened esteem for an 
individual’s own group, culture, and ideology.107 This is directly related to 
such groups’ ability to lower the fear of death by providing their members 
with meaning and signif icance. Conversely, mortality salience can lead to 
heightened hostility towards out-groups and alternative ideologies, as their 
existence competes with, and thus undermines, the ability to the in-group 
or a particular ideology to alleviate the fear of death.108 Mortality salience 
may increase support for violent measures against out-groups perceived to 
be threatening.109 An interesting aspect of mortality salience in the context 
of involvement in terrorism is that it can establish a feedback loop that traps 
members in loyalty to both the cause and the group. As participation in acts 
of terrorism increases the chance of death, existential anxiety is renewed, 
leading to a stronger focusing on the group and its ideology to alleviate this 
stress, thereby prolonging involvement in terrorism and prompting the next 
round of existential anxiety.110
Several participants feared punishments in an afterlife.111 Those who 
experienced such anxieties appear to have become more closely tied to 
the beliefs they thought would save them from the tortures of hell. In a 
telling example, one female participant told police off icers that during 
her involvement in the group she experienced a period of great anxiety 
concerning the right interpretation of Islam. She was shocked by the ex-
tremist interpretation promulgated within the group, especially as it meant 
denouncing her own family as apostates. At the same time, she worried that 
it might actually represent ‘true’ Islam and that her failure to uphold such 
views would lead to terrible punishments in the afterlife.112 Although she 
eventually disengaged from the group, these existential fears initially tied 
her more closely to the group and its extremist views.113
It was not simply a fear of what an afterlife might hold that influenced 
the behavior of some Hofstadgroup participants. The obverse also applied. 
In at least one case, a participant was motivated to become a ‘true’ Muslim 
not just to avoid eternal punishment, but to garner eternal reward. In 
107 Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘Psychological Factors’, 11.
108 Pyszczynski, Motyl, and Abdollahi, ‘Righteous Violence’, 14-15.
109 Mandel, ‘The Role of Instigators’, 6; Silke, Terrorism, 71-72.
110 McBride, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’, 567-68.
111 A[.], ‘Deurwaarders Van Allah’, 7; Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4041; 
Groen and Kranenberg, Women Warriors, 39-40; Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal 
Interview 2’, 2; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’.
112 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, GET: 4020, 4028, 4030, 4050-51.
113 Ibid., 4028-32, 4051.
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addition to fear of hell there was the desire to gain a place in paradise.114 
This desire for personal salvation was also a factor in the acts of terrorism 
planned and perpetrated by the group’s militant inner circle. Van Gogh’s 
assailant and the individual who recorded a threatening video message in 
2005 both stated that their actions were driven by the desire to avoid god’s 
displeasure and to attain a place in paradise.115 Fear of death and a longing 
for paradise were powerful and distinctly personal existential motives 
underlying several participants’ involvement process and, in some cases, 
the planning or perpetration of acts of terrorism.
9.7 Conclusion
A f irst clear conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that there is no 
current empirical basis to assume that major psychopathology or mental 
health issues more generally offer a viable explanation for Hofstadgroup 
participants’ behavior. Neither was there data to suggest that identity-
related alienation formed an explanation for involvement. Quests to gain 
or restore both personal and communal signif icance, on the other hand, 
appear to have been a crucial element driving participation at the individual 
level of analysis. They led to political and religious awakenings, the desire 
to become a ‘true’ Muslim and, in some cases, the wish to avenge personal 
or communally experienced ‘signif icance loss’ through violence. This con-
cept suggests that the group’s planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism 
were a form of personal expression rather than grounded in strategic or 
organizational rationales.
The discussion then turned to the role of personality characteristics. It is 
questionable whether there is such a thing as a ‘terrorist prof ile’. However, 
research does indicate that certain predisposing risk factors may increase 
the likeliness of involvement in terrorism. Applied to the Hofstadgroup, 
this analytical perspective highlighted a keenness for adventure, identif ica-
tion with victims of perceived injustice, and, in the case of Van Gogh’s 
future assailant, a history of violent behavior. Predisposing risk factors 
that played a supportive role in explaining what made at least some of the 
Hofstadgroup’s participants more susceptible to adopt extremist views and 
to plan or perpetrate acts of terrorism.
114 Former Hofstadgroup Participant 4, ‘Personal Interview 2’, 2.
115 Dienst Nationale Recherche, ‘RL8026’, AHB03/27: 4041; NOVA, ‘Videotestament Samir A.’; 
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For some participants, frustration-induced anger influenced their initial 
involvement process. Unable to get satisfactory answers to their questions 
about jihad-related topics at their mosques, some of these young men and 
women became dissatisf ied with ‘mainstream’ Islam and were drawn 
towards venues where they could discuss the themes they were interested 
in, such as Hofstadgroup gatherings. Anger also features prominently in 
the acts of violence that were plotted or undertaken by the group’s most 
extremist participants. The individual who tried to reach Chechnya in 
2003 was angered by the perceived injustices suffered by his co-religionists 
around the world, as well as his increasingly antagonistic relationship with 
the Dutch authorities. Likewise, it appears that the immediate trigger for 
the attack on Van Gogh was the anger and hurt that Submission’s release 
provoked in the f ilmmaker’s assailant.
One f inal factor that appears to have influenced at least several Hof-
stadgroup participants was a fear of death and of ending up in hell in 
particular. This formed a powerful existential motive that kept at least 
several participants closely wedded to their extremist beliefs, albeit in at 
least one case for only a brief period of time, as these beliefs were thought 
to offer the best way of avoiding punishments in the afterlife. Fear of 
displeasing their god and, conversely, a desire to attain paradise was also 
a factor in the planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism committed by 
the group’s militant inner-circle. This factor once again underlined the 
distinctly personal, as opposed to strategic or organizational, rationales for 
the use of terrorism found among the Hofstadgroup’s participants.

10 Conclusion
Following the 9/11 attacks, research on terrorism benef ited from an 
inf lux of new researchers and funding. However, almost f ifteen years 
and an untold number of publications later, many aspects of terrorism 
are still poorly understood. That also applies to the focus of this book; 
namely, how and why people become involved in European homegrown 
jihadism. Chief among the various reasons for this state of affairs has 
been the long-standing scarcity of primary-sources-based research. The 
diff iculties involved in accessing (former) terrorists for interviews or us-
ing data gathered by government agencies, has made researchers overly 
reliant on media reporting. A secondary source of information that is 
frequently very succinct, potentially biased, and too often inaccurate; in 
other words, incapable of serving as the main, let alone the only, foundation 
for academic research.
There are dozens of potential explanations for involvement in terrorism. 
Yet the scarcity of primary sources means that most of these have been 
insuff iciently empirically assessed, raising concerns about their validity. 
These issues shaped this book’s methodological approach in two ways. First, 
collecting primary-sources-based data was seen as a prerequisite. Second, 
because no single theoretical perspective on involvement in terrorism could 
count on strong empirical support, a multi-theoretical analytical framework 
was adopted. This second decision also followed from the widely-held 
view that involvement in terrorism is the result of a complex process in 
which a multitude of factors, spread over multiple levels of analysis, play 
a role. Consequently, this book chose to study involvement by combining 
the breadth of existing insights, divided over the structural, group, and 
individual levels of analysis, with extensive primary-sources-based data.
Terrorism, the deliberate use of indiscriminate violence against civil-
ians for propagandistic purposes and psychological effects, comes in many 
forms. This study focused specifically on the ‘homegrown jihadist’ typology 
as it manifested itself in Europe from 2004 onward, most notably with the 
attacks in Madrid that year and London in July 2005. The attacks in Paris 
and Brussels in 2015 and 2016, as well as the large number of Europeans 
who have joined terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq since 2014, have demon-
strated that this form of terrorism continues to be a pan-European security 
threat. Research on European homegrown jihadism is therefore of ongoing 
relevance for policy makers, counterterrorism practitioners, and journalists 
as well as academics. From the European homegrown jihadist typology, 
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one case was selected for in-depth analysis; the Dutch ‘Hofstadgroup’ that 
existed between 2002 and 2005.
Case selection was partly practical; the author was able to gain access 
to the Dutch police f iles on the group and managed to interview several 
former participants, thus addressing the scarcity of primary sources noted 
above. No less important, there are suff icient similarities between the 
Hofstadgroup and the broader European homegrown jihadist trend, as well 
as the European ‘foreign f ighters’ who have left for Syria and Iraq over the 
past few years, to allow the case to inform the wider debate on this typology 
of terrorism. Finally, existing research on the Hofstadgroup reflects the 
issues present in the literature on terrorism remarked on above in that it is 
predominantly based on secondary sources. Work on the Hofstadgroup has 
also been largely descriptive, emphasizing that there is room for research 
on how and why participants became involved that is both empirically 
grounded and theoretically informed in its analysis.
Guiding the research was the following overarching question: What fac-
tors governed the involvement processes of participants in the Hofstadgroup 
during its 2002-2005 existence? The main research question was addressed 
through three subsidiary ones. The analysis turned f irst to structural, then 
group-level, and f inally individual-level explanations for involvement in 
the Hofstadgroup. For each of these levels of analysis, literature reviews 
identif ied existing explanations for involvement in terrorism which were 
then utilized as ‘lenses’ through which to study the empirical data, thus 
allowing relevant explanatory factors and processes to be identif ied. This 
concluding chapter draws together the various analytical strands. It then 
presents academic and policy-relevant implications that are relevant to 
homegrown jihadism more broadly and rounds off the discussion with a 
brief examination of the present study’s limitations and fruitful avenues 
for future research.
10.1 Key findings
Analyzing involvement in the Hofstadgroup using three levels of analysis 
allowed a multifaceted perspective on the participation process to emerge. 
Each level of analysis contained numerous relevant factors and found that 
they fulf illed different roles. Some contributed to the motive for involve-
ment in the group or the use of violence, others enabled this process. Yet 
others were triggers; setting individuals on a path toward participation in 
the group and, in some cases, the planning or perpetration of specif ic acts 
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of terrorism. Furthermore, there was no single, commonly experienced pro-
cess of involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Participants found and remained 
in the group for a variety of reasons. Additionally, the f indings show that 
‘involvement’ took on numerous forms, the majority of which were not 
directly related to the commission of acts of terrorist violence. Crucially, 
the factors governing the involvement processes were heterogeneous in 
nature. Even so, some generalizations can be made.
The structural level of analysis looked at the broader social and political 
context in which involvement in the Hofstadgroup came about. It revealed 
the crucial role of geopolitical events such as the 9/11 attacks and the U.S.-led 
‘War on Terror’ that followed. In many future Hofstadgroup participants, 
these events triggered ‘cognitive openings’ that led them to study the mo-
tives of the terrorists and to scrutinize Western states’ foreign policies. 
These geopolitical events led many participants to become acquainted 
with radical and extremist interpretations of Islam, and contributed to a 
political awakening that, rightly or wrongly, produced a sense of Muslim 
victimization across the globe at the hands of Western imperialists and 
corrupt Middle-Eastern regimes. A sense of vicarious victimization and 
the desire to help and avenge co-religionists in places like Palestine and 
Afghanistan became key motives for some of the group’s most militant 
participants, their desire to travel abroad as foreign f ighters and, later, to 
plan acts of terrorism in the Netherlands.
Structural-level factors were also important as enablers of involvement 
processes and as the likely trigger for the murder of f ilmmaker Theo van 
Gogh by a Hofstadgroup participant. The Internet and its easy access to 
extremist ideology and jihadist ‘role models’ facilitated the adoption of 
radical and pro-violence worldviews. The freedoms offered by the Dutch 
liberal democratic political system made it easy to hold private meetings, to 
access and disseminate radical and extremist views, and to travel abroad. 
Widespread conservative views within the Dutch Muslim community 
‘socially facilitated’ participants’ adoption of fundamentalist and radical 
convictions. Lack of police protection for Van Gogh made him an easy target. 
Finally, the airing of the controversial Islam-critical f ilm Submission, part 1 
that Van Gogh directed, was in all likeliness the structural-level factor that 
triggered the murderer to plan, prepare, and execute his attack.
Contrary to the assumption frequently made by politicians and the 
media, there were no clear indications that socioeconomic inequality played 
a role in motivating involvement in the Hofstadgroup or bringing about 
its adoption of extremist views. Neither did the harsh tone of the Dutch 
debate on integration and Islam feature as an important factor in motivating 
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involvement or sparking a desire to utilize terrorist violence. Participants 
did indeed face discrimination, and even physical violence, based on their 
religious convictions, but these experiences were principally important in 
sustaining rather than motivating their involvement in the group. That the 
Hofstadgroup was not a response to grievances shared by the broader Dutch 
Muslim community was also apparent by its lack of popular support. This 
was not a vanguard movement, but an extremist cell that was as critical of 
its potential supporters as it was of non-Muslim ‘unbelievers’.
The group level of analysis focused specif ically on intra-group dynamics. 
It was able to account for how the Hofstadgroup formed, what kept it to-
gether, and how radical and extremist views were adopted and maintained. 
Preexisting social ties brought like-minded individuals together who were 
then bound by friendship and a shared sense of identity that revolved 
around their interpretation of Islam. Within this setting, social learning 
increased participants’ exposure to views legitimizing and justifying the 
use of violence, strengthening their division of the world into a small group 
of the righteous threatened by a large and hostile out-group of unbelievers 
and apostates. Lectures, interaction with other participants, and exposure 
to jihadist ‘role models’ in and outside of the group were crucial to the 
exploration and adoption of new identities as ‘true’ Muslims. The group’s 
isolationist tendencies increased its cognitive and behavioral influence 
over participants. Peer pressures toward ideological conformity served a 
similar purpose by engendering a degree of ideological homogeneity among 
participants.
A key f inding was that the group-level of analysis was unable to fully 
account for the acts of terrorism that some participants planned or per-
petrated. The motives for these attacks were distinctly personal in origin, 
rather than the result of communal deliberations. This stemmed from the 
peculiar organizational characteristics of the Hofstadgroup and its lack 
of clear leaders in particular. There were numerous authority f igures, but 
none of them tried to be, or were seen as, leaders who could mold the group 
ideologically, organizationally, or operationally. The absence of leaders 
also meant that participants could not in any signif icant sense displace 
their personal responsibility for violence to leaders who had ordered or 
organized attacks. Any impetus for committing an act of violence depended 
predominantly on the initiative and ability of individual participants.
The individual level of analysis studied participants’ biographical 
backgrounds and personal characteristics. It helped explain what trig-
gered involvement processes, what led some participants to consider or 
use terrorism, how those individuals were able to overcome inhibitions to 
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the use of force, and it shed light on what it was that made these particular 
individuals more likely to participate in violence than others. A small 
number of individuals became involved in the Hofstadgroup as a result 
of ‘unfreezing’; the dissolution of everyday commitments or old social 
networks that made them more amenable to making new acquaintances or 
considering new ideas. The majority, however, experienced cognitive open-
ings that prompted a reexamination of previously held beliefs or a search for 
answers to the bigger questions of life, death, and religious identity. Trigger 
events for these cognitive openings were a mix of the geopolitical and the 
personal, but in many cases, they resulted in ‘signif icance quests’; attempts 
to f ind personal meaning in a reorientation on radical or extremist Islam.
A key explanatory factor was found in the concept of fanaticism. Fanati-
cism not only accounted for the central motive in Van Gogh’s murder but was 
specific enough to explain why out of a group of several religious extremists, 
only one acted on those beliefs. The key to this distinction was the personal 
context in which extremist beliefs were adopted. The murderer stood out 
because 1) his life revolved around his beliefs to a degree not seen among 
his compatriots; 2) he infused those beliefs with a distinct apocalyptical 
edge; and 3) he was the most socially isolated of all participants, minimizing 
the influence of countervailing opinions. These f indings do not imply that 
extremist beliefs were absent from the acts of terrorism planned by other 
participants. But they do suggest that in those cases beliefs were less central 
to the motive to commit acts of terrorism.
The inability of beliefs alone to explain either involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup or the planning or perpetration of acts of terrorism by its 
militant inner circle, was a recurring and distinctly important f inding. Even 
Van Gogh’s murderer’s violent actions cannot be entirely explained by his 
fanatical beliefs. The individual level of analysis also revealed the important 
role of cognitive mechanisms in overcoming psychological boundaries to 
the use of violence; namely, dehumanization, the attribution of blame to the 
victims of (intended) violence and the relegation of personal responsibility 
to the highest religious authority. It further pointed to the role of powerful 
emotions in contributing to the motive for violence; anger brought about by 
perceived injustice, disappointment in ‘mainstream’ Islam, the deep hurt 
caused by blasphemy against a beloved religious f igure, and fear of God’s 
displeasure in an afterlife.
This latter point is particularly important in understanding why people 
became involved in the Hofstadgroup, why they adopted and held to 
extremist convictions, and why some of them felt that violence was not 
only justif ied by a personal duty. Fear of ending up in the torments of hell 
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for failure to be a ‘true’ Muslim and its obverse, a desire for the rewards 
of paradise, formed an existential motive that appears to have been at 
the core of at least several participants’ involvement experiences. This 
existential anxiety led to a quest for answers about what it meant to be a 
‘true’ Muslim and, especially among the group’s more militant participants, 
fed the conviction that jihad was a religious duty that could not be forfeited.
The individual-level analysis also uncovered several factors whose rel-
evance lay in their inability to explain involvement processes, in particular 
the concept of radicalization. Its principal shortcoming was the f inding 
that the majority of participants with radical or extremist views did not act 
on them. Similarly, Hofstadgroup participants were not psychopaths and 
there were no diagnosed signs of what could be termed more minor mental 
health problems. Neither did identity-related alienation offer a convincing 
explanation for involvement. The one personality-related factor of relevance 
was the discovery of several predisposing risk factors that appeared to make 
involvement in the group’s extremist inner circle more likely. These were 
adventure seeking, identif ication with victims of perceived injustice, and 
a history of violent behavior.
The f indings outlined in the previous paragraphs address the main 
research question by highlighting those factors that were most important 
to understanding the involvement processes of Hofstadgroup participants. 
But for a fuller understanding of the how and why of involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup, and to appreciate the relevance of these f indings to the 
broader typology of European homegrown jihadism, it is necessary to look 
beyond the f indings themselves to their broader implications. How can this 
study contribute to an understanding involvement in European homegrown 
jihadism?
10.2 Implications for research on European homegrown 
jihadism
To reiterate a general but important f inding, it is striking that even in this 
one group, involvement processes took on a variety of shapes and that 
involvement was not a singular ‘end state’ but meant different things to 
different participants. This heterogeneity underlines the diff iculty of 
generalizing about the factors governing involvement in extremism and 
terrorism.1 Secondly, the f indings emphasize that gaining a comprehensive 
1 For a similar conclusion, see: Geelhoed, Purification and Resistance, 211-12.
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or holistic understanding of involvement in homegrown jihadism requires 
a broad analytical perspective that utilizes multiple levels of analysis. 
No single explanation or level of analysis offered a suff icient account for 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup. From this follows the f irst of seven key 
implications; namely, that the relative importance of particular factors to 
the involvement process is liable to change over time.
10.2.1 The ‘driving force’ of involvement processes is liable to change
The f indings illustrated that the factors which led to involvement in the 
Hofstadgroup were frequently different from those that sustained it, which 
in turn differed from those that triggered some participants to plan or 
actually carry out a terrorist attack. Van Gogh’s murderer, for instance, 
reoriented himself on his beliefs after time spent in prison and the death 
of his mother. His involvement process was sustained and catalyzed by the 
like-minded individuals he met, principally Abu Khaled, whose teachings 
influenced his burgeoning radicalism. The murder itself draws attention to 
yet another set of influential factors; including the killer’s violence-prone 
personality, his belief that murder in the name of his religion was justif ied 
and mandated, and a deep-seated desire to avoid his god’s displeasure and 
achieve a favorable place in the afterlife.
Another participant’s involvement process began after experiencing 
job-market discrimination. Without an internship to complete his studies, 
he had large amounts of time on his hands, some of which he spent at 
his local mosque, talking with people he may otherwise have neglected. 
Through one of those people he was introduced to the Hofstadgroup. Once 
there, it was not the radical or extremist ideas being discussed that bound 
him to the group, but the sense of friendship he experienced. Only after 
becoming involved did he begin to internalize the extremist beliefs that his 
newfound friends propagated. His intention to plan an actual attack was 
predicated on different factors still. One of these was a propaganda video in 
which a Muslim woman who resembled his mother was mistreated by Israeli 
soldiers. Another was the murder of Van Gogh, which this participant saw 
as highly inspirational because it was perpetrated by a close friend. It also 
made him feel it was now his turn to demonstrate commitment to shared 
values and carry out an attack of his own.
Numerous other examples could be given that would illustrate a similar 
process. What they underline is that what could be termed the ‘driving 
force’ behind an individual’s participation process is likely to shift over 
time. For instance, in the second example structural factors (discrimination 
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against people of Moroccan descent) precipitated the involvement process, 
group-level factors sustained it (the social benefits of group membership), 
and a mix of individual and group-level factors (vicarious injustice and 
emulation of role models) contributed to this individual’s desire to plan a 
terrorist attack.
In her research on Italian and German left-wing terrorism, Della Porta 
found that different stages of the involvement process are governed by 
different levels of analysis.2 The present study reiterates this conclusion 
for the European homegrown jihadist typology of terrorism. It adds two 
further points. First, a multicausal, multilevel, and dynamic perspective on 
involvement processes in extremist and terrorist groups is a prerequisite 
for an accurate analysis of how and why participation comes about and 
is sustained. Secondly, even within a single extremist or terrorist group, 
the ‘driving force’ of involvement processes can differ markedly between 
participants. For instance, whereas one individual may be drawn towards 
extremism by geopolitical events, another’s entry in such a milieu may be 
primarily motivated by a personal crisis or preexisting friendships.
10.2.2 Involvement in extremist and terrorist groups takes various 
forms
Not only are involvement processes in general characterized by a continu-
ously shifting emphasis on particular explanatory variables, but the shape 
of these processes is likely to have distinct characteristics that vary between 
individual participants. Research is beginning to place considerable em-
phasis on the variety of roles and positions that members of extremist and 
terrorist groups may occupy.3 Not all participants in such groups are directly 
involved in acts of terrorist violence; in fact, most will be preoccupied with 
questions of logistics, propaganda, or recruitment. Appreciating the variety 
and fluidity of involvement processes even within one particular extremist 
or terrorist group is key to beginning to understand how roles within such 
organizations are allocated.
Indeed, one question raised in the introduction and returned to 
throughout the manuscript, was what differentiated those Hofstadgroup 
participants who used terrorist violence or planned to do so from those 
that did not. Although no conclusive or broadly generalizable answer to 
2 Della Porta, Social Movements, 10.
3 Nesser, ‘Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe’, 87-114; Bloom, Gill, and Horgan, ‘Tiocfaid 
Ár Mná’, 67-70; Gill and Horgan, ‘Who Were the Volunteers?’, 451-53.
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this question was found, the use of a multicausal and multilevel analyti-
cal framework did reveal several noteworthy partial explanations. These 
included the fact that only Van Gogh’s murderer had a history of violent 
behavior, giving him a proven ability to match words with deeds, and that 
he adhered his extremist beliefs more fanatically than his compatriots. 
Particularly strong identif ication with Muslim victims of war across the 
globe and a personal hatred toward elements of the Dutch state were key 
elements setting apart a second individual in the group’s extremist inner 
circle from the majority of participants who (apparently) did not plan to 
use actual violence.
Additionally, this research has highlighted that involvement in extremist 
and terrorist groups should not be seen as having a singular end state or 
form. Not all of those who became involved in the Hofstadgroup actually 
remained a part of it; some chose distance themselves from the group for a 
variety of reasons. Furthermore, those who did remain a part of the group 
displayed varying degrees of commitment to the religious convictions and 
political goals that formed the group’s shared interests and worldview. It 
would be very interesting for future research to look more closely at the 
differences between those participants in extremist groups who do use 
terrorist violence and those who do not.
10.2.3 The nature of the group shapes the involvement experience
A third key implication is that the nature of the group itself directly influ-
ences the involvement experience. Most important in this regard were the 
Hofstadgroup’s lack of ideological and operational leaders, and the virtual 
absence of communal efforts to achieve terrorism-related goals until the 
very end of its existence. There was never a particularly clear or singular 
‘Hofstadgroup ideology’ to which participants were socialized, creating 
a relative tolerance for divergent views. In addition to the Salaf i-Jihadist 
majority, the group also contained ideological extremists who gave it sect-
like qualities and, on the opposite end of the spectrum, a small number 
of participants without clearly radical or extremist religious views or a 
complete lack of interest in religion altogether. Crucially, the absence of 
operational leaders meant that the development of terrorism-related plans 
was ad hoc and highly dependent on the initiative of individual participants.
These characteristics hampered the Hofstadgroup’s development into 
a more ideologically homogeneous and action-oriented entity. It never 
became a structured organization and only began to resemble a loosely 
constituted network by the end of its existence. For the largest part of its 
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2002-2005 existence, it remained a loosely bound group of friends and 
acquaintances, a ‘Bunch of Guys’ in Sageman’s words, spread over several cit-
ies.4 As a result of this organizational ambiguity, Hofstadgroup participants 
were left with a degree of ideological and operational freedom that placed 
a premium on their own initiative. Had participants found themselves in 
an actual organization or network with clear leaders, one that tolerated 
no dissent from a particular worldview, and that communally planned 
and executed terrorist attacks, their involvement experience would have 
been quite different. This f inding suggests that in order to account for how 
and why participation in European homegrown jihadism comes about, the 
characteristics of the group in question form a set of contextual factors that 
cannot be overlooked.
10.2.4 Fanaticism rather than radicalization
This study found that ‘radicalization’ and its frequently implied link be-
tween radical beliefs and radical behavior was unable to provide a satisfac-
tory account for participation in the Hofstadgroup. Primarily, it could not 
explain why of the numerous Salaf i-Jihadist extremists, only a very small 
minority acted or planned to act on those beliefs. Secondly, the f indings 
problematized the linear and deterministic notions found in some older 
radicalization-based thinking. Some participants became involved in the 
group before adopting radical or extremist views, a number of them never 
went beyond ‘merely’ radical views, and several participants disengaged 
even though they had previously held extremist views.
None of which is to say that beliefs are not important to understanding 
involvement in homegrown jihadism. A shared set of core beliefs was the 
basis for the Hofstadgroup’s formation and allowed a dichotomous and 
militant view of the world to take hold. Furthermore, beliefs were crucial 
motivational components of the planned and perpetrated acts of terror-
ism. Just as important was their ability to justify the use of violence. But 
fundamental as beliefs are to understanding involvement in European 
homegrown jihadism, they are clearly incapable of accounting for par-
ticipation in and of themselves. Radicalization has been the preeminent 
explanation for involvement in terrorism for more than a decade. This 
makes its overemphasis on the degree to which radical beliefs can motivate 
violent behavior all the more problematic.
4 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 69.
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For a more accurate understanding of involvement in terrorism to 
emerge, the concept of radicalization needs to be reexamined. An alterna-
tive way of studying the role that extremist beliefs can play in motivating 
terrorist violence was found in Taylor’s concept of fanaticism.5 A crucial 
difference between the concepts of radicalization and fanaticism is that the 
latter is specif ic enough to explain why merely holding extremist beliefs 
is insuff icient to explain the turn to violence. Fanaticism emphasizes the 
role of contextual factors, such as the degree to which extremist beliefs 
are challenged by contradictory points of view, in increasing the likeliness 
that the internalization of such beliefs will result in violent behavior. This 
makes it a theoretically and empirically robust alternative, or addition, 
to ‘radicalization’.
10.2.5 Involvement as personal expression rather than strategic 
calculation
Although terrorism is frequently understood as a form of violence that is 
utilized to achieve specif ic (political) aims, such instrumental or strategic 
considerations were virtually absent among Hofstadgroup participants. 
Instead, the motives underlying the planned and perpetrated acts of ter-
rorism had a distinct personal edge; aff irming the perpetrator’s identity as 
a ‘true’ Muslim, avenging the Muslim community, claiming retribution for 
insults and pain suffered personally, and avoiding god’s displeasure through 
a commitment to violent jihad. This latter point in particular was found to 
have exerted a strong influence on several participants; fear of hell and a 
desire for paradise sustained both involvement in the group and adherence 
to extremist views. These powerful emotions also appeared to factor into 
several inner-circle extremists’ decisions to use terrorist violence. Although 
it arose in part as a response to worldly issues, such as the 9/11 attacks 
and the War on Terror, participation in the Hofstadgroup was primarily 
a vehicle for f inding, embracing, and expressing a newfound identity as 
‘true’ Muslims.
As such, understanding why people become involved in European 
homegrown jihadism, and in preparations for actual attacks, may be less 
about asking what they are hoping to achieve than it is about who or what 
they are hoping to be. This is not to argue that participants such as those 
found in the Hofstadgroup’s militant core never considered strategic is-
sues, because they did. The point is that their desire to ‘do something’ in 
5 Taylor, The Fanatics.
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response to what they perceived to be Western aggression against Muslims 
or the insidious machinations of apostate regimes, was more about taking 
action than about whether or not those actions stood a chance of actually 
achieving something. Provided this f inding can be replicated, it argues for 
a subtle reconsideration of the motives driving participation in European 
homegrown jihadism.
10.2.6 Neither victims nor psychopaths
Terrorists are frequently portrayed as psychopaths or as people who embrace 
violence after becoming victimized, for instance by political oppression, 
socioeconomic inequality, or discrimination. With the exception of dis-
crimination, which played a supportive role in sustaining some participants’ 
involvement in the group and which strengthened their dichotomous 
worldview, none of these factors were found to have influenced involvement 
in the Hofstadgroup. Perhaps most surprising given its prominence in the 
literature, the research found little support for the hypothesis that identity-
related alienation played a signif icant role in motivating or sustaining 
involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Neither did socioeconomic deprivation 
offer a convincing explanation for involvement; the group’s participants 
came from a variety of backgrounds. Only a very small minority could be 
objectively labeled as unemployed or (relatively) uneducated.
Just as it can make intuitive sense to see homegrown jihadists as people 
who have in some way been victimized, it can be comforting to think of 
people who embrace extremist ideas or even participate in terrorist violence 
as psychopaths. Yet the lack of empirical support for such positions found 
in this research, and echoed in the broader literature, should function as 
a caution against this line of reasoning. More generally speaking, these 
results against intuitively convincing but empirically poorly supported 
explanations. Extremism and terrorism are subjects far too complex to 
be adequately explained by the ‘crazy or victimized’ dichotomy. Only 
through nuanced analysis and empirical validation of assumptions can 
our understanding of involvement in this form of political violence be 
signif icantly advanced.
10.2.7 The often-overlooked role of chance
A f inal research-relevant implication centers on the role of chance. In the 
study of war, chance and luck are understood to be factors that can exert 
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a tremendous influence on the development and outcome of conflicts.6 
Within the context of terrorism studies, however, these elements are seldom 
mentioned. This is surprising, as research on the backgrounds of terrorists 
has indicated that happenstance can play an important role in bringing 
about involvement. This study f inds support for this point of view. The 
vast majority of participants did not make a conscious decision to become 
involved in the Hofstadgroup. More often than not their participation came 
about through people they happened to know or meet. The role of such 
chance encounters should also serve to demystify the involvement process. 
Participation in the Hofstadgroup was not a conscious decision made by 
Islamist radicals and extremists with a view toward organizing for violence, 
but frequently a much more unintentional process based on happenstance 
and a tenuous shared commitment to Salaf i-Jihadist views.
10.3 Policy-relevant implications
With regard to policy-relevant implications, the study supports the notion 
that seeing involvement in terrorism as the result of underlying ‘root causes’ 
such as poverty, discrimination, or radicalization is a dead end. No single 
factor has such explanatory potential. By acknowledging the multifaceted 
nature of the involvement process, more options for prevention, or for the 
reintegration of convicted offenders, can be identif ied. By focusing on more 
than radical and extremist beliefs, practitioners can develop interventions 
aimed at other aspects of the involvement process. For instance, the role 
played by the various attractions of group membership suggests not only 
the potential value of taking people from this social environment but also 
the need to provide them with alternatives that similarly offer benef its 
such as camaraderie and a positive self-image.
Another potential avenue for preventing involvement or recidivism is 
taking seriously the perceived injustice and the sense of altruism that drives 
some of these individuals. As factually incorrect or uncomfortable as we 
may f ind the idea that Western intervention in Muslim countries equates 
with a war against Islam that justif ies retaliatory violence, such ideas have 
considerable potential to motivate involvement and for that reason alone 
should be taken seriously. Because of the popularity of the radicalization 
concept, homegrown jihadist groups are frequently understood purely in 
terms of their religious convictions. What the results presented here have 
6 Von Clausewitz, On War, 101, 138-40.
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suggested, is that the motives both for involvement in these groups and the 
commission of acts of terrorism can be distinctly worldly. Real or vicariously 
experienced political grievances tied to events in the Muslim world are a 
key explanatory factor. Interventions, when undertaken early enough, could 
focus on channeling the altruistic desire to help others that sometimes lies 
at heart of these perceptions into non-violent avenues.
Another policy-relevant aspect of this work lies in its use of police f iles as 
primary sources. These f iles contained large amounts of relevant informa-
tion that had not yet been used in prior research on the Hofstadgroup. 
Although using police f iles for research purposes presents its own set of 
challenges, being able to access this material was a prerequisite for coming 
to a more empirically robust understanding of participants’ involvement 
processes. They were thus indispensable to moving beyond the overreliance 
on secondary sources noted earlier as a long-standing issue in research on 
terrorism. It is to be hoped that authorities within and beyond the Neth-
erlands will recognize the potential for mutual benefits when researchers 
are allowed access to such material.
10.4 Limitations and future research
In closing, it is valuable to acknowledge this study’s limitations and the 
various avenues for future research. One particular limitation is that this 
book focused almost exclusively on proximate factors; those directly influ-
encing involvement in the Hofstadgroup. It has largely remained unclear, 
for instance, what underlying factors made this group’s participants more 
likely than other young Dutch Muslims to experience cognitive openings 
that in many cases led to their involvement. Why were others not similarly 
affected by the 9/11 attacks or images of Muslim suffering? Secondly, the 
study focused primarily on the Hofstadgroup itself rather than the broader 
social, cultural, and political environment from which it emerged. There is 
considerable room for research on the role of underlying factors in bringing 
about involvement, as well as the relationship between the Hofstadgroup 
and the broader environment from which it emerged.
The single case-study research design remains this study’s foremost 
limitation. A comparative approach was not taken because the emphasis 
placed on gathering and utilizing primary sources, and the in-depth qualita-
tive nature of the analysis, would then simply not have been feasible within 
any reasonable amount of time. Nevertheless, it is argued that the f indings 
presented in these pages are relevant not just for the Hofstadgroup itself 
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but for the broader typology of European homegrown jihadism it represents 
for several reasons. First of all, the Hofstadgroup was one of several similar 
groups that arose in other European countries from the early 2000s onward. 
Secondly, single case-study research designs are useful for empirically as-
sessing the validity of explanations held to be of general applicability, such 
as ‘radicalization’. By critically and empirically examining numerous com-
monly found explanations for involvement in terrorism, the analysis was 
able to make a contribution to the larger debate about how to understand 
and study involvement in extremist and terrorist groups.
That being said, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to apply 
the multilevel analysis for understanding involvement to a wider selection 
of cases. Comparative research would be useful for distinguishing between 
factors of general relevance to the (European) homegrown jihadist typology 
and those unique to particular cases. As previously noted, such research 
could also usefully focus on what distinguishes those participants of ex-
tremist groups that do use (or plan to use) terrorist violence from those that 
do not. Can differences in their backgrounds, personality characteristics, 
or involvement processes be identif ied that can explain how and why some 
take up violent roles in such groups while others do not?
Another methodological limitation lies in the utilization of multiple 
theories spread over three levels of analysis. While the choice for breadth 
over depth provided a valuable appreciation of the multifaceted nature 
of involvement processes, it arguably did a disservice to the individual 
explanations. After all, many of them are suff iciently nuanced and well 
developed to warrant chapters or even entire studies of their own. Future 
research could turn this emphasis on its head and study particular hypoth-
eses in more depth.
The primary sources utilized here form both a unique strong point and 
a weakness. The police f iles and interviews with former participants in 
particular offered a wealth of detailed information, much of it never before 
utilized in research on the Hofstadgroup. While such primary sources are 
important for reaching an empirically better-supported understanding 
of involvement processes, they also pose several issues. The police f iles in 
particular focused primarily on the participants deemed the most violent, 
leaving many others relatively understudied. Similarly, interviews could 
only be held with the relatively small number of former participants willing 
to talk. The end result of both these issues is that a lot is known about some 
key participants while others remain relatively poorly understood.
A more fundamental issue is that these sources are not freely available, 
hampering the transparency of the claims presented here. Although this 
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issue could not be fully resolved, several measures were taken to minimize 
its impact. First of all, references to the police f iles and interviews were 
complemented with publicly available sources wherever possible. Secondly, 
links to those parts of the police f iles that had been leaked to the press and 
subsequently published online were provided wherever relevant. Finally, 
readers were asked to keep in mind that the use of restricted information 
is quite common in the social sciences. Interview transcripts, for instance, 
are rarely made freely available for reasons of privacy. The primary sources 
used in this study are thus less of an exception with regard to transparency 
than might f irst be apparent.
10.5 Toward a more empirical study of terrorism
Improving our understanding of how and why people become involved 
in European homegrown jihadism and indeed in terrorism more broadly, 
requires three things. The f irst is an analytical approach that recognizes 
involvement as a process in which numerous and interrelated factors, 
spread over multiple levels of analysis, play a role. Moreover, the ‘driving 
force’ of said process is likely to change over time, demanding analytical 
f lexibility in order to account for why people join, why they stay, and why 
some of them perpetrate acts of terrorist violence. The third requirement 
is the use of primary sources that allow the researcher to acquire detailed, 
reliable, and new information on the involvement process. By applying 
these elements to a study of the Dutch Hofstadgroup, this book has aimed to 
make a contribution to a better understanding of this particular typology of 
terrorism. Hopefully, future studies on involvement in homegrown jihadism 
will similarly be able to utilize primary sources and thereby gradually but 
f inally help overcome one of the oldest obstacles to progress in research 
on terrorism.
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